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Since Xi Jinping became the General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) in 2012, he has tightened ideological control on many fronts. Many refer to 
Xi as the ‘new Mao’ and some even claim that he creates a sense of the Cultural 
Revolution (1966-1976). This thesis investigates to what extent the official 
Chinese media has contributed to the formation of such sentiment through the 
under-studied area of mediated confessions. I argue that the latest resurgence of 
mediated confessions is an indication of regression towards Maoist social control. 
Through Fairclough’s three-dimensional critical discourse analysis, I analyse 
confession-related news from the People’s Daily from 1966 to 1976, alongside 
three news clips (2014-2016) and an Anti-corruption Campaign documentary 
(2016) broadcast on China Central Television. The analysis reveals that through 
selectively and repeatedly appealing to traditional cultural values and adapting to 
the political agenda of particular Party leaders, the official media framing of both 
periods makes the individual, not the CCP, responsible for the pressing social 
issues. Xi not only revives the practice of Mao’s self-criticism model, but also 
revamps the framing, which invokes the memory of the Cultural Revolution. The 
framing is often obsessed with individual leadership, linking Xi directly to Mao 
through certain historiography, and reinforces the distinction between the 
powerful CCP and the ordinary people while paying lip-service to their potential 
inter-dependence. The thesis contributes to understanding the revamped Party 
disciplinary technique. For those who know the cruel nature of mediated 
confessions, the practice sends a clear message of intimidation to those who are 
ready to publicly disagree with the CCP. For those who are oblivious to it, 
mediated confessions blend into ordinary crime news, which has been part of the 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
1.1 General Introduction 
Since Xi Jinping became the General Secretary of the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP) in 2012, there have been debates about the existence of a sense of 
revival of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) (Phillips, 2015). The Cultural 
Revolution unleashed by Chairman Mao Zedong was a social-political movement 
that caused huge damage to Chinese society in the name of ideological 
purification. The political and social chaos paralysed the government bureaucracy; 
ordinary people rebelled against the old form of hierarchy and attacked each other 
in the name of Mao and revolution. The country descended to near anarchy at one 
point. Thus, it seems odd to say that China today resembles anything from the 
chaotic decade. China is no longer struggling to feed its own population and has 
become the second largest economy in the World (The World Bank In China: 
Overview, 2019). The Chinese people, in spite of the current political restrictions, 
are freer to think and live the way they want compared to Mao’s time. So, in what 
sense is there a sense of the Cultural Revolution revival? This thesis focuses on 
some of the most crucial elements that can invoke the memory of the decade, such 
as the personal power of political leaders and the social and political controls 
placed over the population. More specifically, through the lens of media, one may 
easily notice that President Xi’s personality cult, concentration of power and style 
of mobilisation are reminiscent of Mao during the Cultural Revolution. Thus, it is 
highly insightful to study the role of the official media in China in promoting the 
CCP’s legitimacy, maintaining social stability and gathering support for Xi.  
Xi has amassed huge personal power and tightened ideological control 
across many fronts (Shirk, 2008; Minzner, 2015). He revamps a combination of 
discourses - Confucianism, socialist core values and national pride - in the 
legitimisation of himself and the CCP. However, meanwhile, there are 
recognisable Maoist practices of communication and governance that are in use 
today. Thus, there has been much academic debate in the study of Chinese politics 
on the degree to which Xi can be called the ‘new Mao’ (Lam, 2012; Brown and 
Van Nieuwenhuizen, 2016; Buckley, 2017; Phillips, 2017; Sorace et al., 2019). 
Most recently, some people have begun to believe China is going through an 
outright Maoist revival (Blanchette, 2019). However, more China observers tend 
to agree that Xi does not intend to make a full Maoist revival but only wishes to 
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rebuild legitimacy for the Party through exploiting some Maoist strategies, such as 
creating a personality cult, making ideological appeals and garnering support from 
the PLA (Brown and Van Nieuwenhuizen, 2016; Zhao, 2016b; MacFarquhar, 
2018; Minzner, 2018). Some have observed a recent rise in the number of 
television confessions (Fiskesjö, 2017; Gardner, 2018; Minzner, 2018; Safeguard 
Defenders, 2018). They often take the form of a news clip or a part of TV 
programmes in which oneself admits that he or she has done something wrong 
and now sincerely apologises for the mistake. Criticism and self-criticism, which I 
argue is the predecessor of the latest mediated confessions, used to be a weapon to 
promote the Cultural Revolution under Mao and has become one of the common 
ways to showcase the Party’s domination under Xi. Therefore, it is instructive to 
study the resurgence of mediated confessions at this time when there is a sense of 
the Cultural Revolution revival.  
1.1.1 Research questions 
This thesis investigates: 
To what extent is the framing of mediated confessions from Chinese 
official media in Xi’s era a revival of that during Mao’s Cultural Revolution? 
Sub-question 1: how were the mediated confessions framed in the People’s 
Daily during the Cultural Revolution? 
Sub-question 2: how were the mediated confessions framed on television 
during Xi’s first five-year term? 
Sub-question 3: what are the ideological implications, if any, of the 
similarities and changes of the framing of mediated confessions between the two 
periods? 
As the research questions show, I decide to examine the issue of the revival of a 
sense of the Cultural Revolution from the unique perspective of mediated 
confessions. As I will show in the literature review, mediated confessions are not 
an invention of Xi’s era. Confession, or self-criticism, has been an intra-Party 
disciplinary technique since the early days of the CCP. It evolved into an iconic 
mass mobilisation tool and spread outside the Party during the Cultural 
Revolution (Dittmer, 1973). The post-1976 technocratic reform era saw the 
political use of self-criticism gradually fading out of ordinary people’s daily lives. 
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Hence, the recent reappearance of confessions on TV, especially those featuring 
non-Party members, shows that the CCP once again regards this technique as 
being very useful in tackling the challenges that the Party is facing today. 
1.1.2 Importance 
Researching criticism and self-criticism in the Cultural Revolution and its 
contemporary version in Xi’s era is important for three reasons. Firstly, mediated 
confessions remain an under-studied area both theoretically and empirically, 
considering the recent disturbing surge in their number and detrimental impact on 
confessants (Dahlin, 2018; Gardner, 2018). Mediated confessions have returned 
under a new particularly powerful Party leader and migrated onto fast-and-wide 
transmuting television and internet, yet most of the relevant literature still dwells 
on the practice of criticism and self-criticism from the 1950s. Gardner (2018) 
rightly argues that if the issue remains obscure, it carries the risk that mediated 
confessions are reported by media and received by the audience, both inside and 
outside China, at face value. Therefore, the first goal of my thesis is to draw more 
academic attention to the issue of mediated confessions in Xi’s China through 
showcasing a few examples of how manipulative they can be under a seemingly 
harmless, or even righteous, surface.  
Secondly, the thesis provides a glimpse into the intricate process of Mao’s 
and Xi’s ideological predilection. It is obvious that certain people, thoughts and 
terminologies have appeared more frequently today in the official documents and 
rhetoric. This is important because between language and society is a dialectic 
relationship: both shape and are shaped by each other (Fairclough, 2001). The 
dialectical relationship means that through a close examination of the discourse of 
mediated confessions, the thesis can show the specific social and political context 
that gives rise to the confession discourses. It can also demonstrate how the 
discourse of mediated confessions, in turn, shapes the social and political norms 
according to the Party’s expectation.  
The third reason is that understanding mediated confessions and the timing 
of the resurgence can establish a more nuanced understanding of the CCP’s 
promotion of certain Chinese tradition. As the analysis will show, ‘tradition’ is an 
intricate part of the framing of mediated confessions. Such ‘tradition’– seemingly 
constant and everlasting – is often far from a mere set of fixed neutral practices. 
Its pervasiveness and taken-for-granted nature means that in this day and age, it is 
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potentially subtler but more effective to get the message across than blasting 
political slogans at the public. As a result, it is harder to detect or resist, and thus 
deserves more attention. 
For the rest of this chapter, I present a brief history of the Cultural 
Revolution as well as an overview of Xi’s China today. I highlight the ‘political-
elite’ approach to the history of the Cultural Revolution. This is due to my focus 
on the Chinese official media framing: naturally, political elites play an 
indispensable role in shaping the official media discourses, especially considering 
the role of Mao, his personality cult and rhetoric. Similar things apply to Xi as 
well. I also highlight the historical background of criticism and self-criticism 
before and during the Cultural Revolution. I sketch its evolutionary trajectory 
from an intra-Party disciplinary technique to a mass movement involving the 
whole society in the heydays of the chaotic decade. Almost half a century after the 
end of Mao’s last revolution, it becomes increasingly difficult to talk about the 
decade openly. Meanwhile, in the wake of the rise of the New Left and the left-
wing populism as a result of the unbalanced economic development, it is almost 
impossible to speak of equality without invoking the memory of Mao. It is against 
this social background that I end this chapter with a brief review of the televised 
confessions that Xi’s era has witnessed. 
In Chapter 2, I explain the Chinese media system in which mediated 
confessions are produced. Since the early days of the CCP, the core of the official 
media has been the so-called ‘Party Principle’, meaning the top task for the media 
is to serve the interest of the Party. Unsurprisingly, during the Cultural 
Revolution, official media such as the People’s Daily were eventually in the firm 
control of Mao and the Central Cultural Revolution Group (CCRG), a radical 
group established in May 1966. The group had the mandate of Mao, replaced the 
Politburo Standing Committee and made the most important political decisions for 
a period of time (Dikötter, 2016). After an unsuccessful but exciting experiment 
with a more liberal style of journalism in the 1980s, one now finds a hybrid media 
system in China today. It means that both Party control and market forces are at 
work. However, I argue that, without negating the marketisation of the official 
media for the past two decades, a fundamentally unchanged political structure in 
China means a fundamentally unchanged purpose of the official Chinese media – 
to serve the Party. Despite the reality that the information monopoly of the CCP 
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has been irreversibly undermined by the economic reform, the notion that media 
should be at the service of the CCP still holds true, even more so since Xi 
ascended to the Party General Secretary. 
In Chapter 3, I introduce the theoretical and methodological approach of 
the thesis. Taking into consideration the media system in China analysed in 
Chapter 2, I ground the thesis in the theoretical foundation of media framing 
theory. It underlines what has been made salient on purpose for the audience by 
the official media. I apply framing theory in a manner that emphasises the 
relatively stable cultural elements that are particularly relevant to Chinese culture 
and the influence of the CCP. I apply Fairclough’s three-dimensional Critical 
Discourse Analysis (CDA) to investigate the way in which mediated confessions 
are framed to maintain the Party’s rule. CDA explores the role of language in 
political struggles, inequality and domination (Breeze, 2011: 495). Such analysis 
can demonstrate the relationship between discourses and social orders. I conclude 
the chapter with a detailed account of the rationale behind and the process of data 
selection. 
Chapter 4 begins the inquiry into the data mentioned in the previous 
chapter. For both Chapter 4 and 5, I lay out the same general structure of analysis 
as follows: textual, interpretive, explanatory, and a final discussion of ideological 
implications – how meaning is produced in the service of power. I analyse the 
framing process, from the linguistic level of wording and grammars to the 
production and interpretation of the confession news, then eventually to the active 
utilisation of cultural and political norms of the time. I select eight articles from 
the Cultural Revolution and explain how the relationship between confessants and 
confessors, confessants and Mao, and the masses and the enemies were carefully 
framed in this chapter. I conclude that the framing highlighted the role of 
traditional family values that were at play at the national level in the realm of 
political discourse, despite the CCP’s high-profile crackdown on ‘tradition’ at the 
time. The use of the Dehumanisation Discourse and the healing metaphor 
constructed a clear hatred towards the enemies while allowing the CCP to 
maintain a façade of leniency.  The reasoning device of the framing underlined 
individuals’ subjective attitude and the lack of willpower as the cause of a 
confessant’s political mistakes. The nature of the confessions mostly resembled 
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the confession towards deity rather than peers, confirming Mao’s unmatched 
position during the Cultural Revolution.  
After examining the historical data, in Chapter 5, I explore the 
contemporary mediated confessions selected from Xi’s first five-year term. Xi’s 
era has seen a transformation of the format of mediated confessions. They have 
largely migrated from print newspapers to the more widely and faster 
disseminated television programmes. In this chapter, I analyse 3 news clips and a 
documentary about Xi’s anti-corruption campaign. The new era also brings new 
discourses which are more relevant to Xi’s political agenda, such as the ‘Rule of 
Law’ and the National Security Discourses. However, certain discourses which 
could be found during the Cultural Revolution remain relevant today, such as the 
Family Values Discourse. The modern-day TV confessions of the non-Party 
cadres reveal the banality of mediated confessions, which blends into ordinary 
crimes news. Together, they feed into Xi’s agenda of building a society of 
socialist rule of law with Chinese characteristics while sending chilling 
intimidation to those who realise the orchestrated nature of TV confessions. For 
the fallen Party cadre confessants, their treatment is often unclear to the public. 
Their TV confession is a showcase of the tight CCP control and total domination. 
Chapter 6 is the concluding chapter. I take together the results from both 
Chapter 4 and 5 and revisit the research question that is posed here. I identify two 
confession discourses that have been used both during the Cultural Revolution, 
both of which relate to the relatively stable culture existing in both Mao’s and 
Xi’s China. Meanwhile, the changed discourses are linked to the different political 
agenda of the Party leaders. However, both leaders put enormous emphasis on 
blaming the individual subjective thoughts and attitudes as the root of the 
confessants’ mistakes. The continuity in the practice and the framing shows that 
the CCP, despite decades of reform, the core Party Principle remains, and it has 
been further strengthened in Xi’s era. It also shows that the CCP has been 
proficient in utilising the traditional cultural and moral values and the media for 
its legitimation and motivational purposes. Meanwhile, the change in both the 
confession technique and the framing demonstrate the CCP’s adaptability to the 
social and technological changes. Taken together, the continuity and change leads 
me to the conclusion that, through the examination of the framing of confession 
news articles in the People’s Daily during the Cultural Revolution and news clips 
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and anti-corruption campaign documentary in Xi’s first five-year term, the thesis 
reveals that culture, law and moral values are often so deeply rooted that they are 
taken-for-granted. As a result, these elements constitute a primary form of social 
control. Apart from looking back at what I have analysed in the thesis, I also look 
beyond Xi’s first five-year team. His continuation of power accumulation means 
that it is likely that the number of mediated confessions will keep growing. We 
are likely to continue to see media framing supporting the Party agenda in the 
name of tradition, discipline, law and order. I call for more academic attention on 
this topic as well as on audience-oriented research to shed light on the actual 
impact of mediated confessions on the general public. I end the thesis with a 
critical self-reflection, clarifying how my personal experience may have 
influenced the way that I interpret the framing of mediated confessions in Xi’s era 
of political regression.  
As stated earlier, the rest of this chapter is divided into two parts: in the 
first part, I briefly examine the history of the Cultural Revolution and underline 
the major events in the movement. The thesis adopts the elite-focused approach to 
the history of the Cultural Revolution. It pays particular attention to three 
characteristics – Mao’s personality cult, the ritual of criticism and confession and 
the Cultural Revolution Rhetoric - in the role of legitimising and promoting the 
Cultural Revolution. The literature review summarises the inception, the rise and 
the eventual apex of Mao’s personality cult. It highlights the importance of a 
leader’s personality in the psyche of the CCP which, as I will later show, still has 
profound implications in China today. The review then delves into the practice of 
criticism and self-criticism and provides a roadmap of its transformation from an 
intra-Party disciplinary tool to a mass campaign strategy. In the second part, I 
review the important relevant political changes after the Cultural Revolution that 
are most relevant to Xi’s era. The ever-increasing wealth gap and worsening 
environment created by three decades of economic development after the Cultural 
Revolution prompted the appearance of the New Left in China. They profoundly 
worry about the market economy and advocate for a fairer and environmentally 
friendlier society. However, the link to the Left means that their appeal often 
inadvertently touches the over-sensitive memory of Mao and his campaigns, 
including the Cultural Revolution. Nevertheless, an egalitarian society is not the 
only topic making a return to the political discussion which bears the mark of 
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Mao’s era. I agree with some scholars that mediated confessions have also made a 
comeback in Xi’s first five-year term and argue that there is a lack of academic 
attention on the recent phenomenon of the resurgent of mediated confessions. 
1.2 The Cultural Revolution  
As much as people are interested in predicting the future of China, a 
historical perspective is often very crucial in understanding what we are facing 
right now and what we may face in the future (Meng, 2018). The purpose of this 
section is to chart the history of the Cultural Revolution and the spread of 
criticism and self-criticism outside the CCP. I highlight the cultural-social-
political background that was indispensable in understanding the framing of 
mediated confessions in the 1960s and the 1970s. Knowing the practice as well as 
the conditions of its occurrence provides a basic framework for the analysis and 
the comparison in the later chapters. This section begins with an overview of the 
important historical events during the Cultural Revolution through a ‘default’ 
route: focusing on the political elites instead of the more recently developed 
grassroots approach. Next, adopting the elite-focused approach, I pay attention to 
two characteristics in particular – Mao’s personality cult and the time-and-space 
specific cultural background. The two characteristics have lasting implications in 
China. Lastly, I examine the ritual of criticism and self-criticism, track its 
evolution as the CCP expanding its control over China and discuss its role in 
legitimising and promoting the Cultural Revolution. 
1.2.1 A Brief History of the Cultural Revolution 
To understand the historical condition of the appearance of mediated 
confessions, it is necessary to study the period of the Cultural Revolution. This 
section provides a brief review of the history of the volatile decade from 1966 to 
1976 in China. This introduction is not a comprehensive historical account of the 
event. Rather, the aim is to provide a general chronology of the decade and 
underline the uncertainty and the danger confronting almost everyone. It sets the 
scene for understanding the criticism and self-criticism at the time. The Great 
Proletarian Cultural Revolution, commonly known as the Cultural Revolution, 
was a period of social, political and cultural chaos in China. It began with a 
political coup purging the Beijing leadership and ended with a military coup 
against the so-called ‘Gang of Four’ (MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, 2006: 450). 
The movement consisted of a series of mass campaigns initiated by Mao, but 
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mostly supervised by the radicals from the CCRG (Lieberthal, 1995: 190). It 
aimed to not only remove certain political elites but also destroy the whole 
bureaucratic system modelled on the USSR (Walder, 2015: 82). ‘Constant 
struggle’ against cultural elites, intellectuals, politicians, students and different 
factions was at the core of the Cultural Revolution. 
In the name of ideological purification, Mao encouraged young students in 
schools and universities to smash the ‘Four Olds’ – old culture, old ideas, old 
habits and old customs. The idea of what constituted ‘Four Olds’ and how they 
should be smashed was vague. Nonetheless, schools were shut and classes were 
suspended. Violence broke out against teachers, administers and 
‘counterrevolutionary students’ as they were labelled the representatives of the old 
bureaucracy in schools and universities. In response to the spread of violence, 
then Vice-Chairman Liu Shaoqi attempted to reign in the radicals through the 
work teams which were dispatched to universities and schools. Dispatching work 
teams was a routine practice to assist the function of local Party organs during 
mass campaigns (Schram, 1963). However, the students who were under Mao’s 
encouragement to have rebellious spirit clashed sharply with the work teams in 
this case. The work teams which were often full of undereducated cadres with a 
peasant background had few ideas about how to deal with issues in educational 
institutions (Dittmer, 1974). 
Despite the resistance from the students against the work team, the 
upheaval only started spiralling out of control after the Eighth Central Committee 
11th Plenary Session in August 1966 in which Mao expressed his dissatisfaction 
with the work teams’ obstruction of the revolutionary students. He further implied 
that the enemies who followed the capitalist road were among not only the 
bourgeois intellectuals but also the CCP itself (Thurston, 1987: xvi). As a result, 
Mao appealed to the students in Beijing – the Red Guards – to ‘smash the 
Headquarters’. The direct result was almost anarchy. Local authorities did not 
dare to stop the Red Guards, who were blessed by Mao’s command. Students 
stormed the homes of citizens and foreign embassies alike in Beijing. Some Red 
Guards from various provinces also took the chance of free travel to ‘exchange 
revolution experiences’ and visit the capital and other revolutionary holy places 
such as Ruijin, Zunyi, Yan’an and Mao’s birthplace, Shaoshan (Leese, 2011:138). 
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The ‘exchange of experiences’ spread the campaign of smashing the Four Olds 
and the growing personality cult of Mao to the rest of China. 
By October 1966, the focus of the Cultural Revolution had focused on 
revealing the ‘power holders within the Party taking the capitalist road’ (Leese, 
2011:143). That is to say, the target for struggle became the Party elites. Liu 
Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping were criticised for suppressing the revolutionary 
masses and many cadres of different ranks also became the targets of criticism. As 
a result, the Red Guards and many work units split into different factions, 
supporting different cadres and fighting each other fiercely. Some of them even 
stole weapons from the PLA to crush their enemies (Dikötter, 2016: 148). 
Consequently, the PLA, headed by Lin Biao, had to intervene in the summer of 
1967. However, it only brought the militarization of society and more retaliatory 
purges. Another campaign ensued a year later and spread the struggle to more 
people. The ‘Cleansing the Class Ranks’ campaign in 1968 aimed to get rid of 
‘the enemies’ in society. This vague but violent campaign meant more retaliation 
and struggle, which saw the suicide rate rocket to the point that Xie Fuzhi, 
Minister of Public Security, had to suspend the campaign for a week in order to 
‘quell the wind of suicide’ (MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, 2006: 256). At the 
same time, the Red Guards were disbanded and roughly a third of them (five to 
six million) were rusticated between 1968 and 1970. The number had doubled by 
1975 and eventually rose to 17 million by 1980 (Bonnin, 2013). Educated urban 
adults suffered a similar fate, as they were sent to the countryside for hard labour 
in the name of ‘political re-education’.  
Despite the government withholding the news of Lin Biao’s death and 
alleged betrayal for two months, his mysterious sudden death on 13 September 
1971 meant that he and his associates eventually became the target of a new round 
of attacks. Some suspected that Lin had planned a coup against Mao but failed, 
which forced him and his family to escape to the Soviet Union by air (Hsu, 1983: 
718; Cook, 2016). However, the flight crashed in Outer Mongolia, killing 
everyone on board. What really happened remains unclear to this day (Gentz, 
2018). At that point, the country was on the brink of collapse. Mao’s health was 
deteriorating, and he had to summon back the purged Deng to work with Premier 
Zhou Enlai to stabilise the country. However, as Zhou’s health also declined, the 
‘Gang of Four’ – Wang Wenhong, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan and Mao’s 
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then-wife Jiang Qing - launched another round of campaigns against Deng in the 
name of cutting ‘the tails of the capitalism’.  
The final moment of the Cultural Revolution was surprisingly bloodless. 
One month after Mao’s death in September 1976, the ten-year of chaotic Cultural 
Revolution ended with a quiet coup removing the Gang of Four organized by 
Mao’s then successor Hua Guofeng and a group of CCP senior military 
commanders (Foster, 1992; MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, 2006:445). The Gang 
of Four was arrested and put on trial. They were blamed for all the destruction 
during the Cultural Revolution and misleading Mao to make the wrong policy 
decisions. Hence, the decade of the Cultural Revolution was a series of physical 
and psychological struggles and retaliation in which almost nobody was safe and 
unaffected.  
1.2.2 A ‘Political Elite’- focused approach  
There are two main ways to approach the history of the Cultural 
Revolution: a top-down ‘political elite’-focused approach (Dittmer, 1974; 
MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, 2006; Dikötter, 2016; Spence, 2016) and a bottom-
up ‘the people’-focused approach (Yang, 1988; Wang, 2003). The brief review of 
the Cultural Revolution above is political-elite focused in that the review reads the 
situation through certain spearhead figures within the CCP. The assumption was 
that due to their leading roles and close involvement, such figures were the 
driving force behind the twists and turns in many campaigns. The top-down 
interpretation focuses on the top CCP leaders, such as Mao and other members of 
the CCRG, in pushing forward and changing the direction of the mass campaigns 
at that time. 
By contrast, the bottom-up ‘the people’ – centred approach looks at the 
same period through the lens of the people. These tend to be memoirs, biographies 
and autobiographies of ordinary people1, brought to light by families, friends, and 
 
1 ‘Ordinary people’ here refers to a specific group of people. The authors of those publications 
refer to themselves as ‘ordinary people’. However, the very fact that they are able to publish 
books recording their experience in the Cultural Revolution means that they are not the same 
kind of ‘ordinary people’ as those who have no way to recount their experience. The authors 
tend to be cultural social elites or those who eventually became elites after the Cultural 
Revolution. Most of the other kind of the ordinary people remained silent in public about their 
experience. One notable exception is Wang Youqin’s Victims of the Cultural Revolution (2004). 
The stories in the book include some from people she knew personally as well as some from 
complete strangers to her. Their families and friends got in touch with Wang after learning about 
her project of documenting the life of ‘ordinary people’ during the chaotic decade, especially 
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in a few cases strangers (Wang, 2003). This approach argues that the top-down 
perspective neglects the experience and role of millions of people, assuming they 
were all powerless. Therefore, this is more than a perspective of the ‘victims’ who 
suffered both physically and mentally during the Cultural Revolution. On the one 
hand, it shows the active resistance from the ‘victims’ (Cheng, 1986; Yang, 1988; 
Chang, 1991; Yang, 1997). On the other hand, the approach shows that the 
concept of the ‘victim’ can be problematic. In his study of the masses,  Qian 
(2012) explains that ‘victims’ is hardly a neutral term. One group of ‘victims’ was 
sometimes the oppressors of another group of ‘victims’ and they exchanged 
retaliation when the opportunity came. Besides, grassroots sources have always 
been an alternative to the official account to expose the possible strategically 
omitted truth by the CCP (Thurston, 1987; Bonnin, 2013; Wu, 2014). After all, 
Mao hoped to seek the opinion of the masses directly without the hindrance of 
bureaucracy. Mao’s expectation of how the Cultural Revolution would unfold was 
a bottom-up revolution and the dictatorship of the masses (Qian, 2012).  
I use the elite-focused perspective because the focus of the thesis is the 
official framing. It examines the discourse produced by the CCP rather than its 
reception by the individual audience. The elite-focused top-down interpretation 
has dominated the academic discussion of the Cultural Revolution. It follows the 
logic that China is an authoritarian country, hence the ruling echelons of the CCP 
control the lives of ordinary Chinese people. However, this choice is not to negate 
the importance of the bottom-up perspective, but a result of taking into 
consideration of the CCP’s obsession with Mao and the Party’s usual emphasis on 
leadership in general. Some scholars, examining the Cultural Revolution from the 
CCP leaders’ perspective, do not necessarily place specific emphasis on single 
individuals. Instead, they view the top CCP as a group and present the unfolding 
of the Cultural Revolution from their perspective (MacFarquhar, 1974; Esherick 
et al., 2006; MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, 2006; Dikötter, 2016). The top leaders 
are the thread of the unfolding history. Others choose to focus on specific figures. 
‘Mao’ was undoubtedly at the top of the list. As early as the 1930s, American 
journalist Edgar Snow’s interview with Mao, collected in his book Red Star Over 
China (1937), provided the world with a glimpse of the Chinese Communist 
 
those who had no resources to make their own stories known. The details of their life stories vary 
depending on how much is remembered by their respective families or friends.  
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leader. Mao’s role in pushing forward the Cultural Revolution has been widely 
studied (Leese, 2011). Some scholars investigate Mao’s personality and ambitions 
in the unfolding of the Cultural Revolution. The controversial work of Jung 
Chang and Jon Halliday (2005) is highly critical of Mao’s personality, portraying 
him as a cunning demon. Some research conducted in Chinese places a huge 
emphasis on the writing of Mao. The work of Qian (2014) analyses Mao’s 
thoughts and writings during the Cultural Revolution in hoping to make sense of 
the campaigns by examining the dynamic between Mao and the masses. When 
studying the Cultural Revolution, Mao was undoubtedly the unavoidable figure. 
The political elite could, in reality, be either the winners or the losers of 
the political struggle. Some scholars examine the ‘culprits’ such as Mao’s wife 
Jiang Qing, or the biggest ‘victim’ such as Liu Shaoqi. The Cultural Revolution 
was depicted as a stage for Jiang Qing to avenge herself for the tough days when 
the majority of the CCP elites objected to her marriage to Mao despite her being 
eight months pregnant (Terrill, 1992). Dittmer (1974) uses the fall of the ‘biggest 
capitalist roader’ Liu Shaoqi as a case study to investigate how the mass criticism 
and Liu’s self-criticism were used against him. Once a student radical, trade union 
organiser and CCP underground organiser in the KMT-ruled ‘white area’, Vice 
Chairman Liu was the ‘first Maoist’ and Mao’s ‘heir apparent’ prior to the 
Cultural Revolution (Dittmer, 1974: 20). With Liu’s downfall during the Cultural 
Revolution came two dominant interpretations of the purpose of the Cultural 
Revolution. The first interpretation views the Cultural Revolution as the 
culmination of years of an intra-Party top-level power struggle between Mao and 
Liu. Thus, Liu’s downfall was the result of Mao delivering his final blow. The 
second interpretation suggests that the Cultural Revolution was a mere experiment 
to remove the growing bureaucracy within the Party in order to revive socialist 
ideals. Overthrowing Liu was an unanticipated result. Regardless of the real 
reason, Mao expelled Liu from the CCP in 1968. Liu was also denied proper 
medical care for his diabetes and pneumonia and died on 12 November 1969 
(Spence, 2016). Tracing the escalation of Liu’s case, Dittmer attributed Liu’s 
passive acceptance of the mass criticism to the differences of the personalities and 
ideologies between Liu and Mao. Such literature hopes to make sense of the 
Cultural Revolution, or certain aspects of it, from a selection of important Party 
individuals’ personalities, ambitions and experiences. Since one of the most 
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important reasons for zooming in on individual political elites is that their 
personal power might have greatly influenced the historical event, I now discuss 
the single most important political elite during the Cultural Revolution – 
Chairman Mao, his personality cult and its profound impact on shaping the 
Cultural Revolution and even contemporary Chinese politics. Thus, the ‘political 
elite’-focused approach provides a vantage point to inquire about the construction 
of the CCP framing and discourse. 
Mao’s cult before the Cultural Revolution 
The idolatry of Mao was an iconic characteristic of the Cultural 
Revolution. However, Mao was an important but rather elusive character. He had 
a long political career – over six decades - working for the CCP. During the time, 
some believe that Mao was a brilliant military strategist but a less qualified 
governor (Brown and Van Nieuwenhuizen, 2016). As a person, Mao was 
multifaceted. He was capable of borrowing the wisdom of ancient Chinese saints 
while at the same time ruthlessly purging old tradition. There is no doubt that his 
tremendous influence was the driving force behind the Cultural Revolution. In the 
following paragraphs, I provide a definition of Mao’s personality cult, trace the 
origin and the development of Mao’s cult, which eventually reached its apex 
during the Cultural Revolution, and discuss its role in promoting and legitimising 
the CCP’s rule.  
Personality cults have always existed in China and, as I will show later in 
the thesis, their influence remains present today. Mao’s personality cult, as this 
section demonstrates later, bore the characteristics of both the traditional and the 
modern cult. A historical definition of personality cult is to ‘worship religious or 
secular leaders’ (Leese, 2011: 4). In China, there was a long history of emperor 
worship which echoes the definition. Emperors were the ‘Son of the Heaven’ and 
their legitimacy to rule was from a widely accepted idea of ‘the Mandate of 
Heaven, the worship of ancestors, and ritual offerings to various deities that 
restricted the glorification of the emperor himself’ (ibid.). By contrast, the 
definition of modern personality cult is that ‘godlike glorification of a modern 
political leader with mass media techniques…’ (Plamper, 2004: 33). This 
definition differs from the previous one in its source of ‘legitimacy’, ‘intensity’ 
and ‘reach’  (Leese, 2011: 5). More precisely, modern leaders tend to build their 
legitimacy on the claim that they have the support of the people instead of 
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supernatural forces. The ‘intensity’ and ‘reach’ underline the promotional role of 
mass media in forging modern personality cults. With the assistance of mass 
media, modern leader cults tend to be more intensive and widespread. Mao was a 
leader at the time of rapid transition in China, thus his cult demonstrated a 
combination of both definitions.  
The inception of Mao’s cult was in the 1930s during the Long March 
when the Red Army was forced to take a yearlong strategic retreat to escape the 
KMT’s pursuit. According to Edgar Snow (1937), Mao's cult did not exist in 1936 
when he met with Mao for the first time in Shaanxi Province (Leese, 2011). At 
that time, people knew Mao and respected him, but there was ‘- as yet, at least - 
no ritual of hero-worship built up around him’ (Snow, 1937: 83). Mao possessed 
no more important post than others who founded the CCP until the Zunyi 
Politburo meeting in January 1935. It was at that meeting when Mao was 
appointed a member of the Secretariat of the Politburo and the Military Council. 
He was en route to political supremacy. Initially, Mao’s cult served the power 
struggle within the Party. During the power struggle in 1942 between Mao and 
Wang Ming, who was trained and supported by the Soviet Union, large-scale 
public display of a personality cult started to become a common strategy. 
According to Wylie (1980: 41), ‘a woodcut portrait of Mao Zedong was published 
in the Communist party newspaper Jiefang (Liberation)...’. During the 
Rectification Campaign in 1942 and 1943, the rhetorical flattery and imagery 
became omnipresent. The campaign consisted of consecutive study sessions and 
self-criticism sessions on self-development and revolution in which Mao's work 
dominated the content. There was even a ‘Zedong Day’ on 8 February 1942 (Gao, 
2000: 606). 
The building of Mao’s personality cult was developed by intertwined 
international and domestic factors. In 1943, the Third Comintern, which had 
backed the leadership of Wang Ming instead of Mao, dissolved after the Soviet 
Union declared its support for the Allies in facing the Nazis invasion. As a result, 
the coalition between the CCP and the KMT against the Japanese formed under 
the pressure from the Soviet Union collapsed. A civil war was about to break out. 
While fighting each other, both the CCP and the KMT also tried to present 
themselves to the Chinese people and the world as the only protector who could 
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give China a promising future. Chiang Kai-shek, leader of the KMT, published 
China's Destiny in 1943, championing himself as the saviour of the nation from 
years of war and foreign invasion. In reaction to the book and in order to attract 
new followers, the CCP boosted the status of Mao to compete with Chiang. Mao 
was thus portrayed as a powerful symbol of leadership and a Marxist Leninist 
theoretician. Snow's interview with Mao shows that Mao was aware of and agreed 
with the origin of his personality cult, 
In the past it has been [instrumental] to oppose Jiang Jieshi [Chiang 
Kai-Shek]… They set up2 Jiang Jieshi. Therefore, we had to set up 
someone as well. [Should be we] set up Chen Duxiu, impossible; set 
up Qu Qiubai, impossible; set up Li Lisan, impossible; set up Wang 
Ming, impossible as well. What to do? [One] had to set up someone to 
topple Wang Ming. If Wang Ming had not been toppled, the Chinese 
Revolution would not have been successful. How desperate, how 
difficult is she, our Party (Mao, 2002). 
Mao’s words also revealed that his personality cult was used for intra-Party 
struggle; to topple his leadership opponent Wang Ming. Time and again, Mao 
would use his cult to topple many of his comrades.  
Thus, the promotion of Mao’s cult was initially a planned propaganda 
strategy in a highly controlled manner. It was regulated to the very specific details 
as to what could or could not be done and how it should be done. For instance, all 
party buildings should display portraits of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin and Mao 
(Leese, 2011: 38). The CCP also forbade people from naming cities and streets 
after political leaders (ibid.). Guards had been deployed to stop peasants from 
prostrating themselves in front of Chairman Mao during the anniversary parade in 
the previous years. Vice-ministers of foreign affairs Gong Peng and Qiao 
Guanhua attributed the highly regulated measures to the fact that the traditional 
peasant habit of worshipping emperors had deep roots and could not be eliminated 
overnight.  
 
2 This may be a translation issue. The meaning here should be ‘put up’ as in put up a political 
figure to stand for office. 
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However, with the liberalisation of the political atmosphere in the second 
half of 1956, Mao’s personality cult was subject to much debate and criticism. 
The news temporarily replaced ‘Chairman Mao’ with ‘Comrade Mao Zedong’. 
Collective leadership started to appear rather than merely ‘Mao Zedong Thought’ 
(Leese, 2011: 44). Meanwhile, other top CCP leaders also began to enjoy a similar 
reverent treatment in public. For instance, during the annual commemoration of 
the founding of the CCP on 1 July, portraits of vice-Chairman Liu Shaoqi, 
Premier Zhou Enlai and Marshal Zhu De appeared together with that of Mao in all 
newspapers. In 1959, ‘Chairman Liu’, referring to Liu Shaoqi, appeared in tandem 
with ‘Chairman Mao’. Liu’s famous essay ‘How to be a Good Communist’ was 
also edited and published as a pamphlet in 1962. The People’s Daily then made it 
into a series of articles and distributed it to audiences across the country. From 
1959 to 1965, Liu’s portrait continued to appear next to Mao’s in the front page of 
the People’s Daily on the 1 October National Day issues (Dittmer, 1974: 52) (see 
Picture 1). Hence, certain rituals relating to personality cults did not exclusively 
belong to Mao before the Cultural Revolution and the presentation of personality 
cult was under meticulous regulation.  
 
  
Picture 1 The front pages of the People’s Daily on the National Day (1 October) in 1959 and 1965. 
Pictures of Mao Zedong and Liu Shaoqi were placed side by side. 
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Mao’s cult during the Cultural Revolution: a Mao-centred social structure 
It was during the Cultural Revolution that Mao’s cult rocketed to an 
unprecedented level and its power was fully unleashed (Brown and Van 
Nieuwenhuizen, 2016).  It became a potent driving force behind all campaigns at 
the time (Calhoun, 1996). Mao was firstly listed alongside Marx and Lenin as a 
pioneer of the world revolution. Then, he was deified and reached a superhuman 
level; his teaching was reported to have successfully treated incurable ailments 
such as cancer and deafness (Leese, 2011: 192). The CCP eventually curbed the 
intensity of the cult with the demise of Lin Biao. Generally speaking, there are 
two ways to expound the cult – Mao-related objects and rituals and Maoist 
rhetoric, which I explain in turn below. 
Mao-related objects are also known as loyalty objects, such as badges, 
statuettes, books, poems and portraits (Qian, 2012). People treated these objects as 
if they were their religious equivalents. Mao’s pictures were often displayed at 
home and in public, and a whole set of routinised practices developed around 
them. For instance, during the ‘Three loyalties and Four Boundless Love’ 
(towards Mao) campaign promoted by the PLA from 1966 to 1968, factory 
workers were required to follow a series of rituals in everyday life. A typical day 
began with asking instructions from the Chairman in front of his portrait; in the 
factory where Mao’s image was displayed in a prominent position, workers were 
expected to seek help from and be inspired by the Chairman and finish the day 
with a self-reflective report back to Mao’s portrait. This quasi-religious ritual was 
selected for propaganda purposes and became a model for mass emulation during 
that campaign. There were also songs and dances dedicated to Mao. The most 
famous case was the epic song and dance performance The East is Red (Dongfang 
Hong). When Snow revisited China in 1965, he was invited to watch the epic 
show: 
Giant portraits of him [Mao] now hung in the streets, busts were in 
every chamber, his books and photographs were everywhere on 
display to the exclusion of others. In the four-hour revolutionary 
pageant of dance and song, The East is Red, Mao was the only hero. 
As a climax of that performance [...], I saw a portrait copied from a 
photograph taken by myself in 1936, blown up to about thirty feet 
high (1972: 68f). 
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These objects carry significant symbolic meanings that demonstrate a strong sense 
of the deification of Mao. As mentioned earlier, the meticulous details of the 
display arrangement showed the lengths to which the CCP would go to construct a 
sense of a united, positive, fervent and revolutionary political atmosphere. That 
was why from the detail of such displays one could infer the importance and the 
role of certain figures at a given moment. In terms of Mao, he was the one and the 
only ‘red sun’ – the one and the only supreme leader in China. 
Apart from comparing Mao to the ‘red sun’ and propagating the myths of 
curing deafness and cancer with Mao Zedong Thought, Mao’s god-like status was 
premised on the fact that as his personality cult grew, he became increasingly 
distant from the masses. During the eight parades of the Red Guards in 
Tiananmen Square from August to November 1966, Mao never addressed the 
masses except for uttering a few popular slogans. By contrast, Lin Biao, Chen 
Boda and Zhou Enlai all gave long tedious speeches. This distance – one could 
only look at Mao from afar but no interaction was allowed - further eroded any 
human quality of Mao and added a touch of mystery and aloofness, contributing 
to Mao’s deification (Leese, 2011: 134). Meanwhile, the distance also reinforced 
the sacredness of loyal objects, such as the well-known mangos. Originally, they 
were among the exotic gifts from Pakistan's Foreign minister’s visit in 1968. Mao 
gave the mangos to the propaganda worker team at Qinghua University to show 
Mao’s support for their work (Li, 1994; Leese, 2011). The demand for mango as a 
sign of Chairman Mao’s appreciation and approval quickly prompted the 
production of the replica of the mango to a fanatic level3. 
Aside from the Mao-related objects and rituals, Mao’s rhetoric was also an 
essential part of his personality cult. Schoenhals (1992: 135) argues that this kind 
of discourse during the Cultural Revolution was a ‘formalised political language’ 
(tifa). A close reading reveals that this style of political discourse had at least 
three characteristics. Firstly, words often indicated performances. As we shall see 
in the Methodology Chapter, certain verbs indicate the willingness to take action 
(Austin, 1975; Halliday, 1994).  In the field of politics, more often than not, ‘to 
say is to do’ (Bourdieu, 1991: 190), meaning that politicians must make their 
 
3 See Leese’s Mao Cult: Rhetoric and Ritual in China’s Cultural Revolution (2011) for more 
information about Mao’s mango story.  
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commitment attractive to the people and convince them of the party’s ability to 
deliver the promise. During the Cultural Revolution, instead of politicians spilling 
out promises, it was the masses and the news that chanted the ‘performative’ 
phrases. This phenomenon had its root in the Rectification Campaign in the 1940s 
(Apter and Saich, 1994). For example, by chanting ‘Long Live Chairman Mao’, 
one actually performed the act of wishing Mao good health from both his and 
other people’s point of views. In this sense, the function of words during the 
Cultural Revolution was not only transmissive but also performative.  
The second characteristic was that the ‘language [during the Cultural 
Revolution] was most separated from meaning’ (Mitter, 2004: 209). That is to 
say, in order to recreate a revolutionary reality for Chinese people, the discourse 
commonly used during the Cultural Revolution often appeared to be out-of-place 
semantically and contextually. Be it official notices or private letters, the start was 
often Mao’s quotations. This ‘new norm’ lasted at least five years during the 
Cultural Revolution (Wang, 2004). Another phenomenon was the overuse of 
quotation marks to denote the important words for the purpose of the ideological 
indoctrination. Popular inspirational words such as ‘application’, ‘selfishness’ and 
‘loyalty’ were deliberately placed in quotation marks to emphasise their special 
import in the Communist revolutionary world. These phenomena appeared very 
different from how language was used in normal daily conversation. As I will 
show in the analysis chapters, the data I collected for the thesis also reflect this 
norm. 
The third characteristic was that the language was monotonous and 
repetitive (Lu, 2004: 87). One might think of the news during the Cultural 
Revolution as being full of revolutionary passion, enthusiasm and activism if one 
only skimmed through a random article. However, the more articles one reads, the 
more one senses that the emotions were fabricated. Certain words and set phrases 
appeared repeatedly in various texts and contexts, rendering the style highly 
repetitive, monotonous and boring. The news was reduced to only a handful of 
themes and all had to be framed within the broad context of class struggle and 
justified through Maoist Thoughts. For instance, the expression of ‘boundless hot 
love’ for Mao appeared to be a direct expression of an absolute passion for the 
Chairman. However, with farmers working hard to express their ‘boundless hot 
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love’ for Mao, with local production teams overcoming technical difficulties to 
show their ‘boundless hot love’ for Mao and with China’s third world friends 
reading the translated Little Red Book to demonstrate their ‘boundless hot love’ 
for Mao, people were constantly bombarded with the same hyperbole and the 
result was desensitisation.  
All three characteristics of Mao’s rhetoric - the performative words, 
unconventional expressions and monotonous hyperbole - were common in news 
articles, wall posters and other popular forms of communication during the 
Cultural Revolution, as the thesis will show in the later analysis chapters. The 
intensity of Mao’s rhetoric reinforced itself by creating fear that one could be in 
trouble if he or she did not conform to such rhetoric. However, it was worth 
distinguishing that Mao’s own writing was not the same as the Maoist rhetoric 
due to the classic education Mao had received. Pye (1976) argues that Mao’s 
writing and speeches could easily reach and resonate with the ordinary Chinese 
people because Mao used many well-known historical allegories. Mao’s writing 
was rarely obscure; nor was it full of formalised expressions. One possible 
explanation of the obscurity of Maoist rhetoric, as my analysis later emphasises, is 
that Mao’s work or ideas were cited out of context and presented in a formalised 
language by the masses on posters or by Party journalists and ideologues in 
newspapers. 
Having discussed Mao’s rhetorical strategies, I now examine the typical 
forms of communication in which the aforementioned three main characteristics 
manifested themselves. They often took the form of political slogans and 
catchphrases in speeches, posters and newspapers which were omnipresent during 
the Cultural Revolution (Lu, 2004: 93). Political slogans and catchphrases are 
generally understood as ‘a means of focusing attention and exhorting to action’ 
(Urdan and Robbins, 1984: 17). They are useful both in war and in peacetime. 
During wartime, slogans are often an effective propaganda tool. In fact, the word 
‘slogan’ was derived from a word meaning ‘war cry’ (Shalom, 1984). Therefore, 
the initial purpose of slogans was to inspire clan members to fight bravely for the 
clan and its glory. During peacetime, slogans serve a persuasion function in 
advertisements and political campaigns. The advantage of slogans is that they can 
convey considerable information within a concise term, which facilitates the 
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dissemination and usage of the slogans and catchphrases (Lu and Simons, 2006). 
The slogans and catchphrases which were widely circulated during the Cultural 
Revolution had four major themes and purposes: radicalisation, alienation, 
negation and mythmaking. 
‘Radicalisation’ describes the political slogans and catchphrases that 
functioned to polarise people’s political opinions during the Cultural Revolution. 
For example, since the May Fourth and the New Culture Movement (1919), many 
Chinese deemed the traditional Chinese culture as backward and repressive. 
During the Cultural Revolution, slogans such as ‘To Rebel is Justified’ reflected 
the anti-tradition radical thinking and captured a sense of standing up to the 
oppressive old system in China. As Lu explains, ‘these slogans simplified theories 
related to social change, polarised reality into good and evil, and radicalised one’s 
understanding of the old and the new. They provoked intense emotional responses 
and violent actions against anyone or anything considered as a threat to the new 
communist order’ (Lu, 2004: 67). Thus, radical slogans and catchphrases typically 
had war connotations and combative language style, comparing one group to the 
enemies against whom one should have a life-or-death struggle. 
‘Alienation’ underlines the result of the radicalisation-themed language. 
Burke (1969) contends human actions are based on one’s conscious intentions and 
choices. During the Cultural Revolution, class background was the criterion as to 
whether a person was a friend or a foe, and Mao’s rhetoric often alienated people 
from different class backgrounds. By uniting those who were from poor and 
‘revolutionary’ backgrounds under a common cause of fighting for the 
‘proletarian dictatorship’, the rhetoric naturally excluded the rest of the 
population, consequently creating alienation among the people. The alienated 
group was harshly treated, which in turn incited the fear of exclusion among those 
who came from a good class background. The alienation became a measure of 
deterrence to discourage people from questioning the criterion (Burke, 1969). In 
this sense, slogans such as ‘Never forget the class struggle’ could facilitate the 
popularisation of class awareness among the people. In the face of fear of being 
excluded from the ‘good’ class, control was exerted through the strategy of 
uniting through alienation.  
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‘Negation’ refers to the information that is absent, muted or opposed by 
the CCP in the official media (Wander, 1983). Overall, negation meant blocking 
the alternative views that disagreed with Mao’s and discrediting those who held 
the views. The first thing on the list of negation during the Cultural Revolution 
was alternative ideological views. Students at the time were not taught 
Confucianism, Daoism, Legalism or any other traditional Chinese philosophy. 
Instead, narrowly interpreted Marxism and Maoism dominated the whole society. 
Alternative views would alienate and banish the individual to the side of the 
enemies. Maoism and ‘class struggle’ were the only correct political views at the 
time. The second aspect of negation is the dehumanisation of ‘the enemy’ 
(Wander, 1983). ‘The enemies’ were often portrayed as less worthy than human 
beings, thus it was justified to use violence against them. Common dehumanising 
labels included ‘parasites,’ ‘bloodsuckers,’ ‘vermin’ and ‘stumbling blocks’. As I 
will show later, these labels of negation can be found in the sample newspaper 
articles that I collected from the period. 
‘Mythmaking’ in slogans and catchphrases was used to facilitate the 
creation of Mao’s personality cult through linguistic techniques. Traditional 
Chinese thought believes that the legitimacy and the absolute power to rule as an 
emperor came from heaven, known as the ‘Mandate of Heaven’. As mentioned 
before, there were still plenty of Chinese people who viewed Mao as imperial 
emperor at the time, and as such venerated Mao in the same fashion as emperors 
by prostrating themselves in front of Mao or his images. Meanwhile, many 
slogans eulogising Mao tended to use superlatives (‘the most respectable 
Chairman Mao’), parallel structures (‘smashing the Four Olds and establishing the 
Four News’), and number abbreviations (the ‘Three Loyalties’ and ‘Four 
Boundlessnesses’ Campaign) (Lu, 2004: 71). These linguistic features were 
perfect for group-chanting, which intensified the mythical atmosphere and fuelled 
collective hysteria. 
Mao’s rhetorical slogans and catchphrases were an essential tool to 
promote Mao’s cult. They are also where a particular framing can be identified 
and located, as I will show in Chapter 3. Radicalisation, alienation, negation and 
mythmaking helped garner mass support, discredit enemies and legitimise 
violence through the use of language (Lu, 2004). I further argue in the later 
chapters that they not only reflected but also shaped people’s thoughts and actions 
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during the Cultural Revolution. Hence, they were where particular framing could 
be located in the data. These elements continue to remind people of the specific 
kind of rhetoric and discourse associated with Mao and the era. They still have 
influence in China today, as the analysis will demonstrate.  
Having reviewed the literature on the ‘political elite’-focused approach to 
the Cultural Revolution and the formation of Mao’s personality cult, this section 
summarises the role of the personality cult. For those who participate in the 
creation and demonstration of personality cults, the cult has two major functions: 
to demonstrate true loyalty and to foster a patron-client relationship through 
performance  (Márquez, 2018: 26). The form is linked to the social origin of the 
leader’s cult and the latter to the political purpose of Mao’s supreme position. 
Meisner (1982: 183) rightly argues that Mao’s cult has a social origin and 
function, but meanwhile is a direct result of politics. It was true that Mao was a 
respected revolutionary hero in the hearts of many peasants. In this sense, Mao’s 
cult was not manufactured out of nothing because Mao did have a popular base. 
However, it was equally true that Mao’s personal charisma was designed 
particularly for political purposes at the same time. The Communist regimes 
inherently lacked an established system of leadership succession. Hence, Mao’s 
personality cult functioned to foster a patron-client relationship among the CCP 
members. From this perspective, the demonstration of loyalty towards Mao served 
the purpose of publicly displaying personal loyalty towards leaders and readiness 
to take on responsibilities  (Leese, 2011). Therefore, Mao’s cult was both a result 
of the social tradition and a well-thought out rational choice. 
However, the two ways of interpretation of the function of Mao’s 
personality cult are not mutually exclusive, especially during the Cultural 
Revolution. During the chaotic decade, Mao’s cult was initially used to motivate 
the masses to fight the bureaucratic system, which caused many social grievances 
at the time. The ordinary people followed Mao’s call due to his revolutionary 
credentials. Mao’s revolutionary credentials, in turn, became a crucial safety net 
during campaigns when the CCP only gave very ambiguous instructions as to who 
the enemies were and how to carry out the campaign. The name of Mao boosted 
the participants’ sense of righteousness. Meanwhile, its use was also politically 
strategic in that when the CCP decided to put an end to the factional infighting, it 
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declared that it was establishing Mao Zedong Thought Study Classes at all levels 
of society and selecting model soldiers from ‘Study the Works of Chairman Mao 
Activist Congresses’. By using a highly ritualised and organised method, the CCP 
aimed to reduce deliberate misinterpretations of Mao’s cult for ulterior factional 
motives. Despite the fact that Mao’s personality cult could not be reduced to a 
pure instrument manufactured by the Party (Meisner, 1982: 14), at the later stage 
of the Cultural Revolution, the instrumentalisation became more dominant.   
1.2.3 Cultural Revolution & traditional Chinese culture 
Having explained my approach to the Cultural Revolution in the thesis, I 
now shift my attention to the cultural background in which mediated confessions 
should be understood. The reason for examining the traditional Chinese culture in 
the context of the Cultural Revolution is that the traditional culture has been a part 
of an inescapable source of influence on the society, regardless of the campaigns 
of renouncing and destroying it after Mao’s calling for ‘smashing the Four Olds’. 
As I will also explain in Chapter 2, ‘cultural resonance’ - the relatively constant 
socio-cultural background of a specific society at a specific moment - matters 
gravely in the understanding of the framing of an event (Gamson and Modigliani, 
1989: 5). 
By 1949, Mao had set out to convert China to a new ideology from the 
‘outdated’ Confucianism. Marxism-Leninism was set to replace Confucianism as 
the dominant ideology in China. Lenin had believed that the communist 
ideological conversion required the awakening of class consciousness (Yu, 1972). 
Mao might have agreed with Lenin’s belief about ideological indoctrination, but 
he had a very different view on the role of traditional culture in this process. Lenin 
argued for building socialism on tradition, whereas Mao aimed to eliminate 
tradition because it was in essence bourgeois (ibid). Confucianism was deemed a 
‘feudal’ system in which the exploiting class oppressed the proletariat and was 
thus the root of the backwardness of China.  
On the surface, it seemed to be odd how Confucianism became bourgeois 
and exploitative. Ren (humanness, benevolence, virtue and love) and li (ritual, 
rules, etiquette, and custom) were the core concepts in this traditional teaching. 
They manifested in a Confucian political system as such: the rulers enjoyed the 
absolute authority; an elite bureaucracy was necessary and indispensable to rule 
26 
 
the country. Running through the whole system was ren, suggesting a moral 
idealism in that how the emperor treated his people determined the rise and fall of 
the dynasty. While enjoying exclusive and absolute authority, the emperor was 
expected to rule with benevolence, morality and righteousness in order to be the 
example for the masses to emulate (Confucius and Leys, 1997: 58). Otherwise, 
the dynasty would be either overthrown or destroyed by natural disasters, 
epidemics or wars (Mencius and Li, 1992: 153). The means for the ruler to control 
the masses was li (Knoblock, 1988: 153).  By supervising and implementing 
social and political customs and rituals, the ruler reinforced the existing hierarchy, 
order and belief. Historically, Confucian thinking dominated most of the dynasties 
in China. However, the reality often meant that some emperors only enjoyed the 
boundless privileges yet took on little responsibility towards the nation. The 
imperialist aggression and the Qing dynasty’s corruption and incompetence in the 
late nineteenth-century prompted many young people who had spent time living 
and studying abroad to reflect on the failure of China. Thus, their conclusion was 
that Confucianism and traditional culture were to blame for China’s 
backwardness. In an era of burgeoning science and technology, believing in the 
‘Mandate of Heaven’ seemed old-fashioned and out-of-date.  
Nevertheless, the anti-traditional sentiment could not wipe out the 
influence of traditional thinking from Chinese society. Even the CCP itself who 
were vocal about eliminating the tradition could not escape from its influence. 
The Party claimed that they followed the Marxist-Leninist ideology to pursue the 
Communist Revolution. Thus, Marxist-Leninist terminology and political jargons 
permeated the society. However, in reality, what they really did was ‘Sinification’ 
of these ideas from abroad. Chinese indigenous culture seeped into the dominating 
ideology. For instance, the CCP could not escape from the Confucian thinking of 
zhengming (rectification of names). According to Confucius, the correct 
designation of names was the premise for any righteous moral behaviour changes 
(Dittmer, 1973; Lu, 2004). The logic ran as follows: 
When names are not correct, speech will not be appropriate; when 
speech is not appropriate, tasks will not be accomplished; when tasks 
cannot be accomplished, rites and music will not flourish; when rites 
and music do not flourish, punishment will not justify the crimes; 
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when punishment does not justify the crimes, the common people will 
not know where to put their hands and feet (Guo and Li, 1992: 132). 
This passage suggests that ‘names’ were the catalyst to facilitate the 
transformation of individual behaviours and society in general. The misuse of 
names would potentially cause chaos and moral decline, so the legitimacy of 
actions needed the support from zhengming. Therefore, it was important for the 
rulers to have zhengming before taking any actions. When examining the 
discourse surrounding Mao, popular expressions during the Cultural Revolution 
included ‘Long Live Chairman Mao’ and ‘wishing Chairman Mao a Long Long 
Life’. They were exactly the same worshipping phrases which the imperial 
emperors had enjoyed (Lu, 2002: 104). Moreover, in the summer of 1966, the 
Party further restricted the title of ‘chairman’ (zhuxi) to Mao. The rest of the 
‘chairmen’ were renamed as ‘directors’ or ‘heads’ (Leese, 2011: 136). ‘Confucian 
political thought accredited the ruler with moral attributes; his legitimacy is 
mandated by Heaven. Legalists granted the ruler with the absolute power and 
authority over his people’(Lu, 2002: 104). In this sense, Mao, like an emperor 
with the correct name, was granted the absolute power and the exclusive authority 
to lead the Chinese people in building a socialist society. 
There was also a series of chain reactions in the quote above about the 
importance of having the correct name. The chain reactions suggested the 
importance of communication in promoting existing social orders. It potentially 
explained the logic behind the enormous effort that the CCP put into 
disseminating the official discourse and shaping the way in which the masses 
thought and expressed themselves. The CCP devised specific discourses that in 
fact invoked tradition to control the masses during the Cultural Revolution. Lu 
(2002) identified four enduring characteristics of discourse related closely to the 
traditional culture – ruler/cultism, moral/ethics appeals, ritualistic practices and 
the use of metaphors so that the people were encouraged to have private morality 
and be obedient in performing public rituals. These characteristics are identifiable 
in many Party-led campaigns and practices, including mediated confessions. 
Therefore, I briefly review these characteristics in order to inform the analysis of 
the framing of mediated confessions in later chapters.  
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Moral and ethical appeals were a common theme in Confucianism and 
classic Chinese moral rhetoric in general. Therefore, it was regarded as the 
universal norm in public and private persuasion (Lu, 2002: 105). Even during the 
time when Mao was fiercely denouncing some aspects of Confucianism as the 
root of the people’s repression, he simultaneously encouraged people to live up to 
some others, such as altruism and the willingness to sacrifice for the collective 
and the nation. The specific criterion of morality that the CCP endorses has 
changed over time but the moral absoluteness has been constant. During the 
Cultural Revolution, leaders’ words were the ‘moral guidance’ and ‘ethical 
standard for action (zheng ming)’ (Lu, 2002: 106). In other words, quotations 
from Mao were the standard often used to distinguish the enemy from the people.  
Rituals are ‘a structured sequence of actions the correct performance of 
which pays homage to a sacred object’ (Philipson, 1992: 113), as exemplified in 
the previous section in the case  of reporting to and asking for advice from Mao. 
According to Lu (2004), ritualised practices are more than private ceremonies. It 
is also a way to reaffirm the social hierarchy, consolidate social unity and promote 
common values. During the Cultural Revolution, a range of practices resembled 
such rituals, such as the ‘loyalty dance’, ‘self-reflection in front of Mao’s 
portrait’, attending political study groups (reading leaders’ speeches or key 
articles in newspapers. These individual rituals together formed strict top-down 
information dissemination actions, reinforcing the CCP hierarchy in which Mao 
and his ideology were supreme.  
Lastly, the use of metaphors was ubiquitous in classical Chinese writings. 
Among various metaphors, war metaphors and animal metaphors were two very 
common forms in Chinese classics. Some argue that such metaphors are linked to 
Chinese folk mythology and Buddhist religion. This was often reflected in the 
aforementioned ‘Sin-inification’ of Marxist-Leninist ideology. In her work on the 
Anyuan coal mine strike, Perry (2012) shows the Party’s attempt to combine the 
Western communist revolution ideas with the Chinese traditional myths in order 
to increase the party’s appeal in the early days of the communist movement. 
When talking to the coal mine workers, Li Lisan referred to Karl Marx as his 
master who lived in the faraway West and was over a hundred years old. This 
analogy resembled traditional Chinese mythology in which long-living masters 
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who had superpowers would answer their devout believers’ call for help. Such a 
story sounded familiar to the workers and thus provided a better understanding of 
the role Marx played than merely teaching them Marx’s theory. During the 
Cultural Revolution, ter Haar (2002) argues that the CCP’s deployment of a 
similar strategy represents a continuation of this tradition. For instance, the 
dehumanisation of enemies and the war-related terms used in the Cultural 
Revolution were reflections of such a strategy. Dehumanisation meant that the 
enemies were not truly regarded as humans (Cook, 2016). They were ‘ox, ghosts, 
snakes, and demons’ and ‘running dogs’ in speeches, newspapers and daily 
conversations. Liu Shaoqi’s wife, Wang Guangmei, was labelled a ‘monster’, 
‘alluring woman’, ‘filthy miss’ and ‘snake’ in wall posters (Tan and Zhao, 1996: 
239). Lin Biao was the ‘dog-headed General’ and Jiang Qing was the ‘white-
boned demon’(Cook, 2016: 88). Consequently, the masses should ‘us[e] pen[s] as 
knives and guns’, keep ‘fir[ing] at’ the class enemies and ‘pledge to fight to the 
death in defending Chairman Mao in defending the proletarian headquarter’ (Liu, 
1992: 411). The portrait of enemies as inimical, dangerous and less than human 
provided justification for the physical and verbal abuse directed at them.  
As the analysis chapters will show, the traditional culture and its related 
discourse characteristics were clearly visible in the framing of mediated 
confessions, serving the purposes of promoting Mao and his revolution and 
political agenda, despite the outright clampdown on tradition. More crucially, 
these characteristics prevalent during the Cultural Revolution lived on long after 
the end of the decade. Having explained the importance of the general historical 
and cultural background of the Cultural Revolution, now I begin my review of the 
practice of confession. 
1.2.4 Criticism and self-criticism during the Cultural Revolution 
Despite the traditional Chinese cultural elements reviewed above, the 
procedure of criticism and self-criticism during the Cultural Revolution was 
originally influenced by the Soviet Union and modelled on the legacy of the 
Yan’an era. In this sense, Lu (2004: 44) argues that criticism and self-criticism 
have never been part of Chinese tradition. This section reviews the transformation 
that the practice of criticism and self-criticism went through before becoming a 
mass campaign tool during the Cultural Revolution. 
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Criticism and self-criticism had been a means of inner-Party disciplinary 
measures since the thought-reform movement in the 1920s when the CCP tried to 
persuade the captured KMT or potential members to join the CCP. Before 1949, 
criticism and self-criticism were mainly used among the CCP members. For those 
who went through criticism and self-criticism, the process meant these cadres 
were not beyond help. However, there was a gradual shift in the practice from the 
1940s to the 1960s: the practice spread to be used outside the CCP cadres. Its 
approach also turned increasingly unforgiving. The Cultural Revolution saw the 
spread of the practice to the whole of society. Yang (2013) wrote in the opening 
of his book Tombstone that people living under the repressive Chinese imperial 
emperor at least had the right to remain silent. By contrast, during the Cultural 
Revolution, everyone was required to ‘confess’, ‘talk’, ‘criticise’, ‘reveal’ and 
‘expose’. Remaining silent was equal to an act of defiance. This section briefly 
reviews the transition of criticism and self-criticism and examines the ways in 
which the confessional practices functioned during the decade. 
The evolution of confession within the CCP 
As stated before, criticism and self-criticism has been in use within the 
CCP since its early days prior to 1949. The practice was rather standardised. It 
usually began with a collective criticism within a group. One individual would 
often be singled out from the group due to incorrect political ideology, low 
productivity or any other unsatisfactory performance. This person was subject to 
criticism not only from the group but also from oneself by confessing the 
‘mistake’ and showing the determination to repent. In most cases, the individual 
would be re-integrated into the group after the criticism and self-criticism (Wu, 
1979). With assistance from the use of alienation-themed rhetoric mentioned 
before, this process effectively generated fear of being alienated while enhancing 
group unity and cohesion (Schurmann, 1959). 
 Dittmer (1973) distinguishes two methods of criticism and self-criticism 
within the CCP: the one mentioned above originated from the ‘white’4 enemy-
controlled area under the leadership of Liu Shaoqi. The second is the one 
developed under Mao in the ‘red’ Yan’an revolutionary base. Due to the highly 
dangerous work environment, Liu advocated for a concise, concrete, structured 
 
4 ‘White’ enemy-controlled area: the description ‘white’ derives from the White Terror, which 
refers to the violent purge of the CCP members in many cities in China, notably in Shanghai 
where Liu Shaoqi was based, by the KMT in 1927. 
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and rationalised ‘principled redemptive struggle’ (Dittmer, 1973: 710). In other 
words, the goal of the inner-Party struggle to bridge the hiatus of ‘incorrect’ and 
‘correct’ thoughts. Liu’s ‘principled struggle’ made clear that criticism must 
‘submit to reason’ and concern the issue itself rather than attack the person. Once 
the decision was made, everyone must follow. However, individuals were allowed 
to reserve their opinions for the possibility that they might be proven right in the 
future. By contrast, Mao prioritised the correct substance in the debate. For 
example, Mao stressed the distinction between ‘antagonistic’ and ‘non-
antagonistic’ struggles – if the criticism questioned the leadership of the CCP, 
then it was simply ‘antagonistic’ and there was nothing to debate. There was a 
politically correct answer that was not subject to debate. Instead, one could only 
express support. Later, Mao extended this form of inner-party struggle to the 
wider population, maximising the participation of the ordinary masses. Thus, 
criticism and self-criticism had a secondary function: make use of the ensuing 
redemption of the confessant as a case study to educate the masses and garner 
their support. By criticising the targeted person, the masses were brought closer to 
the normative, turning grievances into drives for political changes. This was how 
‘remembering the bitterness’ was designed to win the poor peasants over.  
From the 1940s to the 1960s, Mao’s model gradually trumped Liu’s 
(Dittmer, 1973). From 1942 to 1949, a thought-reform movement in Yan’an 
called the Rectification Campaign took place in order to abolish ‘subjectivism’, 
‘factionalism’ and the rigid ‘eight-legged writing’5 within the CCP (Apter and 
Saich, 1994: 26). Criticism and self-criticism gradually turned into vicious 
personal attacks and a witch hunt for counterrevolutionaries during the so-called 
Rescue Movement led by Kang Sheng who was in charge of the intra-Party 
security. Self-criticism was often not accepted, leading to execution or suicide of a 
large number of cadres. Eventually, Mao had to intervene before the CCP as a 
party was structurally destroyed as losing too many cadres in key positions. Mass 
movements such as the Rectification Campaign forewarned of the kind of deadly 
personal attacks in the form of criticism and self-criticism that characterised many 
of the post-1949 political campaigns. After 1949, the CCP obtained the monopoly 
over the ‘instruments of violence’, ‘state patronage’ and ‘mass communications’ 
which were essential resources for top-down dissemination of identical messages 
 
5 The ‘eight-legged writing’ refers to the form of structured writing that people used to pass the 
imperial examinations in order to join the ruling government. 
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among the masses (Dittmer, 1973: 715). Meanwhile, it was the time when 
criticism and self-criticism spread outside the Party (Lu, 2004: 43). During the 
Land Reform (1950-1952), in order to justify the seizure of land from landlords 
and smash the repressive class, the peasants were encouraged to engage in 
‘spitting bitter water’ – speaking out loud against the ill-treatment and 
exploitation from the landlord. Landlords, on the other hand, were humiliated 
verbally, paraded through streets and forced to confess the ‘crimes’ of how they 
had exploited the peasants. Soon after the Land Reform, the Anti-Rightist 
Campaign (1957-1959) ensued and saw not only the CCP members but also 
intellectuals and some members of the decorative parties humiliating themselves 
and attacking each other for being anti-CCP and anti-Mao. Some of the criticism 
and self-criticism was even published in national newspapers for wider 
circulation.  A series of Mao’s failed policies in the 1950s, represented by the 
Great Leap Forward (GLF), meant that Mao was not only questioned by critical-
thinking intellectuals, but also his own comrades. There was a wider inner-Party 
disagreement on Mao’s judgement. Consequently, Mao and his followers at the 
top level increasingly reserved opinions in the face of disagreement, which led to 
a less frank deliberation. Meanwhile, Mao and his supporters consolidated their 
power by establishing extra-Party resources, such as the PLA and Mao’s alliance 
with Lin Biao (Dittmer, 1973: 720; Chang, 1970). Such defensive and self-
preserving reactions meant that Mao’s way of criticism and self-criticism rather 
than Liu’s had become dominant both inside and outside the CCP. 
 
Criticism during the Cultural Revolution: criticising for the sake of 
criticising 
As the transformation above shows, the purpose of criticism and self-
criticism changed. The domination of Mao’s model of criticism and self-criticism 
meant that its purpose was to ensure the successful implementation of Mao’s 
orders. It also moved away from purely educating the masses to making use of the 
masses. By the time of the Cultural Revolution, on the one hand, the confessors 
needed to encourage and generate reactions from the masses through the 
rectification of the confessant to push the revolution forward. The people who 
were encouraged to participate in the criticism needed to see that what they were 
doing was beneficial and transformative to the confessant. However, on the other 
hand, the gap between the ‘correct’ and the ‘incorrect’ must exist in order to 
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sustain the masses’ support and participation of the Cultural Revolution. 
Therefore, false accusations were common. What a person had actually done 
usually formed the basis of made-up accusations while the false part of the 
accusation often reflected the interests of those who demanded the self-criticism. 
Combining the true and the untrue parts, the ‘crimes’ eventually became framed 
so severely that sanctions at an institutional level were indisputably necessary. For 
example, Liu was wrongly accused of opposing proletarian dictatorship, class 
struggle and the policies related to Party-building (Dittmer, 1974). All three were 
the CCP’s primary advocacy at the time. By forcing Liu to admit to such 
accusations, criticising himself 6 and eventually expelling him regardless of his 
self-criticism, the authority demonstrated and reaffirmed its commitment to the 
masses. Hence, this contradictory yet symbiotic process of constantly needing 
confessants yet never accepting the apology caused substantial distortion of events 
and made-up accusations simply to maintain the momentum of the campaign. 
Criticism and self-criticism became catalysts for the violence within the whole of 
China during the Cultural Revolution.  
In 1980, four years after the end of the Cultural Revolution, Deng restored 
Liu’s vilified name in the ‘Resolution on the Rehabilitation of Comrade Liu 
Shaoqi’ in the Fifth Plenum of the 11th Central Committee (Dittmer, 1981: 467). 
Many wronged Party cadres had their names cleared, though many ordinary 
people did not. With the Party’s self-verdict on the Cultural Revolution as a 
disaster in which Mao was misled by the Gang of Four, the Party was eager to 
move on from the chaotic decade of political struggle. However, the memory of 
violence, disorder, retaliation and public naming and shaming never truly left; it 
remains to haunt China. The anniversary of the beginning of the Cultural 
Revolution still strikes the nerves of the Party. Many would agree that since Xi 
came to power in 2012, there has been a sense of the Cultural Revolution 
resurfacing in China. The rest of this chapter reviews the social and the political 
environment that has cultivated this sense and the way in which mediated 
confessions have returned in Xi’s China. 
 
 
6 Liu was accused of a long list of misconducts, but he did not confess to all the accusations. 
There is limited reliable data as to what Liu actually admitted to, but, according to Dittmer (1973: 
304), he never confessed that he was ‘Anti-Mao’.  
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1.3 Xi’s first five-year term (2013-2018)  
1.3.1 Cultural Revolution: 50 years on 
16 May 2016 marked the 50th anniversary of the beginning of the Cultural 
Revolution. During the days leading up to the anniversary, new books studying 
the period were published, interviews with ex-Red Guards appeared in 
newspapers and reflective articles flourished across social media outside China 
(Dikötter, 2016; Ramzy, 2016; Vasilogambros, 2016; Yu, 2016). However, many 
news and social media noted that the majority of the commemoration articles and 
activities happened outside mainland China (McDonell, 2016; Mitchell, 2016a; 
Phillips, 2016b). ‘Silence’, ‘amnesia’, ‘unmarked’ and ‘forgotten’ were popular 
words found in the headlines describing the fact that no major commemoration of 
this anniversary happened officially or unofficially in China. Only at midnight on 
the 17th of May did the People’s Daily – the mouthpiece of the CCP – publish a 
commentary reaffirming the official verdict on the period. The Cultural 
Revolution was a mistake; Mao was misled, and it would never happen again. To 
make sure that people remember the correct version of history, the framing of the 
Cultural Revolution in the official media has been tightly controlled and the 
relevant academic research limited. History taught in schools and universities in 
China strictly follows the Party’s sanctioned lines (MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, 
2006:179). Therefore, it is not surprising that the official media kept the 
anniversary low-key for fear of inducing unnecessary attention and dissent.  
Looking at the neon lights in the concrete jungle of any megacity in China 
today, few would consider the slightest chance of the Cultural Revolution’s 
return. However, as Santayana’s dictum goes: Those who cannot remember the 
past are condemned to repeat it. The younger generation does not have the 
opportunity or interest to know the non-official history of Mao’s time, including 
the Cultural Revolution. However inconceivable it seems, Nobel-prize winning 
author Gao Xingjian warns sharply: 
..., it is very likely that when people have forgotten about it, it will 
make a comeback, and people who have never gone crazy will go 
crazy, and people who have never been oppressed will oppress or be 
oppressed. This is because madness has existed since the birth of 
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humanity, and it is simply a question of when it will flare up again 
(2002: 195). 
Gao’s concern with the possible legacies of the Cultural Revolution has been 
shared among many scholars since the end of the revolution in 1976. For instance, 
MacFarquhar and Schoenhals believe that the use of military force on 4th June 
1989 ordered by Deng was a manifestation of the fear of returning to the kind of 
widespread anarchy during the Cultural Revolution (2006: 461). In recent years, 
the CCP has had even more reasons to keep silent on the topic. Upon the 50th 
anniversary of the start of the Cultural Revolution, the rise of the New Left and 
President Xi the ‘strongman’ became two prominent factors for the reticence. 
1.3.2 The Rise of the New Left 
After the Cultural Revolution, China gradually began experimenting with 
a controlled market economy. Deng Xiaoping’s opening-up policy meant that 
China gradually moved away from the endless ideological struggle. Consequently, 
the control over people’s thoughts and behaviours was loosened. Media flourished 
and the CCP was more tolerant towards what could be discussed in public. 
Although eventually shut down by the CCP, the Democracy Wall in Beijing was 
once a public focal point where people like Wei Jingsheng and Bei Dao voiced 
their alternative political visions for China. This was unthinkable in the 1960s. 
These rapid social, political and economic changes in the 1980s and 1990s led to 
growing social inequality, environmental degradation and corruption. These issues 
made a group of thinkers and politicians increasingly sceptical and critical about 
the political and economic reform at that time. Some of them had opposed Deng’s 
plan at the start as they regarded the controlled market economy as the equivalent 
of the abandonment of the socialist road. This school of thinking gave rise to the 
New Left (Shi et al., 2018). 
In the mid-1990s, there were many factions among the New Left but they 
shared the fundamental advocacy of social equality and justice in the aftermath of 
the 1989 Tiananmen Crackdown and the collapse of the USSR (Brown and Van 
Nieuwenhuizen, 2016). The social inequality made the New Left question a series 
of notions that the Party was championing at the time, such as China’s peaceful 
development and market. Instead, they called for continuing the socialism 
experiments, world struggle and a reassessment of the collapse of the Soviet 
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Union (Xia, 2010). It is easy to link all these beliefs upheld by the New Leftists to 
what Mao once more or less endorsed. As a result, the New Left is often 
associated with Neo-Maoism (Li, 2008).  
Many of the New Leftists were sensitive towards the term’s negative 
association with the Cultural Revolution and believed that such a label was too 
simplistic (Xu, 2003: 6; Brown and Van Nieuwenhuizen, 2016). Many rejected 
the title of the ‘New Left’. After all, the official culprits of the Cultural Revolution 
– the Gang of Four and Lin Biao – were labelled ‘ultra-Leftists’ by the CCP. The 
danger of the left-leaning worldview during the Cultural Revolution was deeply 
rooted in the mind of Deng and those who experienced it in person (Meng, 2018). 
During the highly symbolic pro-reform Southern Tour in 1992, Deng warned of 
the dangers of Leftism in particular, 
At present, Rightist tendencies are affecting us, as are ‘Leftist’ ones. 
But it is the ‘Leftist’ tendencies that are deep-seated. Some theorists 
and politicians try to scare the public with political labels. That is not 
Rightist, but ‘Leftist.’ ‘Leftism’ carries a revolutionary colour, giving 
the impression that the more ‘Left,’ the more revolutionary. ‘Leftist’ 
tendencies led to dire consequences in the history of the Party. Some 
fine things were destroyed overnight. Rightism may ruin socialism, so 
can ‘Leftism’. China should maintain vigilance against the ‘Right’ but 
should primarily guard against the ‘Left’ (1994:13). 
It was very clear that Deng’s real concern was about the Left, despite his mention 
of the Right at the same time. However, as social inequality, environmental 
degradation and corruption continued to worsen, a gradual left shift of policy 
eventually began in Hu Jintao’s era (2003-2013). Under Hu’s call to build a 
‘harmonious society’, some policies that had been promoted by the New Left 
intellectuals such as inner-Party democracy and elections at the local level were 
finally trialled in certain areas in China (Yu, 2006: 57). Nevertheless, it is also 
true that the old form of Leftism that Deng warned about seems to have resurfaced 
quietly, as I will show later in the case of Bo Xilai (Leonard, 2008). The CCP 
cannot afford to negate their advocacy for socialism but equally cannot afford to 
fall back to political anarchy or economic stagnation. This task is further 
complicated by the presence of Xi as the supreme leader of China. 
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1.3.3 Xi: the New Mao? 
New Left scholars once argued that the ‘strongmen politics’ exemplified 
by Mao and Deng was gone and that policy-making was now increasingly in the 
hands of ‘experts, the media and even public opinion’(Leonard, 2008: 76). 
However, President Xi has given China observers plenty of reasons to feel that the 
‘strongmen politics’ has returned, and with it even a flavour of the Cultural 
Revolution. Media in the West have picked up on it quickly (see Picture 2). As 
one can see, either it is Xi’s figure in Mao-style uniform or feudal emperor dragon 
robe, or the words and phrases such as ‘cult’, ‘must be obeyed’ and ‘mini-Mao’; 
these magazine covers send out a clear message that there is something in Xi that 
reminds one of Mao. A close examination of Xi reveals that Xi’s ‘princeling’ 
background, cult-like clout and rapid amassing of personal power and inclination 
to use coercive forces distinguish him from his immediate previous predecessors. 
Moreover, it conjures in many people’s memory or imagination echoes of 
Chairman Mao and his last revolution.  
 





Xi comes from a so-called ‘red’ family and is known as having a 
‘princeling’ background. Xi’s mother, Qi Xin, was a cadre working in the 
Marxism-Leninism Institution and as such she was always away from the family. 
Xi’s father Xi Zhongxun was a communist revolutionary who had a distinguished 
military career in the Sino-Japanese War and the Civil War. In the 1950s, Xi 
Zhongxun worked in the Ministry of Propaganda. Xi Zhongxun, like many other 
high-ranking CCP revolutionaries, was purged in Mao’s various campaigns in the 
1960s, including the Cultural Revolution. After Mao’s death, Xi Zhongxun was 
rehabilitated and ascended to become one of the ‘Eight Immortals’ who were 
high-ranking veteran Party revolutionaries and enjoyed paramount power in China 
after Mao’s death. As a close ally of Deng, Xi Zhongxun was appointed to lead 
the economic reform in Guangzhou Province and later pushed through the 
establishment of the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone. Xi Zhongxun thus 
became a symbol of reform and the opening-up policy (Barmé, 2015). Moreover, 
compared with other ‘Immortals’, Xi Zhongxun had a ‘clean’ history: as a fallen 
official, he did not implicate any other colleagues during the Cultural Revolution; 
nor did he approve of the use of military force in dealing with the student 
movement in 1989. These become intangible but invaluable assets for his son, Xi 
Jinping. Thanks to his father’s counterrevolutionary label in the 1960s, Xi was not 
qualified to join the Red Guard, who were infamous for physically and verbally 
abusing those they deemed as enemies during the Cultural Revolution. Instead, Xi 
was sent to the Shaanxi countryside to do hard manual labour in 1969. In 1974, Xi 
was finally allowed to join the CCP after over 10 attempts. Since then, Xi worked 
at various levels of the government, which is celebrated by the Party media as 
valuable experience for leading the country (StudyTimes, 2016). The ‘princeling’ 
background may arguably also encourage the self-belief of Xi that it is his mission 
to consolidate the CCP’s rule and save China in the face of social and economic 
challenges (Barmé, 2015). Sociologist Yang Guobin agrees that the first 
generation of the princelings firmly believe that they are the rightful owner of 
China who will lead nation, like the imperial hereditary system (Osnos, 2015).   
Personality cult? 
Xi’s princeling background and the speed of amassing personal power 
since he took office reminds many people of Mao. Like Mao in the Cultural 
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Revolution, Xi’s leadership saw the erosion of collective leadership in tandem 
with the rise of the leader’s personality cult (Luqiu, 2016). The zealous deity 
worship of top leaders seems to have died with Mao, but the leader idolising 
mentality lives on. Many post-Mao top leaders all had their particular titles. For 
instance, Deng was named the ‘architect of Chinese economic reform’. He also 
secured Jiang Zemin ‘the core of leadership’ when Jiang had lacked authority 
among the political elites in post-Tiananmen China. Jiang’s predecessor Hu Jintao 
never achieved the ‘core’ title officially. However, on 27 October 2016, the title 
had a new owner - Xi became the latest ‘core’ of the leadership at the 6th Plenum 
of the Central Committee (Bai, 2016). There has always been an emphasis on the 
special characteristics and absolute authority of the leader, though some leaders 
receive more than others. Their titles are widely distributed through the official 
media. Xi has amassed more titles than any other leader since the 1940s, including 
Mao (Barmé, 2015). In titular terms, Xi’s concentration of power reflects the 
number of official posts he is holding: Party Secretary-General and Chair of the 
Central Military Commission since November 2012; China's State President since 
14 March 2013; Commander in Chief of the Military's Joint Operations Command 
Centre since 21 April 2016; and the ‘core’ of the CCP Central Committee since 
October 2016 (Bai, 2016). Not surprisingly, Xi also has many unofficial titles 
given by China scholars, journalists and China observers: Xi dada (uncle/father 
Xi), Chairman of Everything, the New Mao, the New Helmsman (Wong and Lam, 
2018),  Emperor Xi (Beech, 2014). These titles are symbolic in terms of how Xi is 
packaged and presented to people inside and outside of China. The supremacy of 
Xi is easily decoded from the titles.  
There has been a noticeable difference in how the media packages Xi 
compared to his predecessors. The frequency of Xi’s appearance on the front page 
of the People’s Daily within the first 18 months after he came to power is higher 
than Hu Jintao and Jiang Zemin, and almost as high as Mao (see Figure 1 below). 
The official media also deploy subtler and more social-media-friendly framing 
techniques. For instance, there is a mobile phone app called ‘Study China’, which 
deconstructs the ‘wisdom’ in Xi’s official speeches. Xi's idolatry also manifests 
itself in the humanisation of the General Secretary. It is something that the CCP 
already experimented with ex-Premier Wen Jiabao, portraying him as 
compassionate ‘man of the people’ ('Profile: Wen Jiabao,' 2013). In a similar vein, 
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Xi has been shown as a caring husband, frequently featured in photos visiting 
ordinary workers and soldiers, eating at local cheap restaurants and receiving 
successful athletes. The reactions from the masses interacting with Xi are shown 
as positive, earnest and even exaggerated, like the reactions to Mao fifty years 
ago. Many who had the chance to shake hands with Xi, according to news 
sources, excitedly claimed that they would not wash their hands anymore (Linder, 
2018). Nevertheless, just like his predecessors, what Xi is really like as a person 
remains a mystery. The real Xi is still very little known (and probably will never 
be known to the public) despite the media’s efforts to build a humanised 
charismatic leadership (Batke and Ohlberg, 2016).  
 
Figure 1  Qian (2014): the frequency of leaders appearing on the front page of the People’s Daily within 18 
months of coming to power. 
However, Batke and Ohlberg (2016) argue that what Xi has today in China 
is not a personality cult. Compared with the cult Mao received in the 1960s, Xi’s 
lacks the sheer quantity of the hysteria and adulation. Instead, there is an 
Frequency of top leaders’ appearances on the front page of the People’s Daily within the first 











increasing feeling of Führerprinzip (leader principle, a concept often describing 
the rule of the Third Reich) (Barmé, 2015: xxii) – a conviction that some gifted 
people are born to rule and therefore should enjoy absolute loyalty. As the next 
section shows, Xi’s strongman image showcased in his flagship anti-corruption 
campaign, together with his princeling background, does demonstrate a sense that 
Xi is the one to realise the rejuvenation of the Middle Kingdom. 
 
 
Xi the Strongman 
There has been a clear rise of political repression through the use of 
coercive force in Xi’s era (Brown and Van Nieuwenhuizen, 2016; Brown, 2016: 
180). The crackdown on dissidents is said to be the harshest for decades 
(Makinen, 2016: para 3). Civil activists and legal workers are facing increasing 
pressure, with around 280 detained in the summer of 2015 alone (China: Events of 
2015, 2016). Some of them were convicted under the crime of ‘inciting 
subversion of state power’ or ‘picking quarrels and provoking trouble’ (Wu, 
2015). The media in China is also under tighter control. During Xi’s visit to China 
Central Television (CCTV) in February 2016, a slogan in bright red declaring that 
‘CCTV’s surname is “The Party”. [We the institution are] absolutely loyal. Ready 
for your inspection’ appeared prominently featured in the background (Zhuang, 
2016). The famous liberal magazine Yanhuang Chunqiu was forced to close in 
order to resist the state institution takeover (Yu, 2016). Some people, such as 
foreign NGO workers, Hong Kong booksellers and online public intellectuals, 
were put on show trials or forced to confess on TV. Another group of people 
facing clampdown are corrupt officials. According to a Pew survey in 2015, 
corruption is the biggest concern for Chinese people (Wike and Parker, 2015). 
The survey also shows that 63 per cent of people believe that corruption will 
decrease in the next five years. This optimism coinciding with Xi’s anti-
corruption campaign has become a familiar topic inside and outside China. Xi has 
vowed to crush both high-level Party officials, known as ‘tigers’, and low-level 
cadres, known as ‘flies’.  
The campaign began with the dramatic downfall of Bo Xilai. Being a 
princeling like Xi, Bo was a charismatic, powerful and ambitious Party chief of 
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Chongqing and a Politburo member. He was once a promising candidate to take 
over the position of Party General Secretary from Hu. He was famous for his 
socialist development strategy called the ‘Chongqing Model’, echoing largely 
what the aforementioned New Left appeals for (Zhao, 2012a: para 2). He brutally 
clamped down on local gangs and criminals, increased social welfare and 
strengthened the public sector. However, some of his campaigns were on the more 
controversial side of the Left. He turned Chongqing Satellite TV into a ‘public 
service broadcast’ by prohibiting commercials (Meng, 2018: 4).  He also 
organised events such as ‘singing red and reclaiming the revolution’ and 
recounted revolutionary stories which were direct tributes to Maoist pursuits 
(Meng, 2018). However, Bo’s right-hand man - the police chief of Chongqing - 
Wang Lijun escaped to the US consulate on 2 February 2012 to seek political 
asylum. It marked the beginning of Bo’s public downfall. A month later, hinting 
on Bo’s case and his iconic policies, the then Premier Wen Jiabao urged the Party 
and the people not to let China go through ‘historical tragedies’ such as the 
Cultural Revolution during an NPC press conference (Branigan, 2012). Bo’s case 
became more eye-catching after his wife admitted the murder of British 
businessman Neil Heywood who was deeply linked to Bo’s family and their 
enormous wealth.  
Bo thus became the first ‘tiger’ captured by Xi’s anti-corruption campaign 
(Moore, 2013). In a public show trial, despite his self-defence, Bo was found 
guilty of accepting bribes and abusing power and sentenced to life imprisonment. 
Four years into this campaign, it has come to be known as one of the most far-
reaching campaigns since Mao’s death (Lockett, 2016: para 2). Since its 
inception, the campaign has been producing an ever-growing blacklist of corrupt 
officials. According to ChinaFile’s data, by July 2018, there were 254 ‘tigers’ and 
2193 ‘flies’ who were either under investigation or arrested and sentenced 
(Barreda et al., 2018). They were from various sectors, ranging from the State-
owned Enterprises (SOE), military and law to mining, education and media. The 
campaign continues to grow and spread at the time of writing. 
While exposing and disciplining ‘tigers’ and ‘flies’, Xi’s anti-corruption 
campaign also raises concerns about a Mao-style political purge. News reports, 
such as the scale-down of the Communist Youth League (CYL), keep giving rise 
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to the suspicion that Xi’s anti-corruption campaign is actually a political purge 
against his rivals (Hornby, 2016). This was a technique Mao often used to 
remould the CCP, especially during the Cultural Revolution. Scaling down the 
size of the CYL has been widely regarded as a huge blow to the powerful faction 
which includes the current Premier Li Keqiang and the former President Hu 
Jintao. This elite power struggle attracts considerable attention and many China 
observers and journalists interpret it as Xi’s grander plan to become a more 
powerful leader. Before the 19th Party Congress in 2017, there was wide 
speculation that Xi was probably going to defy the unwritten leadership retirement 
rule (Mitchell, 2016). Instead of retiring in 2022 after a decade of being the top 
leader in China, Xi may remain in power. Therefore, the anti-corruption campaign 
could be Xi’s opportunity to replace anyone who is capable of challenging him 
from staying longer in power with those Xi can trust. The campaign so far has 
relied heavily on the party disciplinary mechanism rather than law and regulation. 
This opaque process has led to dozens of cases of suicide and death from 
unnatural causes by ‘excessive work pressure and mental stress’. Scholars such as 
Yuen (2014) express their concern that without the rule of law during the anti-
corruption campaign, other forms of power abuse will spread. Some are 
concerned that the campaign may backfire in the future after too many corruption 
cases are revealed and people start to blame the central government.  For now, a 
familiar form of power abuse has already surfaced: before someone is tried by the 
court, the person is put on TV to confess their wrongdoings. 
1.3.4 A resurgence of mediated confessions 
Xi’s era has witnessed the resurgence of mediated confessions. The recent 
phenomenon featuring a person apologising for his or her wrongdoing on TV is 
known as ‘televised confession’ (dianshi chanhui or dianshi bigong). As 
mentioned before, confession is neither uniquely Chinese nor an invention of Xi’s 
era. It has a long history in religious practice both within and outside China 
(Tentler, 1977; Wu, 1979). Outside the realm of religion, it has taken many forms 
over the years, such as autobiographies, psychoanalytical therapies, legal 
confessions, governance strategies and political show trials (Foucault, 1998; 
Payne, 2007; Taylor, 2009; Hu, 2012). With the development of technology, 
media has also revamped confession, blurring the public-private boundary, 
thereby altering its function and transforming its power (Burkart, 2010; Liu, 
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2018). However, mediated confessions in China have so far received very little 
attention from academics.  Most of the existing literature remains focusing on the 
Mao era (Dittmer, 1973; Hu, 2012; Sun, 2013). In this section, I review the 
limited literature on the mediated confessions in Xi’s era. 
Fiskesjö is one of the few scholars who has directed their attention to the 
recent TV confessions. From the perspective of Soviet show trials and ‘clean 
torture’, he argues that TV confessions, as a form of staged conformity, show the 
domination and gross violation of human rights (Fiskesjö, 2017: 18). In early 
2018, the rights group Safeguard Defenders pioneered the publication of a book 
which summarises the characteristics of recent TV confessions. Selective as it 
may be, the book reveals the coercive measures behind the seemingly voluntary 
acts between 2013 and 2018. The interviews with 45 confessants show that they 
were pressured, threatened or even tortured into conducting TV confessions. The 
confessants revealed that they were either told exactly what to say or given 
general scripts of the confession. The directors of TV confessions turned out to be 
security agents rather than staff from the CCTV. The report highlights the purpose 
of TV confessions as three ‘Ds’: deny, denounce and defend (Gardner, 2018; 
Safeguard Defenders, 2018). ‘Deny’ means that the confession often includes 
lines rebutting criticism towards the Party. ‘Denounce’ is that the confessant is 
ordered to attack certain people, organisations, or even a nation in his or her 
confession. The last task for the confessant is to ‘defend’. Not only does the 
confessant have to reject the criticism against the Party, but he or she also has to 
praise the government, the security agents, the legal system or even the 
crackdown on him or herself.  
 Despite the hitherto limited academic attention, the aforementioned 
researchers and their teams have provided an invaluable account of the story 
behind some mediated confessions and insightful interpretation of such practices. 
This thesis will demonstrate later that the three ‘Ds’ are indeed present in the 
sample confession. Moreover, while making use of the limited amount of 
information about contemporary mediated confessions, I will further argue that 
instead of viewing TV confessions as a media spectacle on the same scale as a 
show trial, the framing of the TV confession bears greater resemblance to 




This chapter briefly reviews the history of the Cultural Revolution and 
presents the rationale for choosing a top-down elite-focused approach to study the 
decade in which Mao and his followers almost destroyed the very patriarchal 
political system that he and other colleagues had built. Grounded in the cultural 
history and political situation of the time, Mao’s personality and the rhetoric, as 
well as the practice of criticism and self-criticism, played an indispensable role in 
promoting and intensifying Mao’s movements. Initially, Mao’s cult was built in 
order to counter the clout of Chiang Kai-shek, who was promoted as the only 
saviour for China by the KMT. However, it was transformed into a social 
structure where Mao was the centre and eventually became an immensely 
powerful figurehead for the promotion and legitimisation of the Cultural 
Revolution. The rhetoric during the Cultural Revolution actively made use of the 
seemingly rejected traditional Chinese thinking. By fusing Marxist revolutionary 
ideas with traditional Chinese rituals, analogies and myths, the CCP managed to 
convert China to a communist revolutionary base which followed only Mao’s 
teaching. Meanwhile, by condemning Confucianism as the symbol of repression 
and using a highly thought-stifling language, the CCP encouraged the masses to 
rebel and incite fear among any potential challengers. The Cultural Revolution 
rhetoric alienated ‘the enemies’ from ‘the people’, while the former served as a 
symbolic target to strengthen the bond between the latter and the Party.  
Confessional practices have also been used as an inner-Party disciplinary 
mechanism to deal with disagreements, represented by Liu Shaoqi’s model of 
criticism and self-criticism (Sun, 2013). However, Mao’s way of criticism formed 
during the Yan’an time eventually became the prototype of the criticism sessions 
characterised by personal attacks during the Cultural Revolution. The confessional 
practices mutated into an institutionalised mass educational mobilisation strategy. 
The distinction between the correct ideology and the ‘incorrect thoughts’ was 
often ’artificially polarised’ in order to sustain the legitimacy of the Cultural 
Revolution (Dittmer, 1973: 314). The death of Mao and the arrest of the Gang of 
Four drew a conclusion to the Cultural Revolution. As the thesis later shows, the 
mediated confession seemed to have disappeared from people’s daily lives as 
well. Yet, the strong leadership of Xi after the rise of the New Left draws people’s 
attention back to Mao; the resurgence of the confessions on TV invokes the 
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people’s memories of the Cultural Revolution. In this sense, although Mao died in 
1976 and the Cultural Revolution concluded shortly later, the leadership cult 
exemplified by Mao and the Cultural-Revolutionary-style movements still haunt 
China to this day. Both the self-criticism during Mao’s time and the televised 
confession that have resurfaced today in Xi’s era rely on Chinese official media to 
disseminate the message and spread influence. In the next chapter, I turn my 
attention to the official media in China and underline the socio-political system 























Chapter 2. Chinese Official Media 
As suggested in Chapter 1, the popularisation of the practice of self-
criticism and confession was facilitated by the official Chinese media. In order to 
understand the facilitating role of the official media in China in the creation of a 
sense of revival of the Cultural Revolution today, it is essential to scrutinise how 
it functioned during the Cultural Revolution and trace its broad progression and 
regression on the road of reform. Media in China generally has the reputation of 
being a propaganda machine, which is very different from its counterpart’s 
expected watchdog function in a liberal democracy (Zhao, 1998; He, 2008; 
Young, 2013). While there is no denying that Chinese media has been widely 
used for CCP ideological indoctrination, one will undoubtedly oversimplify the 
wider picture if they reduce the official media in China to pure ‘propaganda’. This 
is due to the fact that the complexity of the media’s function has increased since 
the economic reform after the Cultural Revolution.  
The purpose of this chapter is to contextualise the official media in China 
in terms of the ‘Party Principle’ and the reform with ‘Chinese characteristics’. In 
doing so, I highlight the major contradictions between political control and 
information diversity brought by the economic reform. These contradictions shape 
the role of official media in China at different times and ultimately have an impact 
on the understanding of the appearance of self-criticism and confession in media 
throughout the past century. This chapter begins with a clarification of the 
definition of ‘official media’ and then examines three impactful factors that affect 
the function of the official media: the Party Principle (dangxing yuanze), western 
media values and commercialisation. I conclude the chapter by arguing that, 
despite the fact that western media values and media commercialisation have 
challenged the CCP’s monopoly over information, a fundamentally unchanged 
political system in China largely means fundamentally unchanged Party 
journalism. 
2.1 ‘Official media’ in China 
Chinese ‘official media’ is a term that many scholars often use without 
giving a clear definition, assuming everyone more or less knows what ‘official 
media’ includes. Some highlight its special relationship with and ownership by the 
CCP or the state (Nyíri, 2006: 88; Kennedy, 2009: 533; Shirk, 2010: 5, 105). 
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Some suggest that official media are those under heavy censorship (Lee et al., 
2006: 582; Qiang, 2011: 49). Others omit any elaboration at all (Hurst, 2004: 104; 
Gill and Huang, 2006: 27; Hoddie, 2006: 27; Yan, 2010: 495).  Among those who 
give a clear definition, Peng and Winfield (2005: 261) describe ‘official 
mainstream media’ as a ‘media organisation directly owned and operated by the 
government at central level’, including Xinhua News Agency, the People’s Daily, 
the Global Times, CCTV, to name just a few. This definition is the closest to the 
‘official media’ used in this thesis: those which are state-owned or CCP-owned, 
circulating nationwide plus having a history extending before the reform in the 
late 1970s. It thus includes the People’s Daily, CCTV and Xinhua News Agency. 
It is a definition tailored for this research and is explained below. 
To be an ‘official’ media organisation is to directly represent the CCP, 
who has been the most dominant arbiter in China since 1949. The characterisation 
of the ‘official model’ of broadcasting from Luo (1983) captures the core 
characteristics of the ‘official media’ in this thesis. The duty of the media to the 
CCP often overrides everything else. They are structured similar to government 
organisations so that they are easy to coordinate. Their media products are usually 
propagandistic, doctrinaire and pedantic; hence their relationship with the 
audience is primarily top-down and one-directional. ‘Circulating nationwide’ 
means that the media has a wide reach, which is often an indication of importance. 
This criterion makes sure that it is the most important affairs for the Party 
collectively that are under scrutiny. Similarly, ‘to have existed before the reform’ 
is to enable a more consistent data collection process. Moreover, its continuous 
existence signals the importance of the media. As this chapter explains, media in 
China has been through cyclical processes of expansion and proliferation to 
restriction and reduction. Those media which survived all the turmoil are the most 
crucial for the Party, the most susceptible to its influence and the most successful 
in adapting to the rapidly changing political and economic climate. Having 
defined the ‘official media in China’ used in this thesis, I now turn my attention to 
the key aspects of the pendulum-like development of the media system in China 
since the Cultural Revolution. 
The concept and the structure of news reporting in the early days of the 
PRC remained much the same as in the pre-1949 period. The contemporary 
Chinese media news (since the 1870s) was initially modelled on western media 
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when the western colonisation in China began at the start of the twentieth century. 
It then copied the Soviet model when the CCP gradually consolidated its power 
(Chen, 1947: 1). When media first entered China, being named the ‘mouthpiece of 
the people’ (weimin houshe) was praise for newspapers (Chen, 1947: 1). In other 
words, it was a journalistic professional norm and something worth being proud 
of to speak for the people at the time.  
The media was gradually modelled on its Soviet counterparts throughout 
the republic era. In the late 1910s and early 1920s, a group of people, some of 
who later became core members of the CCP, created newspapers to criticise 
imperialism and warlords. As journalists, they witnessed the life of ordinary 
people and appealed for support from workers and peasants while trying to avoid 
censorship. It was during this process that the communists experienced first-hand 
that the purpose of news could be more than disseminating information (Zhao, 
1998). They realised that news propaganda was an essential part of a political 
struggle because it could garner people’s support and at the same time collect 
intelligence for the Party. Since then, the CCP has always clearly claimed the 
political function of media and used media as such. Direct and explicit Confucian 
influences are not mentioned or referred to in either model. 
After 1949, the media in China held a dual identity – it was both a media 
and an administrative organisation, meaning it was under the supervision of both 
the state and the CCP. The Party’s focus shifted to ideological development, 
leaving the government responsible for the supervision of the daily running of 
newspapers. However, the Party bureaucracy, such as the Politburo and the 
Central Propaganda Department, often weighed in on substantive issues (Zhao, 
1998: 22). In fact, when facing crucial editorial decisions, it was often the Party 
Secretary as the highest authority in media who finalised the decision (Zhao, 
1998: 21). From the Broadcasting Bureau to provincial local media, they were all 
under the dual leadership of the state and the Party. However, as the attempt to 
separate the state and the CCP has never really been successful, the CCP has 
always had an impact on the media. 
2.1.1The Party Principle 
The dual identity of media in China means that they are prone to the 
influence of the Party ideology; thus they tend to churn out propaganda. In the 
Chinese context, what ‘churning out propaganda’ really means is to obey the 
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Party Principle. Inherited from Lenin’s view on the role of media, the Party 
Principle is a belief that ‘the Party newspaper should be the Party’s collective 
propagandist, agitator, and organiser’, which is ‘instrumental in shaping the 
Chinese Party’s journalism policy’ (Zhao, 1998: 19). In other words, news is less 
about reporting the latest events, and more about facilitating whatever the Party 
tries to promote. As early as the 1920s, the CCP made the importance of media 
clear by declaring that ‘[j]ournals, daily publications, books and booklets must be 
managed by the Party’s central executive committee’ and that ‘no central or local 
publications should carry any article that opposes the Party’s principles, policies 
and decisions’ (Tong and Cheng, 1993: 147). From the very early days, the CCP 
set out to implement the Party Principle and never hesitated to claim its control 
over media. Later, Mao further strengthened such notions by detailing four 
functions of the media: disseminating CCP policies from the central to the local, 
educating, organising and mobilising the masses (Bishop, 1989). Mao’s vision of 
the top-down one-directional communication required strict control over the 
media by the Party, and the Party had many means to do so. Through ownership, 
the CCP often released general rules on media regulation in the CCP 
announcements and top leaders’ speeches. There were also some specific 
guidelines on news reporting. For instance, certain incidents required particular 
timeliness, such as the death of important personalities, foreigners in China or 
Chinese overseas ('Central Party Propaganda Department, Central Party External 
Propaganda Group, Xinhua News Agency, "Several Suggestions on Improving 
News Reporting",' 1993). Furthermore, the CCP was able to directly order what 
topics were covered, corresponding to the political tasks of the time. Through 
censorship, the Party could ban certain politically dangerous topics. The state 
apparatus guaranteed legal punishment for those who failed to follow the Party 
Principle. However, all these rules of control were subject to amendment or 
overturn as the CCP saw appropriate, hence the rules were often subject to 
frequent changes.  
The Party Principle reached an extreme point during the Cultural 
Revolution (Bishop, 1989: 93). At the time, the majority of the newspapers ceased 
publication, leaving only 43 within the whole country (China Statistical Yearbook 
1993, 1993: 785). The People’s Daily, the People's Liberation Army Daily (PLA 
Daily) and the Red Flag Magazine were the three most important publications 
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remaining in circulation, and these media were where Mao and the CCRG passed 
on their most important orders. Many radio programmes were duplicates of this 
official news or Mao’s writings (Lynch, 1999: 22). The news was full of sweeping 
claims inciting class hatred and blind extolment of Mao. Be it choosing content or 
even font, there was little editorial independence. Zhao describes that the lack of 
diversity of information sources ‘led to a situation in which a single editorial in 
People’s Daily could shape a whole mass movement’ (Zhao, 1998: 32-33). 
Accordingly, Lynch named this style of control a form of ‘communication 
compression’ (1999: 22). The CCP used deliberate manipulation, distortion and 
exaggeration in this ‘compressed communication’ to serve political purposes.  
2.1.2 Western media values 
After Mao’s death, media reform, as part of economic reform, took place 
in the late 1970s. According to the reform plan, the official media was no longer 
an ‘instrument of class struggle’ (Zhao, 1998: 34). Rather, it was to facilitate the 
new focus of the CCP: economic development. During this fairly economy-
focused and comparatively politically relaxed period, media started the attempt to 
be a partially-marketised business and experimented with western news values, 
which I will explain in detail shortly below. Despite some backlashes in terms of 
media control and censorship, such as the Tiananmen Square crackdown, Chinese 
media and the way the CCP use it have changed significantly. Six forces drove the 
transformation of the media in China: the Party, the state, capital, professional 
journalists, individual media users and Chinese culture (Luo, 2015: 51).  Many 
scholars regard the first three forces as the most influential factors in the current 
Chinese media system, also known as Commercialisation Authoritarianism or 
Marketised Authoritarianism (Zhao, 1998; Zhao, 2004; Murphy, 2007; Sparks, 
2008; Stockmann, 2012). By contrast, professional journalists, individual media 
users and Chinese culture appear to be less impactful. Professional journalists 
usually do not have the final say in the production of media programmes; 
individual media consumers have limited say in the production of programmes 
primarily aiming for ideological indoctrination, despite the fact that they can 
provide feedback for media programmes; culture influences media in a more 
pervasive but intangible way, which is very difficult to isolate from the other 
forces. Therefore, in this section, I mainly focus on the first three dominant forces: 
the Party, the state and the capital. The three factors manifest themselves in two 
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prominent phenomena that occurred to the media in China: the introduction of 
western media values and the popularisation of commercialisation.  
Liberal democratic news values re-entered China after 1978, among which 
the most prominent were freedom of the press, ‘People Principle’ and journalism 
law (Zhao, 1998: 34). These values are among the many assumptions 
underpinning the use of framing theory in liberal democratic media studies, which 
I will discuss in more detail in Chapter 3. Here, I illustrate the influences and 
limitations of these values in studying Chinese media during the reform era. These 
western media ideals temporarily inspired new possibilities of what Chinese 
journalism could be. Facts were given special attention after Deng’s advocacy for 
‘seek[ing] truth from facts’. The scope of news that was covered expanded 
rapidly. Coverage of human interest, disasters and crimes, which had been ignored 
in the past, began appearing in news. Sometimes, news exposing the wrongdoings 
of local government would even lead to punishment from Beijing. Truthfulness, 
brevity, timeliness, liveliness and readability became important (Zhao, 1998: 34). 
While insisting on the media’s role as the mouthpiece of the CCP, the then Party 
General Secretary, Hu Yaobang, allowed the call for more editorial independence. 
In October 1987, the then Party Secretary, Zhao Ziyang, listed media reform, 
alongside political reform, in the agenda of the Thirteenth NPC. At the same time, 
the media’s role as the Party’s mouthpiece was dropped from the reform agenda 
after heated debates (Polumbaum, 1990: 41). This was partly because the 
discourse advocating for media democratisation such as freedom of the press, the 
‘People Principle’ and media law which regulates and protects people working in 
the media industry had entered the discussion, giving Chinese media some 
potential new roles in society (Zhao, 1998: 41; Wu and Wu, 2004). 
For those living in China, talking about ‘freedom of the press’ seems to be 
such a taboo and utopian topic today. However, it was included in the discussion 
of media reform in the 1980s (Zhao, 1998: 36). It was not only autonomy for the 
press but for every individual Chinese citizen as well. Hu Jiwei, former editor-in-
chief of the People’s Daily, once explained, 
The kind of press freedom we want to advocate is press freedom for 
all the people and not just press freedom for news workers. Freedom 
of the press for citizens is the right to be kept informed as masters of 
the country, their right of political consultation, their right of 
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involvement in government and their right of supervision over the 
Party and government (1989: 8). 
Article 42 of China’s Constitution declares that ‘all citizens possess freedom of 
speech’ provided it does not harm the nation, the society and other people’s lawful 
rights (Shao et al., 2016: 41). Indeed, Hu’s statement emphasized the ‘right’ of 
individuals to supervise the Party – something guaranteed by the law and 
constitution. Nonetheless, this kind of freedom worried the CCP because it went 
against the Party Principle of the media’s educational and indoctrinating role, and 
because it might lead to social instability. Wang Ruoshui, ex-People’s Daily chief 
editor, appealed to the Party by arguing that it was bureaucracy and corruption 
that led to social chaos. The media could, by contrast, contribute to easing the 
social tension by functioning as a supervisor ('Mainland Scholars Talk Freely 
about Freedom of the Press,' 1988). 
Some scholars proposed the idea of the ‘People Principle’ in the early 1980s 
to replace the long-standing Party Principle. Initially, it was criticised but re-
entered the political discussion in 1987. This idea was premised on the lesson 
from the ‘Party Principle’ and the Cultural Revolution. Gan (1994: 45) elaborates: 
… the lesson of the holocaust of the ten-year Cultural Revolution has 
taught us that the Party’s leadership, even the Party Central 
Committee, may commit mistakes. When mistakes are made and 
when the Party’s press blindly executes the leadership’s intentions, 
newspapers themselves are committing serious mistakes. Therefore, 
upon discovering mistakes, editorial departments should not blindly 
implement their instructions. Newspapers should put the interests of 
the people above everything else and be run accordingly… When a 
communist society is attained, even the Party will be eliminated. Yet 
the people are permanent, they live forever! 
This interpretation of the People Principle was rather radical from the CCP’s 
point of view because it pointed out the detrimental mistakes the CCP had 
made and its ultimate demise in the realisation of a Communist society. This 
was a fairly honest claim but unacceptable for some of the CCP leaders. 
Discussing the ultimate demise of the CCP after talking about the Cultural 
Revolution carried a tincture of heresy. A less radical view on the People 
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Principle argued that media should serve both the Party and the people 
(Qian, 1989). Even this interpretation was a direct challenge to the CCP, as 
the Party had always thought of themselves as representing and speaking for 
the people. Stressing the ‘People Principle’ implied otherwise. 
As a part of the campaign that strived to move China away from the 
lawlessness that characterised the Cultural Revolution, there were proposals 
that journalism should have its own ‘law’ of functioning to guide what the 
media should be doing. The number of laws and regulations overseeing 
media at both the national and local level has been on the rise since the 
1990s. Defamation law is one of the common ways to control and punish 
those who do not toe the official line (Liebman, 2011: 845-846). As 
Stockmann reveals, the media loses the majority of the cases according to 
her journalist and lawyer sources (2012). Meanwhile, the media and courts 
have developed a complex relationship. On the one hand, the CCP actively 
uses the media to promote its dedication to its version of ‘rule of law’, 
which is different from its conventional western counterpart, as I will 
explain further in the later chapters (Liebman, 2011). On the other hand, the 
CCP also indirectly controls the court through funding, personnel 
management as well as media framing of court cases in some instances 
(Liebman, 2007; Lin, 2012: 424). As this research demonstrates, the official 
media and the court collude with the Party to support certain political 
campaigns in some cases. In other cases, the official media appear to replace 
the court to ‘pass’ a verdict and produce the illusion of a guilty verdict 
through its media framing. In this way, the CCP diversifies the means to 
control media while shifting responsibility from the political administration 
to the legal system.  
Despite the discussion about the ideas of the freedom of the press, the 
People Principle and the ‘rule of law’ inspired by western liberal media 
values, the real impact of them in China was ‘loud thunder, small raindrops’ 
(Starck and Xu, 1988: 143). Very little consensus existed on these ideas as 
there were too many factions splitting among the political elites on the issue 
of reform. Western media often described China’s reform in the 1980s as a 
tug-of-war between ‘Reformer vs Hardliner’ (Zhao, 1998: 42), as if both 
sides were a unified entity. In reality, there were so many factions within the 
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reform campaign that they never reached sufficient consensus to push any of 
their ideas through. Neo-authoritarians believed that China was not ready to 
embark on the road of democracy supported by media freedom and still 
needed time to enhance its citizen’s knowledge and ability before putting an 
end to paternalistic rule. There were also the technocrats driving the actual 
operational reform in the 1980s. Relying on giving ‘scientific training’ and 
creating ‘professional occupations’, they believed that being practical was 
the correct way to tackle all social issues (Zhao, 1998: 42). Then there were 
the democrats advocating that China’s modernization needed democracy 
and that only by participating in democracy could the Chinese people 
understand and live with democracy (Zhao, 1998: 43). They wanted to enact 
laws to protect journalists’ rights and at least have part of the media 
independent of the CCP (Jernow, 1993; Sun, 1994). All three groups of 
reformers had their various emphases and disagreements on what was best 
for China. Consequently, concrete reform measures that they all could agree 
on were few.  
Worst still, all of the discussions halted in the face of the Tiananmen Square 
crackdown in the summer of 1989. It marked a major setback for all reforms, 
including media, as the Party Principle made a full-scale return. Jiang Zemin, who 
took over the role of the CCP Party Secretary after the crackdown, gave a speech 
reiterating the media’s mouthpiece role (Jiang, 1990). Li Ruihuan, who was the 
Central Committee member in charge of propaganda, also stressed the positive 
function of media propaganda which the CCP had historically made use of and 
called for the continuation of this tradition (Li, 1990). Hence, there would be no 
substantial structural change in the media. Pro-reform journalists, editors and 
government staff were replaced by conservative ones. A ‘Leadership Team on 
Ideological and Propaganda Work’ under the Politburo member Ding Guan’gen 
was established to reassert ideology into media (Zhao, 1998: 46-47). Restrictions 
on media that had been loosened during the 1980s were tightened again. The 
discourse on the freedom of the press, together with other liberal media inspired 
ideas, disappeared quietly. The media reform has since then been on the economic 
and technological side.  
In short, the economic reform in China had a tremendous influence on the 
media industry. It brought about a range of Western media values, such as 
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freedom of the press, the ‘People Principle’ and media law. Due to the 
disagreement among the political elites in terms of which reform route was best 
for China, these values were never thoroughly or systematically applied. 
However, they were under heated discussion among the Party, the intellectuals 
and the public. The more lasting impact of the media in China is 
commercialisation, which re-started in the 1980s and accelerated after the setback 
of 1989. Official media, unlike local media which had less influence and thus 
faced less control from the CCP, were under the most pressure to balance being 
the mouthpiece of the CCP and attracting readership at the same time. The 
tradition of the CCP political communication means that the two were often at 
odds with each other – CCP propaganda is infamous for its emptiness and lack of 
readability, as the analysis of this research will show. However, the CCP has been 
evolved in terms of its political communication. It has adapted to the latest 
technology, which is discussed later in the section on media in Xi’s era (Lee, 
2009; Stockmann, 2012). My focus below is the influence of one force of 
capitalism – commercialisation. 
 
2.1.3 Commercialisation 
Commercialisation in China experienced waves of progression and 
regression since 1949. It existed briefly in Mao’s era. Chinese media, like many 
other industries at the time, used to emulate the way its Soviet ‘Big Brother’ ran 
its country (Lu, 1979/80; Bishop, 1989: 92). However, after the denunciation of 
Stalin inside the Soviet Union in 1956, China gradually sought to break away 
from its influence. Hence, Chinese media developed in a more indigenous way. 
The CCP permitted advertising and a few commercial newspapers because the 
traditional Party newspapers were simply not appealing enough to urban residents 
(Zhao, 2008: 79). Major newspapers such as the People’s Daily began to learn 
from Western media, expanding coverage, including public debates and 
improving their writing style. The People’s Daily even became financially 
independent thanks to advertisements (Fang and Chen, 1992: 83-84). However, 
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after the ‘Hundred Flowers Movement’7 backfired and the Anti-Rightist Purge8 
began, the Party’s attitude towards private-owned commercial newspapers 
consequently became rather discouraging. Media censorship thus increased. For 
example, newspapers could only publish pro-CCP materials; Government officials 
often refused to give much information during interviews with commercial 
newspaper journalists because of their ‘intrusive’ way of asking questions (Zhao, 
1998: 16). As the planned and collective economy went ahead, advertising 
became increasingly difficult to find. The result was that the number of 
commercial newspapers plummeted. Between 1950 and 1952, all 58 commercial 
newspapers died out (Sun, 1988: 61). Similarly, all 33 commercial radios had 
disappeared by 1953 (Zhao, 1998: 17). What was left was the kind of media 
which followed a strictly top-down order (central – provincial – municipal) and 
was monopolised by the CCP.  
The situation did not change until the end of the Cultural Revolution. 
Media reform began at the same time as the economic reform (Shao et al., 2016). 
In 1978, the Ministry of Finance introduced a business management system into 
some media in Beijing, such as the People’s Daily. One year later, the first 
advertisement in the post-Mao era appeared on Shanghai Television, marking a 
re-start of media commercialisation in the PRC (Zhao, 1998). Meanwhile, thanks 
to the economic growth, the number of TVs, radios and other forms of media in 
individual households increased dramatically. The number of TV sets shot up 
from 3.4 million in 1978 to 230 million in 1992 (Zhao, 1998: 53). More demands 
for television content meant that the media needed to provide more channels, 
more programmes and more broadcasting time. Government at all levels soon 
began to struggle to fund the growing demand. The central government could only 
provide roughly 9 per cent of what was needed for the print media technological 
 
7 The Hundred Flower Movement (1956-1957) was a period when Mao tried to secure the 
support of intellectuals and scientists for his economic development policies. Mao thus relaxed 
the culture, art, media, and science sectors to encourage intellectuals to freely voice their 
opinions. For more information, see Roderick MacFarquhar (1974) The hundred flowers campaign 
and the Chinese intellectuals.  
8 The Anti-Rightist Purge immediately followed the Hundred Flower Movement as it backfired. 
Some criticism even questioned the right of the CCP to rule. The amount of criticism that the 
Party received prompted Mao to fiercely attack those who voiced their concerns during the 
Hundred Flower Movement. Mao ordered Deng Xiaoping to be in charge of the purge of over half 
a million such people (Dikötter, 2011). Among them, many were intellectuals and students. They 




renovation in the 1980s (Zhao, 1998: 53). Consequently, advertising became the 
lifeline for Chinese media. The revenue reached around 618 billion yuan (£70bn) 
in 2018 (Reporter of the Industry, 2018: para 2). 
Since the late 1970s, advertising, both from home and abroad, has been the 
most important non-governmental financial support for most media in China 
(Zhao, 1998). Especially in the 1990s, the advertising rate in China was one of the 
lowest in the world and thus attracted many global commercial giants such as 
Casio, Hitachi, Toyota, Coca-Cola and IBM. This money brought a boom to 
China’s media industry. The year of 1992, according to Joseph Chan, ‘will be 
remembered as the year of commercialisation’(Chan, 1993: 25.2). He argues that 
the commercialisation since 1992 is as significant as the demand for 
democratisation in the late 1980s. In early 1992, Deng made a series of tours in 
Southern China and gave several pro-reform speeches along the way. Therefore,  
eventually, the CCP re-focused on furthering the economic reform after the 
backlashes of the Tiananmen Crackdown (Fewsmith, 2008). In October, the NPC 
officially adopted Deng’s main points in those speeches and official re-prioritised 
the economic reform. Business began to sponsor media content or support 
particular columns. By 1995, there were 2200 newspapers in China selling 72 
million copies a day (ibid.). Newspapers expanded the number of pages in order 
to contain more information as well as advertisements. The majority of 
newspapers used a four-page broadsheet format in 1992, but the number of pages 
increased to eight and then twelve within two years. ‘The eye of the newspaper’ – 
an eye-catching spot, the first place a reader is likely to see when glancing at the 
newspaper (Zhao, 1998: 58) – used to be reserved for Mao’s quotes or political 
slogans during the Cultural Revolution. It was for advertisements in the 1990s. 
Meanwhile, Party organs such as the Xinhua News Agency became operating like 
a giant business consortium, running scores of dailies, weeklies and monthlies 
simultaneously. Similarly, the People’s Daily had five subsidiary publications in 
the 1990s, four of which were modelled on commercial newspapers rather than 
Party journalism (Zhao, 1998: 66). Official media increasingly resembled official 
corporations.  
Nevertheless, the official Chinese media has simultaneously changed 
and remained the same (Zhao, 1998: 48). On the one hand, the then 
Politburo member Li Ruihuan ordered the media content to be changed from 
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something preaching, empty and dry to something more informative in order 
to meet the readers’ needs (Chan, 1993: 25.3-25.4). On the other hand, the 
news reporting lacked important substance for a long time. Cover-ups and 
censorship often stood in the way of what the readers needed and wanted to 
know. This paradox existed largely due to the media’s unchanged dual 
identity: they were under the control of a system of party organs and state 
departments, both of which set up groups in media. They formed a 
hierarchical structure in terms of media governance to ensure objectives 
from the top were successfully passed down to the audience (Creemers, 
2015). At the very top was the Standing Committee, who usually held an 
informal discussion to formulate directives for the official media to 
distribute. They directly passed directives to the Central Propaganda 
Department (CPD), an important party organ in charge of the thought work 
in media as well as education. The CPD drafted general policies for 
ministry-level government institutions such as the Ministry of Culture, the 
Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, State Administration of 
Press, Publications, Radio, Film and Television and the State Council 
Information Office (Creemers, 2015: 54). It is these ministry-level 
institutions’ responsibility to formulate specific and concrete regulations for 
the media. Relevant media-related organisations could interact with the CCP 
and give feedback on policies but were undoubtedly all under the control of 
the Party.  
The dual control over the media means that this pattern continued as 
Xi took power in 2012 (Ringen, 2016). In Xi’s era, the CCP has 
increasingly rejected liberal democratic values such as ‘pluralism, 
regulatory impartiality and free expression (Creemers, 2015: 48)’. Many 
dissidents have been terrorised, investigated, arrested or persecuted, and 
journalists are among them. The editorial team of the Liberal magazine, 
Yanhuang Chunqiu, which existed for 25 years under the protection of the 
liberal CCP elites, was secretly replaced; the then 71-year old liberal 
journalist Gao Yu was jailed (now released due to her illness) for ‘leaking’ 
state secrets and forced to make a TV confession ('Gao Yu: Chinese 
Journalist Released from Jail over Illness,' 2015; Buckley, 2016). 
Meanwhile, the occasional exceptions such as exposing corrupt local 
60 
 
officials were closely monitored in terms of their social impact. They were 
an illusion of a relaxed Party media environment.  
Meanwhile, the information explosion and technological 
advancement forced the CCP’s response in terms of the control of 
information. Online media has proliferated since 1993 when the Chinese 
government decided to develop internet technology (Shirk, 2011: 1). The 
official media all have an online presence. Subsequently, the spread of 
mobile phones, computers and other electronic devices has facilitated wider 
access to the internet and social media. The number of internet users in 
China reached around 802 million in 2018 (Deng, 2018: para 3). The 
amount of information online has rocketed. The speed of online information 
dissemination has become so fast that it is invariably where news first 
appears. In this sense, the CCP ‘chooses’ to relinquish some control over 
information in exchange for economic gain, improvement of  its 
international reputation, government performance as well as popular support 
(Shirk, 2010: 5). However, the growing speed of information dissemination 
undoubtedly poses enormous political challenges for the CCP in meeting the 
demand of the masses and maintaining its exclusive leading position 
(Naduvath, 2009; Shirk, 2010: 5). The internet forced the CCP to evolve its 
technique of control to adapt to the latest technology instead of solely 
relying on human manual effort (Hachigian, 2001; Zheng, 2007; Yang, 
2009). For example, the Great Firewall prevents access to popular Western 
social media and foreign news, which carry politically inconvenient 
information; all major websites available in mainland China have 
implemented keyword censorship; the CCP also deploys a large amount of 
human resources to further manually check user-generated contents (Qiang, 
2011). After over thirty years of marketisation without major political 
reform, the official Chinese media today seems to be have the status of 
being changed and remaining the same simultaneously (Zhao, 1998). The 
news indeed includes more diversified topics and becomes timely to suit the 
taste of the readers today, yet it remains properly filtered. The implications 
of this status manifest themselves in the role media play.  
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2.2 Role of the media in China 
Taking into consideration the trajectory of media development since the 
Cultural Revolution, I will discuss the media’s role at different periods of recent 
PRC history in the following paragraphs. I conclude that despite the 
depoliticisation and the marketisation of media since the economic reform, a 
fundamentally unchanged political system means a fundamentally unchanged role 
of official media: Party journalism championing the Party Principle.  
The role of media before 1978 was solely to fulfil the political objective of 
the CCP (Li, 1998: 11). After 1978, media became more able to fulfil some social 
objectives, such as exposing corruption, tracing unethical and illegal business 
operations, exposing poor quality products and raising issues of the rights of 
vulnerable people. After the Western journalistic values and the People Principle 
were shut down after 1989, many believed that the commercialisation of media 
would be able to revive the media reform. After all, the market indeed changed 
the nature of news media in China. It used to be solely for the purpose of making 
revolutions, according to (Mao, 1990b); but the media are now partly about 
making money. Since the control of information is one of the key characteristics 
of authoritarian regimes, many scholars recognise that the pressure to generate 
revenue and attract a larger audience can challenge the CCP’s information control 
(He, 2008; Lin, 2012). This process, the so-called ‘information empowerment’, is 
further facilitated by internet technology such as social media. The result is that 
the Chinese people have more diversified sources of information that can 
potentially break the monopoly of information wielded by the CCP (Shane, 1994; 
Smith, 1996; Brewer, 1997; Dennis and Synder, 1998; Curran, 2000; Ekecrantz 
and Olofsson, 2000; Shirk, 2011). 
However, the commercialisation of media in China is in essence different 
from that in a liberal democratic society. Underpinning a liberal democratic media 
system is constitutional law, which recognises and protects private property and 
legislative law,  thereby allowing a free market and competition among the media 
(Zhao and Hackett, 1998; Luo, 2015). China has neither of the two. All land in 
China is officially owned collectively, though individuals can buy the right to use 
it for a period of time; The CCP’s ‘visible hand’ always tries to outmanoeuvre the 
market’s ‘invisible hand’(Harvey, 2005: 120; Luo, 2015). Therefore, Zhao (1998) 
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is very cautious in terms of what commercialisation can offer to media 
democratisation in China.             
Neither the Party Principle nor commercialisation alone is the guiding 
power of the official Chinese media today. In fact, Chinese media is under the 
control of both the Party and business (Zhao, 1998: 152). On the one hand, the 
CCP will never lose its control over the media as long as the ‘Party Principle’ 
stands. The CCP is essentially in charge of all the media in China. One cannot 
meaningfully distinguish the Party and the state. Hence, ‘state-owned’ and ‘party-
owned’ in essence are the same (Shao et al., 2016: 37). On the other hand, the 
neo-market mechanism determines that official media need to address issues that 
‘the audience’ are concerned with, such as corruption, economy, food safety and 
pollution. Official media have to function like any other business in order to make 
a profit. However, unlike the traditional western ‘the state vs the business’ model, 
the state and the business are almost inseparable in China. The CCP also demands 
the media serve ‘the people’ and the public good as if they were a non-profit 
public service. Thus, the nature and expectation of media are fraught with 
contradictions. More often than not, media in China can supervise neither the 
Party nor the business (Zhao, 1998). Among the contradictions, the official 
Chinese media are facing the issue of balancing their political and social 
objectives (Creemers, 2015) – a question of when to use the old-school 
propaganda and when to apply subtle persuasion. Striking the balance is the core 
task of the official media. 
The era of Xi is witnessing a return to the more rigid Party control over 
almost everything, including media. Since Xi’s coming to power, the political 
objectives seem to have gradually outweighed any social objectives. The keyword 
in Xi’s era is ‘control’, which reflects the nature of Xi’s China (Ringen, 2016: 1).  
Compared with the Mao era, Chinese people today have much more freedom in 
terms of what they can do and say, but Chinese people also have unprecedented 
self-censorship – knowing what is allowed and what is forbidden (Chu, 1994; 
Huang, 2001; Lin, 2008; Yang, 2009; Lin, 2012; Ringen, 2016). Control is 
achieved through means such as education and media, or combinations of these 
elements. Hence, the control over media is tighter. Topics that are safe for 
journalists to tackle are increasingly secondary social issues and they rarely 
directly challenge the CCP (McCargo, 2003; Lin, 2012). The media is primarily 
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used to guide public opinion and legitimise the CCP’s rule. Rather than telling the 
media what not to do, the CPD usually specifies how media should behave (Tang, 
2005). What to cover and how to frame are crucial issues. Meanwhile, since 1989, 
sustaining stability has been a core target. Media professionals often ask 
themselves whether the news will produce negative effects or undermine social-
political stability (Xiao, 1994). The only negative news the CCP permits the 
media to report are those items which can be framed as not harmful to social 
stability or jeopardise the legitimacy of the Party.  Gradually, the media have 
formed the habit of self-censorship and gained the ability to reframe sensitive 
issues to avoid questioning the CCP’s responsibility to run the country and take 
care of its people.  
Zhao illustrates the above two points with an example of the reporting on 
the unaffordable university fee for poor families (1998). Higher education used to 
be state-sponsored, but the government was unable to provide enough funding in 
the late 1990s. Many students from less well-off families found it very difficult to 
afford the tuition fees. In order to bypass the censorship, the production team of 
the programme did not frame the issue around inequality, which could potentially 
cause social grievance. Instead, the team reframed the issue by painting the bigger 
picture that unaffordable tuition for higher education was a convention in 
capitalist countries. The team further noted that China was at an early stage of 
development and hence its education investment was insufficient. The programme 
even provided a solution - however insufficient it might be - by encouraging 
students from poor families to study harder to win scholarships. Thus, the 
example shows the importance of media framing and the way in which the media 
is able to guide the interpretation of the social issue.  
2.3 Conclusion 
In sum, the media in China since 1949 has generally experienced highly 
fluctuating development. The media enjoyed considerable freedom in the early 
days of the PRC before plunging into the ‘Dark Ages’ of Mao’s continuous 
ideologically-oriented political and economic campaigns (Lu, 2004: 164). 
Journalism became a pure instrument for political propaganda and indoctrination. 
Deng’s economic reform restored substantial freedom during the mid-1980s and 
some liberal democratic media ideals entered China. However, the 1989 
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Tiananmen Crackdown saw a return of the rigid mouthpiece media. Only in 1992 
did new reform opportunities arrive when Deng’s Southern Tour put the economic 
reform back on track. The media, together with many other industries in China, 
had to seek commercialisation for survival, which ultimately helped form the 
hybrid media structure of contemporary China.  
Despite the economic changes and all the freedom it has brought, the core 
of the official media has always been the Party Principle. Media reform in China 
remains an economic project and the Party Principle in media has never changed 
(Zhao, 2008; Luo, 2015; Shao et al., 2016). The official media tried to balance the 
political and social objectives and adapted to the latest technology and techniques 
(Kluver and Powers, 1999; Zheng, 2007), In terms of technology, the official 
media have learned to use animations and pop music to package and sell political 
ideas. In terms of technique, the official media is able to frame crises in a way to 
enhance the image and popularity of the CCP among the people, such as using 
anti-corruption campaign documentaries. The role of media changed from a pure 
propaganda loudspeaker during the Cultural Revolution to a more sophisticated 
adaptive Party persuasion. Thus, the fundamental role of media in China has not 
changed much since the Cultural Revolution. The media’s bottom line has always 
been to serve as the mouthpiece of the CCP. Despite the fact that 
commercialisation and technological advancement have challenged the monopoly 
of information of the CCP and encouraged the peoples’ participation in media 
production, the Party Principle remains the standard of Chinese media. Economic 
reform certainly brought changes to media, but not in terms of what role the 
media plays, only in how the media play their roles. 
Ranking China as 176th out of 180 in the 2017 World Press Freedom 
Index, the NGO ‘Reporters without Borders’ describes President Xi as ‘the 
instigator of policies aimed at complete hegemony over news coverage…’ ('World 
Press Freedom Index,' 2017). During Xi’s visit to CCTV in February 2016, a 
slogan declared blatantly that media must be ‘surnamed Party’ (Rudolph, 2016). 
Journalistic norms and the institutional practices of the official media are both 
strictly under the guidance of the Party. Commercialisation and technological 
advancement have challenged the CCP’s monopoly on information and 
encouraged the participation of the people in media production. However, the 
Party Principle remains the standard of the official media. In this thesis, I study 
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the role of the official media through the theoretical perspective of framing and 
the methodological lens of critical discourse analysis, which I will discuss in more 


























Chapter 3. Theoretical Framework & Methodology 
Having reviewed the literature of the history of the Cultural Revolution 
and the Chinese official media, I now turn my attention to the theoretical 
framework and the methodological design of the thesis. The purpose of this 
chapter is threefold. Firstly, it grounds the research in the theoretical framework 
of the official media framing within the Chinese media system. The thesis covers 
the under-researched area where media framing theory is applied in a non-
democratic non-Anglophone country. Secondly, it provides the rationale behind 
the research method of the thesis. Lastly, it summarises and explains the data 
collection process which serves as the basis for the analysis in the next two 
chapters. 
This chapter begins with a review of media framing theory. I underline 
that certain aspects of media content are made more salient and persistent than 
others through the process of selection and reutilisation. Next, I present a review 
and three main reasons for choosing Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). Firstly, it 
provides a normative and explanatory critique of discourse, evaluating it against 
what ought to be right (Fairclough, 2017). Secondly, as the result of the normative 
claim, the explanatory interpretation follows what the CCP has always admitted – 
the aforementioned ‘Party Principle’. Lastly, CDA complements framing theory 
in that the latter focuses on the patterned and explicit features of a text, whereas 
the former also takes into consideration what is purposefully left unsaid. I 
conclude the chapter by offering a detailed account of the data selection process. 
3.1 Media Framing Theory 
In the thesis, I approach mediated confessions from the lens of media 
framing theory. The following part critically reviews framing theory. It gives a 
brief overview of the broad application of the theory before scrutinising the area 
that is most relevant to the thesis: the official media framing in China. 
Considering the authoritarian nature of China, I propose to apply media framing 
theory in the manner that takes into consideration the Chinese media system, 
which is centred on ‘the Party Principle’ mentioned in the previous chapter.   
 
3.1.1 Framing 
Generally speaking, framing refers to ‘the modes of presentation and 
interpretation that construct social realities’ (Tang and Huhe, 2014:562). This 
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concept originated from anthropology and cognitive psychology (van Gorp, 2007) 
where anthropologist Gregory Bateson (1972) showed how monkeys, through a 
certain interactive sequence, could frame and then distinguished an act of ‘play’ 
from an act of ‘combat’. Meanwhile, as early as 1940, some researchers already 
noticed that reality was not one thing that everyone agreed upon. In the field of 
media and journalism, sociologist and journalist Robert Park argued that news 
should have been viewed as a knowledge source rather than reality. This is due to 
the fact that more often than not, ‘the world that we have to deal with politically is 
out of reach, out of sight, out of mind’ (Lippmann, 1921: 284). It highlighted the 
important mediating role of the media. However, only at the beginning of the 
1990s did researchers start shifting their attention from a positivist view of the 
world to the idea of a reality that could be ‘socially constructed, deconstructed and 
reconstructed’ (Snow and Oliver, 1995: 586). Edelman compares the potential 
social realities to a kaleidoscope ‘which can be readily evoked by altering the 
ways in which observations are framed and categorised’ (1993: 232). This social 
constructivist root is where framing theory comes from. 
Since then, researchers from various disciplines have discovered the value 
of framing. Apart from anthropology and psychology where it originated, framing 
theory has spread to subjects such as sociology (Goffman, 1997), policy research 
(Schön and Rein, 1994), public relations research (Hallahan, 1999), linguistics 
and discourse analysis (van Dijk, 1977; Tannen, 1979), political communication 
(Gitlin, 1980), social movements (Snow and Benford, 1988; Gamson, 1992) and 
even artificial intelligence (Ryan, 1991). Moreover, it is a particularly popular 
research concept in the study of media and communication (Entman, 1993; 
D'Angelo, 2002; de Vreese, 2012). Since the thesis investigates the media and 
official framing of the Cultural Revolution and Xi’s first five-year term, I narrow 
my focus within the literature of media framing. I will demonstrate soon that the 
conventional application of media framing theory with an emphasis on the role of 
journalists is insufficient and problematic in the case of China due to the non-
democratic nature of the country. I argue that applying framing theory in the 
Chinese media system means paying particular attention to the official discourse 
which has yet to receive more scholarly attention in media framing research. 
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3.1.2 Media framing  
Framing theory in media and communication research has two theoretical 
strands. The first champions a psychological tradition, pioneered by the famous 
‘Asian Disease’9 study of Kahneman and Tversky (1979). This tradition, also 
known as the ‘equivalency framing’ (Cacciatore et al., 2016), investigates the 
question of whether people have different attitudes towards the same piece of 
information that is expressed differently. The second root lies in sociology, 
represented by Erving Goffman’s (1997) work. This strand of framing is called 
the ‘emphasis framing’, which investigates ‘what an audience receives rather than 
how equivalent information is presented’(Cacciatore et al., 2016: 10, emphasis 
added). That is to say, this second strand of framing focuses on analysing what 
message is fed to the audience, the way in which the message is manipulated for 
the audience and how the audience decodes the message. This thesis is premised 
on the second theoretical root, investigating what kind of message the CCP wants 
the audience to receive in mediated confessions and how it is constructed.  
Erving Goffman defines framing as ‘schemata of interpretation’ which 
allow people to ‘locate, perceive, identify and label’ events while trying to make 
sense of the world (1997:21). It is an active, contentious and evolving process. 
Researchers such as Tuchman (1978) and Neuman et al. (1992) argue that the 
media actively set frames for an audience, guiding their interpretations and 
discussion of the events. In contrast, Kosicki and McLeod (1990) contend that 
individuals are actively supplementing, reflecting and ignoring certain 
information from the media. In this sense, framing happens in two dimensions: 
media frames and individual frames (Kinder and Sanders, 1990; Entman, 1991; 
Scheufele, 1999).  
Media frames are ‘the characteristics of the news text’ (Entman, 1991:7). 
They are usually characterised by selection, salience, re-utilisation and persistence 
 
9 The ‘Asian Disease’ study is an experiment conducted by Tversky and Kahneman. The 
participants were told that in an imaginary scenario an unusual Asian disease would soon strike 
the US. It would kill 600 people. Two programmes were available for them to combat the disease. 
Tversky and Kahneman worded the essentially exactly same options differently, with one 
emphasising the survival rate and the other the fatality rate. Their conclusion was that people 
tended to be ‘risk-averse’ when they were facing an outcome of gains (survival). Meanwhile, 
people became more ‘risk-seeking’ if they were facing a losing situation (death). Tversky and 
Kahneman have since managed to demonstrate a consistent result when studying other issues 
(Kahneman, 2011; Kahneman & Tversky, 1984). Humans behave differently facing the same 




of certain aspects of an event (Gitlin, 1980; Entman, 1993). Therefore, media 
framing is a selective construction of events where certain characteristics of 
events outweigh the others in the text. Individual frames, however, represent an 
audience’s ‘internal structures of the mind’ (Kinder and Sanders, 1990: 25), which 
examines people’s perception and interpretation towards the same media item. 
This thesis does not investigate how the audience actually interprets the media 
programmes or whether the official media framing manages to alter people’s 
opinions. Instead, it primarily focuses on the construction of media frames and 
subsequently a potential CCP-preferred interpretation of them. The aim of the 
analysis is to have a better understanding of the political logic behind the 
legitimation processes through the CCP-led official media framing. It is also able 
to explore how the framing is changed by the Party for various purposes at 
different times.  
There are many ways that framing can operate in texts. Gamson and 
Modigliani (1989) identify at least five so-called media ‘framing devices’ in the 
western democratic media system. These framing devices are where frames are 
often located in media texts: metaphors, exemplars (historical examples), 
catchphrases, depictions and visual images. These framing devices provide crucial 
guidance for the analysis in the thesis. They also summarise three ‘reasoning 
devices’ that the framing process relies on: it often starts with a causal analysis of 
the roots of an issue and then presents the consequences and effects of the 
problem. In the end, it appeals to people’s principles by making moral claims. 
These two devices and the moral judgement directly facilitate the identification of 
framing in the analysis chapters.  
Gamson and Modigliani treat the content of media discourse, which 
includes the aforementioned framing and reasoning devices and moral claims, as 
‘the outcome of a value-added process’(1989b). This process creates a so-called 
‘media package’. The success of such a media package is premised on the 
combination of cultural resonance, sponsors and media practices. Cultural 
resonance refers to the relatively constant social-cultural background. Framing 
requires drawing on this shared social meaning in a historically and culturally 
specific context (Reese, 2009; Fairclough, 2010a). Gamson and Modigliani (1989) 
give an example of how the pro-nuclear progression frame fits into the American 
cultural value of supporting technology and efficiency. However, counterframes 
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can exist. For instance, there is also part of America’s culture that is very sceptical 
about technology and fears technology eventually running out of human control. 
Therefore, the authors remind us to think of culture dialectically. As the analysis 
will show, similar contradictions exist in Chinese culture and they are reflected in 
the framing analysis. 
‘Sponsors’ means those who are in charge of public relations in various 
social organisations, governments and companies. Their responsibility is to keep 
in touch with journalists to promote their collective agenda. Sponsors are familiar 
with journalistic routines and some of them may have been journalists themselves 
in the past. However, having sponsors actively shape a collective agenda does not 
mean that journalists are passive. ‘Media practice’ describes the journalists’ role 
in shaping media framing (Halberstam, 1979). For instance, even in Cultural 
Revolution China, there was conscious passive resistance to the unreasonable 
personal attack of some cadres at the early stage in the Revolution. Delaying 
publication as long as possible after the CCP denunciation meeting was one 
method of silent resistance (RMRB History, 1988). Hence, in a liberal democratic 
country, whether certain framing makes it to the news depends on the three main 
factors mentioned above. 
Much of the recent debates within media framing theory tilt heavily 
towards journalists and the study of media effects (Cacciatore et al., 2016). There 
was even a recent call for the abandonment of ‘emphasis framing’ and a total shift 
towards effect studies in order to end the conceptual confusion of framing with 
some other similar concepts such as agenda-setting theory (Cacciatore et al., 
2016). These arguments may seem to make sense in the study of media effects, or 
the aforementioned individual frames. However, the debate leaves out the 
discussion concerning media frames and the theoretical values of ‘emphasis 
framing’ in analysing the formation of media frames. Moreover, since the theory 
has been developed on cases predominantly from Western democracies, as shown 
in the previous chapter, it has some default assumptions as to journalistic 
professional norms, checks and balances in political systems, and the 
responsibilities of business corporations, which are very different from those in 
China. For example, journalists often have the duty to keep powerful institutions 
in check; media is supposed to be a contested public sphere where various 
participants voice different opinions. Also, the business interests of big media 
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organisations may be at odds with their expected traditional media 
responsibilities. There are many differences between authoritarian political 
environments and their liberal democratic counterparts in terms of the ways in 
which relationships among political elites, the media, business corporations and 
ordinary people intertwine. Here, I would like to highlight the point that, for 
authoritarian states, media, together with education, is a critical tool in 
legitimising the domination of the leaders. As Sullivan elaborates, ‘authoritarian 
regimes select and control access to the information that citizens are exposed to 
and interpret “the facts” for them’ (2014:29). This selection, control and preferred 
interpretation mean that when positioning media framing theory in a different 
context, such as China, the boundary of the three sources of influence begins to 
blur. As reviewed in the previous chapter, the Chinese media system’s dual 
identity and the core of the ‘Party Principle’ means that the theoretical nuance will 
inevitably affect the application of the theory. An authoritarian media system is 
very likely to significantly undermine the individual journalist’s role in framing 
the news.  
Therefore, instead of advocating moving away completely from ‘emphasis 
framing’, I propose that the application of media framing theory needs a shift of 
attention to other elements rather than the journalist-centred ones. It is particularly 
relevant when researching areas in which individual journalists have limited 
control of the framing in contrast to their counterparts in liberal democratic 
countries. The previous chapter has explained that the official media during the 
Cultural Revolution was rather different from that of the rest of the period since 
1949. The total politicisation of the society meant that the CCP or a group of top 
political elites, as the main source of framing influence, held the aforementioned 
three roles simultaneously: they determined the ideology and professional norms 
of journalists; they made rules about the organisational routine and political 
preference of the media; and last but not least, they were also the ‘external 
sources’ - authorities, interest groups and elites – that could effectively influence 
the creation of media content. Today, in the age of the internet in Xi’s China, the 
Party retains an influence on the three roles. The official media can often 
effectively counterframe most challenges from less influential media, increasingly 
so in Xi’s era. While it is true that resistance to total control has always existed, 
the individual journalistic-centred sources of influence in the case of Chinese 
official media are very likely to ineluctably fuse into the one factor, ‘the CCP’, 
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considering the fundamentally unchanged political structure in China (Tang and 
Huhe, 2014). 
3.1.3 Official media framing in China 
The application of media framing theory in this study closely relates to the 
role of the official media in China during the Cultural Revolution and Xi’s era. 
Official media in China has always been at the forefront of constructing common 
beliefs to facilitate the Party’s rule. Its importance also lies in the fact that it often 
provides a possible inference into the otherwise murky Party politics. Young 
explains that, 
China’s media are a sort of window on the soul of the Communist 
Party. They present the Party’s message of the day, its broader agenda, 
and information on how it aims to achieve its goals. They also contain 
messages – some straightforward and others more veiled – of what is 
and is not acceptable, and what happens to those who make trouble. 
Equally important is what’s not reported, be it an event that’s 
considered taboo or an official who has fallen out of favour (2013:3). 
Therefore, caution is necessary when applying media framing theory in the case of 
China. The focus on the CCP means that it is the official framing that has to be 
under particular scrutiny in the thesis. By no means do I suggest that the CCP is a 
monolithic entity and that every member in important positions agrees on all 
matters. However, the official media framing is often the result of ‘an internal 
hegemonic struggle for interpretative supremacy among the regime’s intellectual 
and political elites’ (Bondes and Heep, 2013: 320). That is to say, after the power 
struggle and deliberation, once a particular framing is agreed on, the CCP has the 
advantage to direct the interpretation of it due to its control over the official 
media, creating potentially very effective official framing (Noakes and Johnston, 
2005).  
Bondes and Heep (2013) innovatively combine the social movement 
framing perspective (Snow and Benford, 1988) and the study of legitimacy 
(Beetham, 1991) in an exploration of the official discourse during President Hu 
Jintao’s era. Borrowing Beetham’s idea on power and legitimacy, the authors 
argue that the ruling party in authoritarian China plants the notion of leadership 
qualities and the determination of serving the people by reproducing an official 
frame that is in line with the established rules in Hu’s era. Supported by 
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identifiable evidence, these rules are justified by norms shared between ‘the 
dominant and the subordinate’ among Chinese people (Bondes and Heep, 2013: 
319).  They rightly point out that ‘[s]tudying both the limits and shifts in official 
framing and their related concepts can help to provide useful insights into the 
country’s political development’ (Bondes and Heep, 2013:331). Their case study, 
therefore, sets an example for this thesis to further explore the issue of official 
framing and trace the ideological framework and political development in China 
since the Cultural Revolution. 
In conclusion, media framing theory contends that through selection and 
reutilisation, certain aspects of media content are made more salient and persistent 
than others (Gitlin, 1980; Entman, 1993). Metaphors, historical examples, 
catchphrases, depictions and visual images often indicate the location of frames in 
media programmes (Gamson and Modigliani, 1989). Together, they identify, 
diagnose, suggest solutions to and make moral claims on the topic. The success of 
framing depends on the relatively constant social cultural background, or ‘cultural 
resonance’, that is specific to a society at a particular moment (Ferree, 2003). 
After the review, I propose to build the theoretical framework of the thesis on the 
media framing theory with a particular emphasis on official framing after taking 
into account the nature of the media system in China. The thesis has two major 
contributions to framing theory research. First of all, it answers the call for more 
diachronic and cross-movement framing research (Benford, 1997). The thesis 
examines the official media framings at two historic periods under two CCP 
leaders (the 1960s and the 2010s). Secondly, the thesis is a demonstration of 
applying framing theory in an authoritarian nation. Currently, cases from western 
democratic countries dominate the empirical studies of media and communication 
(Yoshitaka, 2007).  This domination, as pointed out earlier, often leads to certain 
assumptions embedded in the media, cultural and political systems. Therefore, 
this research provides a critical reflection on the elements that potentially affect 
the application of framing theory in a non-democratic non-Anglophone 
environment.  
Having presented the theoretical framework of media framing theory, I 
move on to explain the rationale behind choosing the CDA approach and clarify 
how the three-dimensional model facilitates the analysis. 
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3.2 Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) 
3.2.1 What is CDA? 
Broadly speaking, I use critical discourse analysis in the thesis: a qualitative 
critical realist approach to media framing analysis. It gives priority to the study of 
power relations and the role of language in challenging or maintaining the existing 
power relations (Breeze, 2011: 512). CDA is transdisciplinary, relational and 
dialectical (Fairclough, 2010b: 3). There are multiple schools within CDA. 
Fairclough and his colleagues state that CDA is a ‘problem-oriented 
interdisciplinary research movement, subsuming a variety of approaches, each 
with different theoretical models, research methods and agenda’ (2011: 357). That 
is to say, depending on the project and the researcher, CDA has different foci and 
is conducted in various ways (Fairclough, 1985; 1989; Fowler, 1991 [initial 
British school]; van Dijk, 1991 [sociocognitive model]; Wodak, 1996 [the 
Viennese Discourse-Historical Approach]; Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999 
[developed British school]). Such heterogeneity and flexibility mean that 
individual researchers may have different understandings of some of the core, but 
rather contentious notions associated with CDA, such as discourse, power and 
ideology. Therefore, it is necessary first to clarify these concepts in this thesis.  
I apply Fairclough’s three-dimensional CDA to examine the power 
relations, identities and ideology involved in the mediated confession mainly 
through the lens of language. In this thesis, discourse, in its abstract uncountable 
noun form, means ‘language and other types of semiosis as elements of social life’ 
(Fairclough, 2003: 26), such as written texts, spoken languages as well as visual 
images. I adopt the Foucauldian view on power, which means that power is 
productive (Foucault, 1972: 45). That is to say, power has the ability to produce 
subjects and agents through discourse, influencing who we are and how we think. 
For instance, a confession discourse creates ‘confessants’ who admit their 
mistakes, ‘confessors’ who listen to the confession, and a repenting procedure. In 
this way, CDA deals with the relation between language and identities. As for 
ideology, it describes the creation of meaning in order to serve the dominant 
power (Thompson, 1984: 4). It often implicitly manifests itself as values, 
standards, norms or ‘truths’, which are crucial for the CCP in order to articulate its 
legitimacy to rule. These values, standards, norms or truths can be complex, 
contradictory and messy in nature (Hodge and Kress, 1988; 1993; Hodge and 
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Louie, 1998: 11). This is discussed in more detail in the section detailing 
Fairclough’s three-dimensional model later in this chapter.  
Fairclough (1995: 135) defines CDA as a school of, 
discourse analysis which aims to systematically explore often opaque 
relationships of causality and determination between (a) discursive 
practices, events and texts, and (b) wider social and cultural structures, 
relations and processes; to investigate how such practices, events and 
texts arise out of and are ideologically shaped by relations of power 
and struggles over power; and to explore how the opacity of these 
relationships between discourse and society is itself a factor securing 
power and hegemony.  
The implication of this definition is that CDA is an empirical study of the 
relations involved in the production, dissemination and consumption of language 
and its connection to the wider social structure. Language on its own is not the 
focus of CDA. Rather, the analytical importance lies in both the internal and 
external relations of discourse.  
The internal relation deals with discourse itself as a set of relationships. 
That is to say, it draws on ‘orders of discourse, i.e., social practices (forms of 
social activities) in their discoursal aspect, and their discourses, genres and styles 
associated with them’ (Fairclough, 2010: 359). ‘Discourses’ refer to ‘particular 
ways of representing part[s] of the world’ (Fairclough, 2003: 26). For example, 
different political discourses about China, such as the Century of Humiliation 
Discourse emphasising the bitter past as opposed to Xi’s more assertive and Sino-
centric China Dream Discourse, reflect different relationships between China and 
the world. Genre refers to a semiotic form of ‘acting, of producing social life’ 
(Chiapello and Fairclough, 2002: 193). ‘Genre’ is ‘the use of language associated 
with and constituting part of some particular social practices…’ (Fairclough, 
1995: 56). Different genres mean acting and interacting with discourse in different 
ways, such as public confessions, street interviews, news bulletins and 
documentaries. ‘Style’ is ‘particular way of being, i.e., a particular identity’ 
(Fairclough, 2010: 358). It explores the way in which a person’s use of language 
manifests in self-identification. For example, there are various ways to conduct 
self-criticism as a confessant. In the analysis, these will manifest in the way in 
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which the confessant frames themselves, their wrongdoings and their relation to 
others in the social-cultural and political environment.  
The external relation refers to the link between discourse and other 
‘objects’ such as power in the external social structure (Fairclough, 2010a: 3). 
Such a relation is often dialectical, meaning the relationships ‘are different from 
one another but not… “discrete”, not fully separate in the sense that one excludes 
the other’ (Fairclough, 2010b: 4). That is to say, power can be discursive, yet not 
purely discursive (such as physical power). Therefore, discourse and power are 
neither discrete nor reducible to each other. In the end, both the internal and 
external relations mean that discourse both shapes and is shaped by a specific 
society at a specific time. Next, I provide the rationale for choosing CDA as my 
method. 
3.2.2 Why CDA? 
CDA is highly relevant in the study of the framing of mediated 
confessions because it connects meaning to power. More specifically, there are 
three main reasons to choose CDA in this research. The first reason lies in CDA’s 
preference for politically interested research. Inspired by Marxist theories, more 
specifically the Frankfurt School, CDA has a political tendency (Breeze, 2011: 
498). Instead of observing and interpreting like many natural scientists who aim to 
hold a ‘neutral’ and ‘objective’ ground, CDA theorists identify the hidden 
problem, evaluate it and prescribe how it ought to be dealt with. In this sense, it is 
a ‘critical’ and ‘normative’ approach which advocates intervention after the 
identification of issues. Not all analysis of texts is or needs to be ‘critical’ so that a 
judgement is given. For example, content analysis is only a ‘simple description of 
structures of texts and talks’ (Maingueneau and O'regan, 2006: 230). CDA is 
‘critical’ and ‘normative’ in that it does not claim that researchers should be 
neutral observers in terms of its research aims and often actively aligns itself with 
the powerless.  
However, such politically charged aim is also one of the biggest critiques 
of CDA. Some CDA critics are suspicious of this emancipatory righteousness 
(Widdowson, 1996; Hammersley, 1997; Widdowson, 1998; Widdowson, 2004; 
Shi, 2014). I admit that there is no guarantee that one’s own sense of judgement 
must be correct and accepted by others. Nevertheless, CDA is appropriate for this 
study. Considering that the CCP never hides the fact that the media’s first 
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obligation is to be loyal to the CCP, as reviewed previously in this chapter, nor is 
it shy about openly sanitising media, the official Chinese media is bound to frame 
the news in the service of the Party first and foremost. When the needs of the 
powerless in China inevitably come into conflict with that of the CCP, the 
interests of the powerless can easily be sacrificed for the preservation of the Party. 
To use CDA in the research is to state clearly that one of my research aims is to 
demonstrate the way in which the current official media reinforces existing power 
relations through careful framing.  
The second reason for using CDA is that CDA researchers often adopt a 
particular selective interpretation. CDA critics tend to argue that 
overinterpretation may endanger the scholarly task of producing valid knowledge 
(Hammersley, 1997: 245). Therefore, I now explain the principle of interpretation: 
it is set according to the CCP’s political agenda. Since the CCP is never shy to 
admit the discursive control and manipulation to serve the Party purpose, what 
constitutes the official news is an ideological product specific to the Party leader. 
This particular interpretation is important. For example, official media texts have 
been carefully crafted by the relevant Party personnel, especially important 
editorials which would have been drafted, redrafted, checked and proofed by top 
CCP members such as Zhou Enlai in the 1960s. Seemingly trivial details have to 
follow a rigid standard. Therefore, it is necessary to interpret the Party’s intention 
in the Party Principle and reveal the Party’s logic and potential intention 
embedded in the framing of mediated confessions. This is not a pure personal 
interpretation preference but something the CCP has always admitted and done. 
Moreover, reading the line alongside the CCP’s political agenda has been 
proven a reliable way of interpretation. For example, the order of the names of 
leaders appearing in news is never random, with the most important appearing 
first all the time (Leese, 2011: 109). Certain wordings are indeed reserved for a 
certain level of leaders. This is why there was such a fuss when Xi was hailed a 
‘great helmsman’ by some officials during the 19th NPC in 2017 – it is a term only 
Mao had been entitled to (Gan, 2017). Details as such cannot be generalised in the 
linguistic theories, yet they are crucial in understanding the political discourse in 
China. Considering the degree of discursive control in China, many people rely on 
reading between the lines to infer what happened or may happen in the future. 
Consequently, it has been almost a requirement, in some cases a survival 
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technique, for the reader to unpack news according to his or her experience and 
understanding of the politics of the time (Hodge and Louie, 1998). For instance, in 
the 1960s – a time when every aspect of people’s lives was under the control of 
the Party - some people noticed that if it was common to see a sentence containing 
two different emphases, such as ‘we should highlight the importance of politics; 
we should also do our own jobs well’ or ‘education should emphasise politics; 
education should also emphasise on teaching quality’ (Yang, 1988: 60). The 
reader understood that the real importance was the second half of the sentence, 
and the first half was merely a compulsory part stating what was politically 
required in the news framing formula. This kind of interpretation was highly 
subjective and selective but crucial in sensing political changes. It was based on 
life experiences and the political situation of the time. Even though mediated 
confessions may not be as important as the Party frontpage editorials penned by 
the elite, its highly orchestrated nature means that it is very likely to be carefully 
and deliberately worded in the way it is. According to the report of the Safeguard 
Defenders (2018), what to say and how to say it during the confession recording is 
often under tight control. Frequent retakes of recordings due to unsatisfactory 
performances are very common. Thus, it is reasonable to infer that the cases 
examined in the thesis are carefully prepared in a similar fashion. Hence, careful 
reading according to the specific political situation is needed. 
The third reason to use CDA is that the utilisation of theoretical integration 
framing theory and CDA potentially makes the analysis more comprehensive. 
More than merely focusing on the linear effects, both concepts highlight the 
process of maintaining or challenging certain existing framing and power. Similar 
to the pluralistic nature of framing theory mentioned above, CDA is 
‘transdisciplinary’ (Fairclough, 2010a: 476). It benefits from theories and notions 
from other social science disciplines, lending itself to integration and being used 
in association with complementary research methods. More importantly, CDA 
and framing theory can complement each other in the analysis. The strength of 
framing is to pinpoint what is intentionally made salient in the text, while CDA 
can potentially take into consideration what is deliberately omitted. What is 
missing is as important as what is present. Therefore, a methodological approach 
which takes into account of both provides a more thorough analysis of mediated 
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confessions. Having laid out the reasons for choosing CDA, I next discuss the 
CDA approach to study media discourse. 
 
3.2.3 Media Discourse Analysis 
 Fairclough (1995: 56) summarises the ‘twin focuses’ of media discourse 
analysis: communicative events and the order of discourse. Communicative events 
are the empirical cases of language use, such as a specific news bulletin or an 
episode of a TV documentary. The communicative events as social practices 
change and are changed by the order of discourse. The order of discourse, which 
Fairclough borrows from Foucault, refers to a ‘network’ of ‘the discursive 
practices of a community’ which mediates between the concrete text and language 
in an abstract sense (Fairclough, 1995: 55). It is ‘sets of conventions associated 
with social institutions’ (Fairclough, 2001: 14). In the thesis, the order of 
discourse of mediated confessions refers to the conventions of news media and 
self-criticism which is constituted by genre, style and discourses mentioned 
above. The media discourse analysis typically concerns the continuity and change 
in the media discourse in relation to the social order. Social order is a set of rules 
around which social practices are organised and the order of discourse is the 
semiotic reflection of this social order. Now I introduce Fairclough and his 
colleagues’ three-dimensional model which systematically traces and analyses 
communicative events.  
Fairclough and his colleagues contend that there are three dimensions 
within a communicative event: a textual dimension, a discursive dimension and a 
social dimension. Thus, a three-dimensional CDA is an analysis of ‘the 
relationship between texts, interactions and contexts’ (Fairclough, 2010a: 21). The 
three-dimensional model represents the conceptual framework of CDA, which 
functions to establish links and mediate between texts and social practices. It aims 
to bridge the gap between social theories and linguistic theories (Weiss and 
Wodak, 2003: 6). As a result, researchers can integrate various elements from 
different theories as long as these elements are ontologically and 
epistemologically coherent and appropriate. The three-dimensional CDA 
framework is also flexible in that while maintaining a comprehensive view of 
discourse practices mediating between the language and the social political 
practices, one may choose to focus on one of the three dimensions according to 
the research agenda  (Fairclough, 1995: 62).  
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The first dimension revolves around ‘texts’. This level is most interested in 
the linguistics analysis of the textual and visual content, including vocabulary, 
grammar, and sentence organisation. It largely adopts the analysis of Halliday’s 
Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL) (Fairclough, 1995: 58; Fairclough, 2003: 
5). In the thesis, through analysing the language used by the confessants and those 
who are immediately involved in the story, the analysis can show the construction 
of individual identities. Meanwhile, through the linguistic features surrounding 
the involved subjects, this level of analysis reveals the relationship between the 
confessant and those who are closely involved. In the end, via the construction of 
the subject identities and relations, this dimension identifies the construction of 
the aforementioned reasoning device that is involved in different mediated 
confession cases: diagnosing problems, making moral judgements and prescribing 
remedies.  
On the level of textual analysis, I apply the linguistic analysis in a cautious 
manner. In general, many social science theories and approaches are heavily 
Western-centric, and so is CDA (Hodge and Louie, 1998; Shi, 2014). Considering 
its theoretical foundations, assumptions and application, Shi claims that CDA is a 
‘hegemonic discourse in academia itself’ (2014: 5). Some of his arguments are 
controversial10, but I do share his statement that the majority of the 
communicative events in existing CDA research are examples from the western 
democratic countries or are carried out in English. Therefore, when analysing 
Mandarin Chinese texts, apart from the linguistic features that it shares with 
English, such as active/passive voice and modalities, I also pay attention to the 
potential different linguistic and rhetorical features that are a part of Mandarin 
Chinese, but not English, such as an implicit form of judgement shi…de, which 
has no equivalent in English and I will explain in more detail in Chapter 5. 
 
10 Shi (2014) places the role of traditional Chinese culture at the centre of interpreting current 
Chinese political communication. He heavily criticises the ‘propaganda’ interpretation of the 
political communication from many Western scholars and views it as an example needing a ‘de-
westernised’ reading. He proposes to use the traditional Confucian culture of ‘nature-human 
harmony’ to understanding Chinese political communication. Shi emphasises the Eastern 
culture’s harmony-oriented characteristics and believes that ‘informing, educating and mobilising 
the public’ to maintain social and political stability is ‘a culturally alternative, moralistic tradition 
of using communication for societal good…’, rather than a ‘polarising and pejorative’ propaganda 
(Shi, 2014: 70). Such claims can be seen as controversial since it can be argued that the current 
function of Chinese media follows neither a Confucian tradition nor an alternative way of using 
communication ‘for societal good’. I later argue in the thesis that there is a need for Chinese 
people to think twice about the ‘culture’ they are selectively fed.   
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Moreover, in Mandarin Chinese, there are two popular discursive forms – 
closed and open. The closed one refers to those whose form is reductive and 
meaning relatively clear, whereas the open one is allusive (Hodge and Louie, 
1998). The closed form includes chengyu (set phrases, usually in four characters) 
and slogans whose implication is usually straightforward. In contrast, the open 
form, such as couplets (dui’ou), parallelism (paibi) and poems, is more artistic. 
The open form echoes the rule of ‘discrepancy’ (Shi, 2014), meaning that the 
open form of the Chinese discourses is indirect and full of covert meanings, as 
one Chinese saying goes: ‘words are finite whereas meaning is infinite’. This 
discrepancy has a profound implication in terms of the research goal of Chinese 
discourse analysis. The goals of the interpretation should be ‘suggestive’ and 
‘dialogical’ (Shi, 2014: 91), and pay attention to the possibility of having multiple 
interpretations. The textual level of analysis in the later chapters will also take into 
consideration the closed and open discursive forms. 
The second level of analysis is the interpretive level, which relates to the 
production and consumption of media texts. An institutional discursive practice 
includes elements such as newspaper editorial routines and newspaper reading 
groups during the Cultural Revolution. By contrast, a narrower sense of discursive 
practice includes studying the transformation of information from various sources 
into news or TV programmes. One important such transformation is 
intertextuality. Intertextuality is an interpretative process that constructs meanings 
through other available texts, such as direct quotations (Kristeva, 1980: 36). 
Intertextuality is important because it is through referencing to other sources of 
texts that a new text builds its authority and argument (Hansen, 2006). If 
‘different discourses and genres are articulated together in a communicative 
event’, constitutive intertextuality occurs, which is also known as 
‘interdiscursivity’ (Fairclough, 1992). For example, when talking about the 
rehabilitation of corrupted officials, the Party often calls it a process of treating 
sick people. It exemplifies the healing discourse being migrated to the realm of 
politics. As I mentioned above, it is at this level of the communicative event that 
the order of discourse elements plays a role. The two key elements in the order of 
discourse - genres and discourses – often reveal the assumed and expected means 
of producing and consuming media discourse. The way the communicative event 
makes use of the order of discourse and the reference to other sources determines, 
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to a large extent, whether the media discourse under scrutiny is a reinforcement or 
a reconstruction of existing identities, relations and power structures. 
With the mediation provided by discursive practices, the textual level is 
connected to the third dimension – the social level. This level examines the 
context of mediated confessions. This context is the basis of the socially accepted 
norms for the production and interpretation of mediated confessions. It explains 
the formation of the discourses identified from the previous two levels of analysis. 
Depending on the research topic, one may choose to discuss in more detail the 
economic, the cultural or the political practices. I focus on the political and 
cultural practices in this analysis. 
Media discourse is ‘sensitive’ (Fairclough, 1995: 51) to social and political 
changes. Hence, through tracing the change in media discourse, one can expect a 
certain corresponding change in the broader environment. More specifically, since 
the practice of confession is a manifestation of ideological education, I attempt to 
address the crucial ideological consequence of mediated confessions in this part: 
to what extent, does the mediated confession discourse change or maintain the 
current socio-political order? That is to say, how does mediated confession 
construct particular Party legitimacy at different times and to what extent has the 
framing strategy for legitimising the CCP’s rule changed or remained the same? 
The answers to these questions will be addressed after the analysis in the 
concluding chapter. 
Overall, the three-dimensional model places ideology or the ideological 
consequences of media discourse at the centre of the investigation. Fairclough 
highlights ‘the ideological workings of language’ (2001: 2) as the way in which 
power is exercised in society. Building on the work of Hodge and Kress (1988; 
1993), Hodge and Louie (1998: 52) further propose to distinguish the so-called P-
ideology and S-ideology in the case of China. The former (P) characterises the 
ideology’s function to showcase the power of ‘the powerful’ and separate them 
from ‘the non-powerful’, whereas the latter (S) functions to maintain solidarity 
and stress interdependence among ‘the non-powerful’ and between ‘the powerful’ 
and ‘the non-powerful’. The two conflicting ideologies create the corresponding 
discourses with different emphases. P-ideology, utilising oppositional binaries, 
tends to explicitly show the differences and implicitly indicate preferences, 
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whereas S-ideology focuses on the interdependence of and the equal importance 
of the binaries.  
For instance, what is the power relationship between the Party and the 
people according to the two ideologies? S-ideology explains that, on the one hand, 
expressions such as ‘serve the people’ and ‘power bestowed by people’ shows a 
master-servant relationship where the existence of the CCP depends on the trust 
and support of the masses; on the other hand, people ‘rely on’ and ‘trust’ the Party 
in the sense of a parent-child relationship where the masses cannot do anything if 
the officials keep neglecting their duties. It is a sense of feudal ‘subject mentality’ 
(chenmin yishi), similar to an expression which describes the local officials and 
residents – parents officials (fumu guan). In this relationship, the officials were 
described as the parents of the local residents, implying a total reliance from the 
local residents on the officials being responsible and upholding justice in order to 
have a good life. Therefore, S-ideology emphasises the interdependence and equal 
importance of the people and the Party. 
P-ideology often suggests that the CCP members are advanced and know 
better what is good for the people. A common phrase in news ‘the Party and the 
people’ – ‘the Party and the people trust you’ or ‘the Party and the people thank 
you’ – sets the hierarchy clearly. Firstly, the order shows that the Party is always 
of the top priority and the people are always secondary. Secondly, such sentences 
are more likely to eminate from the President, rather than from any ordinary 
people. The very fact that there is no voice of the people in official news 
demonstrates the supreme position of the Party. Therefore, P-ideology showcases 
the domination of the CCP. 
Consequently, while P-ideology creates binary identities in which ‘the 
powerful’ can display their domination, S-ideology tries to blur the distinction to 
ensure unity and harmony. The view of ideology follows the same logic as the 
understanding of Beetham’s legitimacy, which was introduced previously in the 
section of Chinese official media. Both the P/S-ideology and Beetham’s theory of 
legitimacy require a show of the differences that distinguish the powerful and the 
powerless at the same time a show of the consent over the differences between the 
powerful and the powerless. The contradictory process neatly captures how 
ideology and legitimation can be understood in China where the logic of any story 
is secondary to the Party’s political agenda. The analysis chapters will investigate 
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whether there is a creation of such distinctions alongside a show for consent and 
how it is framed. Having discussed the official media framing theory and the 
rationale of applying Fairclough’s three-dimensional CDA, I describe the data 
collection process in the last part of this chapter. 
3.3 Data Summary 
The data collected in the thesis includes both historical materials from the 
Cultural Revolution and the most recent (2015-2017) examples from Xi’s era. For 
the period of the Cultural Revolution, due to accessibility issues today and the 
limited media technology in the 1960s and the 1970s, I have chosen to collect 
confession news from the People’s Daily. As mentioned before, many media 
disappeared at a certain point or temporarily ceased publication. It makes it 
difficult to systematically trace long-term changes of the same publication. By 
contrast, the uninterrupted existence of a selected few media makes it possible to 
better capture the change and similarity of the way in which official media have 
operated over time and the People’s Daily is one such example. It is the one 
newspaper organisation which has a bureaucratic rank equal to a ministry 
(Jernow, 1993: 1). Consequently, it has a unique duty to the Party. As a national 
newspaper, the People’s Daily was one of the only three official publications 
which remained in circulation during the Cultural Revolution and is the sole 
survivor among the three today. It was a key propaganda tool during the Cultural 
Revolution, containing important information and directions which were often 
read out on radio and loudspeaker for further dissemination. Today, the People’s 
Daily, like other official newspapers, is much less popular among audiences. This 
is partly the result of the development of media technology, which transmits news 
in a much faster and more entertaining fashion than the traditional official printed 
press. It is also the result of having a close tie to the CCP, which leads to 
restrictions on the topic and language of the publication. The CCP often has to 
impose compulsory subscription in local government departments, business 
organisations and schools. The significance of such official newspapers lies less 
so in the circulation, but more for its symbolic status as representing the 
seemingly unified Party voice.  
The data in the thesis not only spans two periods of time but also includes 
different kinds of media into which confession has made an appearance. 
Considering the technological and economic developments, I choose three CCTV 
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news clips and a CCTV documentary series as contemporary data. Unlike those 
who had very little access to information during the Cultural Revolution, Chinese 
people today have many more options regarding what to read and watch. 
Compared with official newspapers today, television programmes from CCTV 
have a wider reach and attraction to the general public, in spite of also being 
official media. In fact, an initial scan of the contemporary data reveals that much 
of the political ritual of confession and self-criticism is mediated through 
television rather than newspapers, and then further spreads on the Internet. By 
selecting the aforementioned data, I aim to capture not only the content of official 
framing but also the CCP’s ability to adapt when facing the challenges posed by 
economic and technological advancement. The detailed selection procedure and 
criterion are as follows. 
3.3.1 Newspapers 
This thesis collects the confession news pieces firstly from the Cultural 
Revolution period (1966-1976) and from the People’s Daily (1946-2008) 
database, and then the first five-year term of Xi’s presidency (2012-2017) from 
the limited access to its contemporary database produced by the website 
http://data.people.com.cn/ (1946-2018). I conducted a keyword search using the 
phrase ‘I made mistakes’ (wo fancuowu) in the database to narrow down the 
number of articles. The reason to choose this particular phrase is that the other 
seemingly obvious choices of words, such as ‘confession’ (chanhui, fanxing), 
‘self-criticism’ (ziwo piping) and ’mistakes’ (cuowu), tend to return the corpus of 
news articles describing the necessity of being self-critical and self-reflective 
rather than a confession written by or attributed to someone. However, the 
existence of those articles did reflect the confessional culture approved by the 
CCP, which was part of the social and political norm at the time. The search 
returned 56 pieces of news, ranging from 1946 to 2008. After skimming through 
the pieces between June 1966 and September 1976, I narrowed the 56 pieces 
down to 8 news articles. The reason to include pre- and post- Cultural Revolution 
data is that it gives a simple but straightforward overview of the development of 
the confessional practice represented in the newspaper since 1946. The result 
echoed the literature in Chapter 1 that self-criticism and criticism was not an 
invention during the Cultural Revolution (see Figure 2). According to Figure 2, 
confession-themed articles were most popular (7 pieces) between 1956 and 1958. 
86 
 
They peaked again at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, though with fewer 
than half of the articles in 1957. A similar spike recurred at the beginning of the 
1980s. The confession articles almost disappeared during the years after 1995. 
Since the database does not include any news articles published after 2007, I 
searched the open online resources11. The search12 returned only one article, 
which turned out to be irrelevant to confession. However, having no recent 
confession news in the People’s Daily does not mean mediated confession does 
not exist. As mentioned before, much of it has transferred to the platform of 
television. 
 
Figure 2 The Number of Confession News Articles in the Sample 
3.3.2 TV News Clips 
With the advancement of media technology, confession and self-criticism 
are often mediated through TV news. TV news, with its sound and visual framing 
effects, becomes an ideal option for the CCP to make the confession ritual as 
widespread as possible. According to the Safeguard Defenders (2018: 4), there 
were at least 45 TV confession cases between 2013 and 2018, involving people 
from all walks of life. There were journalists who were said to have produced 
false reports, public intellectuals who were alleged to have spread rumours and 
celebrities who were accused of taking drugs. I selected three cases for analysis 
which have attracted much attention from home and abroad alike. They are the 
 
11 http://58.68.146.102/rmrb/20170526/1?code=2  (Accessed 26 May 2017). 
12 Due to access issue, I only had a limited access to the article: I could only read the title, 
publishing information and the first few lines of the news. Nonetheless, it was enough to decide 
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case of journalist Gao Yu, Hong Kong-based Swedish bookseller Gui Minhai and 
Swedish rights activist Peter Dahlin.  
The three cases bear common traits that are shared across TV confessions, 
but they also have their own unique characteristics (Safeguard Defenders, 2018: 
37). The TV confessions are politically motivated, yet they are often framed as 
anything but politically relevant. They all exhibit the three ‘Ds’ character – deny, 
denounce and defend. It is the task of the thesis to analyse how the three ‘Ds’ is 
framed in every case. Meanwhile, all the three cases also exhibit their uniqueness, 
charting a broad sketch of what can possibly be involved in mediated confessions 
today. The confessors are from different professions (a journalist, an activist and a 
bookseller) and nationalities (Chinese, Swedish, and a man who was born in 
mainland China but does business in Hong Kong and holds a Swedish passport). 
The reasons for them being forced to conduct TV confessions and the content of 
their confessions are different, which I will explain in detail in the analysis.  
Here, I would like to highlight the quite unique case of Gui. Alongside the 
cases of Gao and Dahlin, Gui’s case demonstrates the diversity of nationalities 
and professions in the mediated confessions. While the cases of Chinese journalist 
Gao Yu and Swedish activist Peter Dahlin have both ended – Gao was sentenced 
and released while Dahlin was deported to Sweden and barred from entering 
China for ten years (Wong, 2016), bookseller Gui Minhai represents a more 
complicated case. Gui was born in Ningbo, southeast China, but is currently a 
Swedish citizen who does not hold PRC citizenship. Before his disappearance, he 
made a living from selling books in Hong Kong. He was one of the five Hong 
Kong Causeway Bay booksellers who were kidnapped by mainland authorities 
due to, according to wide speculation, their book business, despite the denial from 
the mainland. Gui’s multiple identities and connections with mainland China, 
Hong Kong and Sweden make him a prism, refracting multiple relations that the 
framing needs to construct and coordinate simultaneously. Gui’s case reflects a 
growing trend that the political ritual of confession has not only reappeared in 
China but can also affect anyone in Chinese society if the CCP feels threatened by 




3.3.3 Documentary - ‘Always on the Road’ (2016) 
More varieties of public affair programmes have entered the official media 
since the economic reform. They are deceptively more attractive and less 
propagandist communication measures. As reviewed in Chapter 1, Xi’s anti-
corruption campaign is his flagship political agenda and the official media are at 
the forefront of promoting it. There have been three documentaries about the anti-
corruption campaign since 2012: ‘The Party’s Work-style Construction Is Always 
on the Road’ (Zuofeng jianshe yongyuan zai lushang) (2014), ‘Always on the 
Road’ (yongyuan zai lushang) (2016) and ‘Forging Steel Requires Strength in 
One's Body’ (Datie haixu zisheng ying) (2017). ‘The Party’s Work-style 
Constriction Is Always on the Road’ tells the anti-corruption stories from the 
perspective of the CCDI, which is usually inaccessible for the ordinary people. 
Shifting focus, the latest anti-corruption documentary ‘Forging Steel Requires 
Strength in One's Body’ features the corruption cases mainly involving the 
Commission for Discipline Inspection at both central and local levels. The 
documentaries strive to show that the Commission for Discipline Inspection, as 
the internal disciplinary organisation for the CCP, is actively battling on the 
frontline of Xi’s anti-corruption campaign and at the same time is no exception to 
scrutiny.‘ The Party’s Work-style Constriction Is Always on the Road’ and 
‘Forging Steel Requires Strength in One's Body’ are shorter; only four and three 
episodes, respectively. The corruption cases in these two documentaries are less 
well-known. In the case of ‘The Party’s Work-style Constriction Is Always on the 
Road’ the guilty officials are mainly on the city level, with a few cases on the 
provincial level. As for ‘Forging Steel Requires Strength in One's Body’, even 
though it showcases the stories of the fallen provincial officials and CCDI staff, 
these people are less known by the public. All three are co-produced by CCTV 
and the Party regulation watchdog, CCDI. All three were firstbroadcast at prime 
time 20:00 on CCTV1.  
In this thesis, I choose to focus on the 2016 CCTV Anti-corruption 
documentary ‘Always on the Road’ (yongyuan zai lushang). Consisting of eight 
episodes, the documentary tells the story of scores of fallen officials during Xi’s 
Anti-corruption campaign. Compared with the rest of the documentaries produced 
in 2014 and 2017, ‘Always on the Road’ attracted more media attention both 
home and abroad. Dubbed ‘China’s Real “House of Cards”’ by some media (Shi, 
2016), the documentary highlights the involvement of some very high-ranking 
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(provincial level and above) disgraced CCP officials confessing and repenting of 
their crimes (CCDI, 2016). It is said that there are fourteen high-level ‘tigers’ 
appearing in the documentary, including the highest ranking fallen CCP official so 
far - a former member of the PSC and Secretary of the Central Political and Legal 
Affairs Commission - Zhou Yongkang. Therefore, the high publicity and the 
special attention on self-confession make ‘Always on the Road’ an appealing 
sample for this research. 
3.4 Conclusion 
In sum, this chapter introduces the official media framing theory and its 
application in the Chinese media system, explains the rationale behind the use of 
Fairclough’s three-dimensional CDA and gives details about the selection and the 
collection of the sample data for the thesis. The theoretical framework of the 
thesis is to answer the question of how the mediated confessions during the 
Cultural Revolution and Xi’s China are framed to facilitate the creation of a sense 
of the revival of the Cultural Revolution in Xi’s China. The thesis is informed by 
media framing theory. However, considering the media and political system in 
China, I propose to apply it with the emphasis on the influence of the official/CCP 
instead of the usual journalist-centred perspective. In the analysis chapters, 
through examining the framing device such as metaphors and examples and 
identifying the reasoning device (i.e. what is the issue and how to solve it), critical 
discourse analysis can reveal the cultural resonance and relatively constant 
cultural background of China that the CCP has been keen on using to frame the 
confessions. 
This study applies Fairclough’s three-dimensional CDA to investigate how 
the TV confession is framed to maintain the CCP’s rule. CDA is able to 
distinguish the elements that have changed and the possible reason behind the 
changes because changes in the use of language can be a sign of social shifts, 
which ultimately link to changing power relations (Fairclough, 1995). Such 
analysis can demonstrate the relationship between discourses and social orders 
through three steps. The analysis begins by unpacking the textual linguistic 
features of the item under study. It then interprets the effects of the production and 
possible means of consumption of the discourse. Finally, it explains the social, 
cultural and political environment that gives rise to the discourse (Fairclough, 
2001; Fairclough, 2003). Meanwhile, the application of media framing theory in 
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China can provide valuable insights when testing the theory in the non-democratic 
non-Anglophone environment. Having discussed the relevant historical 
background of the Cultural Revolution and self-criticism, the theoretical 
framework of media framing theory, the methods of CDA and the data so far, I 
provide the detailed analysis in the following two chapters. In Chapter 4, I assess 
the historical data of the confession news in the People’s Daily during the 
Cultural Revolution. The news clips and the documentary of Xi’s era will be 






















Chapter 4. Confessions on the People’s Daily during the Cultural 
Revolution 
This chapter presents a critical discourse analysis of eight pieces of sample 
confession news from the Cultural Revolution. The purpose of the chapter is to 
investigate the historical background of the confession practice at its crucial 
transition period so that it can shed light on the recent resurgence of a similar 
phenomenon in Xi’s China in the following chapter. This chapter begins with a 
summary of the key characteristics of the structure and the content of the news. 
Through a close reading of metaphors, historical examples, catchphrases, 
depictions and visual images, the first two levels of analysis explore the textual 
and the intertextual characteristics that frame the key subjects, their relationships 
with each other, and the social, cultural and political norms surrounding the 
confession news. The analysis reveals the framing of the confession news centred 
on the reasoning device: the diagnosis of the reason for the confessants’ mistakes. 
As we will see, the reason for making mistakes was largely due to the fact that 
they had relaxed mentally and paid inadequate attention to studying Mao’s 
teaching. The third level of analysis highlights three discourses that emerge from 
the socio-political background of the Cultural Revolution. To maximise the 
effectiveness of persuasion, framing tends to appeal to cultural resonance. 
Therefore, the analysis explains how the framing of the confession news increased 
the cultural resonance through conforming those key subjects, their relationships 
and norms to the concurrent cultural, social and political background. As 
mentioned in the literature review section, regime legitimacy and the work of 
ideology centre on both the showcase of the difference and the unity between the 
dominant and the subordinate. Thus, this chapter concludes with a discussion on 
how the form of confession news created a constructed consent between the 
subordinate and the dominant subjects in the confession.  
4.1 Content characteristics of the confession news during the Cultural 
Revolution 
During a series of political and economic campaigns in the 1950s, the CCP 
had encouraged the public to showcase their anger, love and shame in criticism, 
self-criticism and mediated versions (Myrdal, 1965; Hinton, 1966; Crook and 
Crook, 1979; Endicott, 1991). The early stage of the Cultural Revolution could be 
considered as an extension of those campaigns (Yang, 2016: 249). However, the 
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content and the structure of confession news went through some significant 
changes. Regarding the content of the eight selected news articles that I 
previously narrowed down from the People’s Daily, two characteristics in 
particular contribute to the framing. Firstly, most of the news content was 
abstract. Only a small proportion of the texts was dedicated to recounting what 
happened in reality; the majority of the content was repetitive political rhetoric, 
which is in line with observations made in Chapter 1. Personalised experiences 
and stories which often distinguished one story from another hardly had any 
presence in the news. It substantiated Leese’s claim that a ‘superficial analysis of 
media texts’ revealed that the overarching themes of the time were ‘class struggle’ 
and ‘Mao worshipping’, which consequently restricted the variety of topics 
available in media (2011: 180).  Secondly, the confession news repeatedly 
referenced similar or even the same works from Mao. Regardless of what the 
stories were, certain extracted quotes applied in all scenarios, resulting in 
repetitive language and tedious rhetoric style.  
In terms of the structure of the stories, there were generally two forms in 
the sample: the traditional first-person self-criticism (6 pieces) and the educational 
feature stories (2 pieces). The former generally exhibited the following patterns: 
1. A short description in the form of editor’s notes, Mao’s quotes or general 
statements on the key issues which occurred in the Cultural Revolution;  
2. The confessant (‘I’) admitting having committed mistakes;  
3. Sharp conflicting thoughts clashing in the mind of the confessant;  
4. Realising mistakes after consulting Mao’s works;  
5. Feeling ashamed and vowing to change (in some cases, recalling the 
personal suffering in the past); 
6. Expressing loyalty to Mao and his campaigns;  
7. Repeat from No.1 or end.  
As the summary shows, these articles generally apply the three reasoning devices 
of the framing process. As mentioned before, the reasoning devices in media 
framing theory include three stages. It firstly conducts a causal analysis of the root 
of an issue and then presents the consequence of the problem. In the end, it 
appeals to people’s integrity and self-discipline by making moral claims. 
Regardless of the content of the sample story, the confessed mistake was 
invariably abstract and attributed to the abstract reason of failure to follow Mao’s 
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guidance or to study Mao’s works. The natural solution was to closely follow 
Mao’s instruction and rigorously study his works. The consequence of such 
framing was a highly repetitive storyline with little factual substance. 
 By contrast, there were two educational feature stories (19690906 & 
19690601) which contained detailed and distinctive personal experience. Both 
were about local leaders, narrated in the third person ‘him’ (there was no 
indication that any of the confessants were female) and including first person 
conversations. I use the article published on 6 September 1969 as a key example 
(Personal Experience Example) in the following analysis, though examples from 
other pieces were also present. Applying Fairclough’s three-dimensional 
discourse analysis, the next section explores the way in which the framing of the 
confession news contributed to the establishment of the legitimacy of the CCP’s 
campaigns in the Cultural Revolution. I begin with the textual level of analysis. 
4.2 Descriptive level of analysis   
The descriptive level analysis examines some of the internal relations of 
the discourse: it is about the identity of the subjects who are directly involved in 
the story. The confession news essentially tells one story of self-salvation of 
different confessants: it diagnoses the root of the mistakes, investigates the cause 
and prescribes a treatment. Therefore, the construction of the causal relationship is 
crucial. The descriptive level of analysis identifies linguistic features that feed into 
the construction of identities of the subjects and the relations among them. The 
most important social subject created here is the ‘confessant’. The most important 
relationships the confessant has are with ‘the confessors’, ‘the masses’ and ‘the 
enemies’. The following linguistic features are particularly relevant to the 
analysis: lexical choices, the degree of certainty of the language, the use of 
passive voice and the sequencing of information.  
4.2.1 Confessants 
Self-criticism had spread to the whole of Chinese society in the 1960s and 
many ordinary people joined, or were forced to join, the mass criticism campaign 
(Hu, 2012). Nevertheless, the data show that the page of the People’s Daily 
seemed to be reserved overwhelmingly for the confessions from the Party 
members and leaders, regardless of their rank. Among the eight confession news 
pieces, the confessants included one provincial cadre, three city-level cadres (one 
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article was a compilation of confessional speeches from six city-level cadres), one 
county-level cadre, two factory leaders and one Party Secretary from Tsinghua 
University. They were either the author (a piece of first person self-criticism) or 
the protagonist of the news article (an educational story about ‘him’ or ‘her’ the 
confessant).  In this sense, the confessant was not an ordinary person.  
The reason behind the lack of ordinary people could be twofold. Firstly, it 
might have mirrored the political situation during the Cultural Revolution. Cadres 
at various levels were targets for criticism and struggle, especially at the initial 
stage of the Cultural Revolution. However, as the country descended into anarchy, 
Mao sent the PLA troops, who predominantly supported the Party elites rather 
than the rebel groups, to restore order. The rebel masses and the ordinary people 
consequently made up most of the casualties. Major institutions, including 
national media such as the People’s Daily, were in firm command of the political 
elites, leaving no place for the real stories of the ordinary people in the official 
media. Secondly, the newspaper also reflected the hierarchical political order. As I 
will show in the analysis, the politically dominant – those who came from a good 
class background, resided in the urban environment and possesses the leading 
position – tended to obtain representation in media while the politically 
subordinate were either invisible or negatively represented. 
Overall, the identity of the confessants was vague. Sample articles usually 
devoted little content to confessants’ personal stories. Apart from the name 
appearing as a byline at the start or a signature at the end, the content of the 
articles (6 out of 8) was so vague and lacked personal elements that they could 
have been written by and be about anyone. A typical example goes,  
When checking against the method of Chairman Mao’s historical 
materialist ideas and class analysis, I found that my view on the 
proletariat revolutionaries was the same as members of the gentry on 
peasants during the democratic revolutionary time. Those so-called 
people who did ‘not follow the instructional words’ – the majority of 
them – were the ones resisting slavery during the rule of the 
counterrevolutionary line, daring to offer advice, daring to hold on to 
the truth. They were full of revolutionary characters. In the Cultural 
Revolution, they hold high the red flag of the great thought of 
Chairman Mao, stand at the frontline of struggle, drag out the small 
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bunch of capitalist roaders within the Party, unearth a large amount 
of evil evidence of their attempt to resurrect counterrevolution and 
drag them off the saddle. Their stance is firm and their flag bright. 
They fear nothing. But I’ve stood on the opposite side to them and 
become a stumbling block to the revolution. (19671123) 
The content above was essentially empty in the sense that it did not reveal what 
exactly the confessant's wrongdoing was. It was hard to picture in reality what 
‘stand[ing] at the frontline of struggle and pull[ing] out the small bunch of 
capitalist roaders within the Party’ was. The confessant specified neither who 
‘they’ were nor what the ‘large number of evil facts’ included. The meaning 
remained rather unclear and on the metaphorical level. Such vagueness meant that 
the same words could potentially appear in news on a different date and be penned 
by a different person about a different story and no one would be able to tell the 
difference. In the end, this kind of empty content reflected the everyday way of 
speaking, thinking and writing that characterised the Cultural Revolution. 
However, there were two exceptions with personal stories featured in the news, 
which will be introduced alongside Chairman Mao in the next level of analysis. 
Having introduced the confessants, I now examine those who were also 
involved in the news but were less prominent than the confessants. They were 
‘confessors’, ‘the masses’ and ‘the enemies’. Confessors were those who listened 
to confessions from confessants, such as readers of the People’s Daily. In some 
cases, confessors actually appeared in news stories. They were often members of 
the masses, such as a factory worker who actively participated in the mass 
criticism session. The masses, or the ‘revolutionary masses’, referred to the 
individual students, workers or peasants. They collectively had two basic images, 
appearing to be both friendly and menacing. However, the actual identity of the 
collective masses was generally vague and changeable, and thus the relationship 
between the confessant and the masses often seemed fluid and even contradictory. 
As for the enemies, they took various forms and the following were some typical 
examples: the character ‘si’ (selfishness), Liu Shaoqi the biggest capitalist-roader 
in China and his local agents, the landlord and Japanese from the ‘old society’, 
and the American Imperialists and the Soviet Revisionists. They existed 
everywhere in society; they were in constant struggle with the masses, and more 
importantly, they were bound to lose. The identities of these subjects were by no 
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means static, passive or clearly demarcated, as one could assume multiple 
identities at once or over a period of time. For example, a confessor could turn 
into a confessant after studying Mao’s teaching. As mentioned earlier, I arbitrarily 
separate these identities for the purpose of analysis. In the next section, I will 
unpack the framing of the relationship between these subjects, which reflected as 
well as constructed the political and social norms in the news in the next section.  
4.2.2 Confessants & confessors  
A typical relationship between a confessant and a confessor was dialectical 
and seemingly contradictory. I illustrate the relationship by using the educational 
news story: ‘Personal Experience Example’. Published on 6 September 1969 and 
titled ‘We All Should Continue the Revolution!’, the story depicted the thought 
struggle of Zhang Yonggui, a CCP cadre and manager of Shenyang Chain 
Company. Written in a third person account and mixed with occasional first 
person conversations, the news showed how Comrade Zhang managed to 
overcome the shame and pressure of being criticised by the masses due to his lack 
of passion for being a leader during the Cultural Revolution. He eventually 
resumed his responsibility as a local factory leader and persuaded a young man to 
correct his slacking work attitude. The young man had previously harshly 
criticised Comrade Zhang at a struggle meeting. He was also rather rebellious, 
showing the most contempt for senior members of the factory who repeatedly 
criticised the young man for slacking. Thus, the identity of the young man as a 
confessor was clearly in the dominant position in this relationship. Despite being a 
slacking junior worker, he dared to direct the harshest criticism towards the head 
of the factory. By contrast, inferiority, worry and hesitation featured heavily in the 
identity of Comrade Zhang. Comrade Zhang’s specific mistakes were downplayed 
as the news never mentioned what mistakes he had made. Instead, the news 
emphasised the psychological effect of being someone who had been criticised 
before. Comrade Zhang always needed the ‘warm help’ and ‘encouragement’ 
from other workers so that he could carry out his duty without being overwhelmed 
by self-doubt. He dared not discipline the slacking young worker because he 
fretted over ‘losing authority and face’ and ‘feared that his words would be 
viewed as a retaliation’ for what he had suffered.  
The relation between Comrade Zhang and the young man seemed 
contradictory. On the one hand, Comrade Zhang was supposed to be in a more 
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powerful position than the slacking young worker. Comrade Zhang was, after all, 
head of the factory. However, as someone who had already been publicly shamed, 
Comrade Zhang felt unconfident and thus hesitant to execute the leadership of the 
company. He did not dare to correct the young man’s slacking behaviour. 
However, their relation dynamic flipped once again after Comrade Zhang 
carefully studied Mao’s work. The following extract from the ‘Personal 
Experience Example’ was what Comrade Zhang said to the slacking young man 
after the young man had questioned Comrade Zhang’s credentials to criticise 
other people. Comrade Zhang replied with a brief self-criticism before using the 
key element in his self-criticism to persuade the young man; 
The root of my [Comrade Zhang’s] mistake is the failure to closely 
follow Chairman Mao’s words. You [the young worker] were born to 
a new society and grew up under the red flag, and you should think 
about why your father did not have enough food or warm clothes 
when he was forced to do physical labour for the landlord in the old 
society. Why was your father beaten almost to death when he was 
captured and sent to do hard labour by the Japanese devils? 
Chairman Mao led us to overturn the backwardness, and only until 
then did we start to have the kind of life we enjoy today. If you do not 
study or work hard, how can you claim that you have followed the 
words of Chairman Mao, the respectable old man? (19690906) 
Their relation began reversing after Comrade Zhang cited Mao’s teachings and 
recalled the bitter history. The use of the pronoun ‘you’ and the modality ‘should’ 
alongside each other indicated an educating tone. ‘Should’, expressing a high 
degree of certainty of the speaker and signalling a norm should be followed, 
indicates that Comrade Zhang was the one who was in the position to lecture 
others. In saying ‘you should think about…’, Comrade Zhang urged the young 
man to remember the past. Comrade Zhang made the demand based on his own 
experience of having gone through the process of making mistakes, realising 
mistakes and then remoulding his thought. He was the one who became capable of 
distinguishing right from wrong and was ‘knowledgeable’ enough to guide and 
elicit the emotional response of the young man.  
It was Mao that made possible the reconciliation between the seemingly 
contradictory relationships. In the example, it was Mao, not the act of confession, 
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who enabled Comrade Zhang to gather the courage to educate the young man and 
the young man to regain respect for Comrade Zhang. As in all other confession 
news, Mao did not directly appear in the story, nor was there real-life encounter 
with Mao. However, Mao’s name or his works were the ultimate source of 
authority from which the confessants sought help. When Mao was not directly 
mentioned, the confessant often referred to Mao’s works or the role models from 
his works. Therefore, the role of Mao was crucial in making possible the 
seemingly contradictory relationship between the confessant and the confessor, 
which will be addressed in detailed in the intertextual section. 
4.2.3 Confessant & the masses 
As mentioned above, the masses appeared both friendly and hostile to the 
confessants. This section examines how the two opposite images constructed the 
relationship between the confessants and the masses. The first image of the 
masses was that of a wise trustworthy adviser. Guizhou cadre Yu Jialin’s 
confession titled ‘Only by Firmly Believing the Masses Can One Return to 
Chairman Mao’s Revolutionary Path’ (19671123) highlighted the role of the 
masses during the Cultural Revolution in a utopian scenario. ‘Return’ suggested 
that one had previously deviated from Mao’s original path, thus indicating the 
anecdotal role of the masses in confession. According to cadre Yu, the masses 
were ‘proletarian revolutionaries’ who were ‘disobedient’ (in a positive way), 
‘very revolutionary’, and ‘brave enough to give advice and uphold truth’. They 
were ‘the most understanding and reasonable’ group of people who followed 
Mao’s guidance ‘the closest’, and ‘drew the clearest demarcation between who to 
love and hate’. The superlatives underlined the ideal qualities of the masses: they 
possessed the highest moral and intellectual ground, thus were the most suitable 
candidate to listen to the confession. Never should the confessant as a cadre or 
leader be ‘detached from’ the masses; therefore, the confessant proposed that one 
must ‘trust, learn from and mingle with the masses’. This meant that the 
confessant should have participated in physical labour with ordinary workers and 
peasants so that the cadre and the people would be able to ‘emotionally and 
physically work as one’. Thus, the masses played an indispensable supportive role 
in correcting mistakes of cadres. Hence, the confessant should treat the masses as 
a ‘good mentor and helpful friend’.  
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Despite this positive, wise, welcoming, tolerant and earthy image of the 
masses, there were more than a few instances when ‘the masses’ appeared to be 
very susceptible to the enemy’s influence. This second image of the masses 
manifested in Cadre Yu’s self-examination. He raised the following points about 
‘shedding the ugly mantle of pretentiousness and becoming a willing pupil’ in 
front of the masses, 
Be honest with the masses;  
Together with the revolutionary masses, firmly expose and criticise the 
Chinese Khrushchev and his agents in Guizhou;  
Responsibility must not be pushed down in order to avoid the situation 
of the masses criticising the masses’ (19671123). 
While the text demanded that one be humble and show willingness to learn as a 
pupil would do, it somewhat hinted that the masses sometimes could not 
differentiate right from wrong and end up attacking each other. It actually echoed 
the CCP’s belief that the Party represented the masses and guided them, as the 
masses did not know what was best for themselves, despite the masses being the 
source of wisdom according to the CCP. It was contradictory to the previous 
identities of the masses. In this scenario, the masses needed the confessant’s 
action to realise what went wrong and who to criticise. Thus, the confessant 
became the guidance of the masses. 
Furthermore, through reading between-the-lines, one could also sense that 
the masses could even be dangerous sometimes. One rather explicit example in 
the data was the recurring theme of ‘having a correct attitude towards the criticism 
from the masses’. Guizhou cadre Yu, mentioned above, explained why he 
hesitated when conducting self-criticism: ‘the painful feeling’, ‘the shame’ and 
‘losing face’ in public. He concluded that the root of his hesitation was ‘being 
scared of the masses’ (19671123). This was at odds with the supposedly 
trustworthy and understanding masses mentioned in the previous paragraph. 
Certainly, nobody would feel positive about being named and shamed in public, 
but had the crowd been truly supportive as described previously, they would not 
have intimidated the Party cadres as such. Therefore, similar to the confessor, the 
masses had two seemingly contradictory identities when interacting with the 
confessant. The masses were supposed to be wise and understanding, yet they 
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could be harsh and prone to manipulation. The reason for this contradiction was 
implicit in the news, but the social level of analysis later provides an explanation. 
4.2.4 Confessant & the enemies  
The last set of the relationship was between the confessant and the 
enemies. There were four main kinds of enemies in the framing: the Chinese 
written character si (selfishness), Liu Shaoqi and his local agents, the ‘US 
Imperialists’ and the ‘Soviet Revisionists’. The character si seemed to be the 
strongest among the four. As something intangible, si represented the internal 
subjective factor causing the confessant to be tempted by the external enemies, 
such as the other three mentioned above. In the confession news titled ‘Eliminate 
Selfishness and Build up Devotion to the Public Interest; Following Chairman 
Mao to Make Revolution Forever’ (19680613), all paragraphs, except for the 
opening one mentioned ‘character si’ at least once. Moreover, in the first three 
years of the Cultural Revolution, the following expressions were very common in 
the sample news.  
• ‘To become a true leading revolutionary cadre, one must first and 
foremost revolutionise one’s mind and remove the character si.’ 
(19670412) 
 
• ‘From now on, I will surely study laosanpian [three of Mao’s famous 
writings] hard, further fight against the character si, and establish Mao 
Zedong Thought as an absolute authority. I will devote my whole life to the 
revolution and achieve new things for the people and the revolution.’ 
(19671123) 
 
• ‘All evil comes out of the character “si”; all mistakes come out of the 
character “me”.’ (19680613) 
 
• ‘Although I have corrected the attitude toward the criticism from the 
masses and come out to work, I haven’t removed the root of the character 
si.’ (19680613) 
 
• ‘Character si is very stubborn, just like class enemies who do not easily 
give way.’ (19680613)  
These examples illustrate the determination to remould human nature and 
overcome selfishness. Remoulding human nature and overcoming selfishness was 
an abstract process. Therefore, it is interesting that si was framed as if it was a 
tangible object rather than an intangible element of human nature. Fighting the 
character ‘si’ was a process of objectifying an abstract idea as if it was something 
concrete. It functioned in reverse to the process of nomification, which turns a 
101 
 
concrete action to an abstract concept. This effect of objectification of one’s 
selfish thoughts to a Chinese character produced an illusion that to stop being 
selfish was as straightforward as removing dirt from one’s hands through 
washing.  
Like tumours or diseased body parts, such framing ensured that it was not 
the person’s fault to be selfish. Rather, being selfish was like being caught 
unfortunately by a disease that was somewhat outside the person’s control. 
It is precisely due to this character si that led me to deviate from 
Chairman Mao’s revolutionary path and turn away from the 
revolutionary masses in the campaign. I have thoroughly realised 
that: character si is the soil where revisionism stems and grows and 
the deciding factor for my mistakes. If one can’t struggle against and 
overcome the character si, one can make mistakes anytime and 
anywhere when carrying out work. The ‘resentful feeling’ in one’s 
mind is a derivative of the character si, which is the ‘bacteria’ 
causing me to continue carrying out the wrong line. (19671123) 
The character si, rather than the confessant, was blamed for the mistake. 
Criticising and fighting the character of ‘selfishness’ (dou sizi) was like fighting 
an illness caused by ‘bacteria’ from the outside. In this sense, the confessant 
excused himself for ‘being selfish’ due to this shortcoming being unintentional 
and uncontrollable. This, as the contemporary data will show, is a recurring way 
of framing something that the CCP vows to remove but struggles to implement. 
Apart from the internal factor abetting confessants to make mistakes, one 
of the most infamous external sources of evil at the time was Liu Shaoqi and his 
‘local agents’. Before Liu’s expulsion from the CCP in October 1968, it was 
impossible for official media to name Liu and criticise him directly. Thus, the 
media used terms such as ‘traitor’, ‘scab’ and ‘Chinese Khrushchev’ to refer to 
him. Therefore, while the specific culprit in the confession story was often vague, 
Liu or the derogatory labels associated with him often appeared as the target for 
crushing. For example, 
If the revolutionary proletariats do not command the ‘absolute 
power’, do not have the invincible passion, or do not take ‘an act of 
violence’, it is impossible to carry out a big fight and killing against 
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the Chinese Khrushchev and his agents in Guizhou, impossible to 
drag out and expose the vermin, and also impossible to strike them 
down. (Yu) 
Firstly, the enemies were described as harmful ‘vermin’. The enemies in the other 
confession news were also labelled as ‘bacteria’ (xijun) and ‘poison’ (liudu). Such 
analogies justified the use of violent language as well as violence against them. 
They became umbrella derogatory terms which could be conveniently used in any 
context when an enemy was present. Secondly, the enemies were also referred to 
as ‘the Chinese Khrushchev’s agents in Guizhou’. ‘Agents’ was a vague umbrella 
term, specifying nobody. It was a convenient political synonym to any local 
leaders or cadres who were under attack. The term conveniently included all kinds 
of people from Guizhou under one of the most serious crimes of the time – being 
an accomplice of the biggest traitor in China. ‘Khrushchev’ was hardly an 
unknown name to the Chinese people at that time either. Nikita Khrushchev 
succeeded Joseph Stalin as party secretary and initiated a de-Stalinisation. 
Khrushchev criticised Stalin’s rule and personality cult at the 20th Congress of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1956, which ‘shocked the socialist camp 
to the core’ (Dikötter, 2016: x), including China. The CCP leaders were very 
cautious about their reaction but eventually decided to break the decade-long bond 
with their Soviet ‘Big Brother’ and publicly denounce the Soviet Union as a 
revisionist power. Since then, the Soviet Union and Khrushchev had become 
synonymous with revisionism in China. By 1967, many Chinese people would 
have realised who ‘the Chinese Khrushchev’ was (Yang, 2016). From the end of 
1966 to the beginning of 1967, Liu had been attacked by Mao and singled out as 
the biggest Chinese capitalist-roader in China, namely ‘the Chinese Khrushchev’.  
After Liu’s official expulsion, the attacks on enemies naturally became 
explicit in targeting Liu, 
Now he has realised that due to a lack of mental preparation for the 
socialist revolution in the past, he deviated from Chairman Mao’s 
proletarian revolutionary path and was dragged by Liu Shaoqi’s 
counterrevolutionary revisionist path to an evil route of capitalist 
restoration. He passionately states that ‘the more the masses criticise 
me, the more I abhor the renegade, traitor, scab Liu Shaoqi and the 
more I love the great leader Chairman Mao! It was Liu Shaoqi who 
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brought me harm and it was Chairman Mao who saved me! When the 
masses criticise me, they are pulling me towards the right path. I will 
stand on the same side as the masses, thoroughly criticising my own 
mistakes by using Mao Zedong Thought and criticising the 
counterrevolutionary crimes committed by the great renegade Liu 
Shaoqi and his agents. (19690601) 
Once again, despite the confessant admitting his own lack of preparation for the 
revolution, he immediately diverted the blame to Liu. He ‘was dragged’ onto the 
wrong route by Liu’s ‘counterrevolutionary revisionist path’. The passive voice 
deflected the responsibility of making the mistake from the confessant. By not 
omitting the agent who carried out the action, the confessant actively assigned the 
blame to Liu. Moreover, the enemies’ image in this example produced the illusion 
that the confessant had a personal grudge against Liu and Liu’s nameless cronies. 
The sentence structure made the grateful admiration for Mao and the bitter hatred 
for Liu parallel to each other, creating a clear sharp dichotomy. However, apart 
from showcasing the high spirit of fighting the enemies, the confessant did not 
reveal anything concrete as to who the enemies were and how they had harmed 
the confessant. 
Aside from Liu Shaoqi and character si, the enemies also existed outside 
China. Considering the strong international revolutionary spirit that the CCP 
upheld at the time, these foreign enemies appeared largely as the token enemies in 
Mao’s quotation that was cited by the confessant, such as the imperialism, the 
feudalism and old society. In a few cases, they appeared to trigger bitter memories 
contrasting sharply with the happy life after 1949. In the Personal Story example 
above, the confessant asked the young man to remember how his father had 
suffered – ‘[he] was forced to do physical labour for the landlord in the old 
society. Why was your father beaten almost to death when he was captured and 
sent to do hard labour by the Japanese devils…’. The use of passive voice here 
unconventionally underlined the agent of action and the confessant actively 
assigned responsibility and blame to the old society and the Japanese. ‘The 
landlord’ and ‘the Japanese’ were named as the culprits who had physically 
abused the young man’s father. Passive voice bei in Chinese implies the unjust 
nature of an event with negative undertone (Hodge and Louie, 1998). This use of 
passive voice in the horrible personal experience reinforced the victim status of 
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the young man’s father. Meanwhile, despite the fact that the ‘War of Resistance 
against Japan’ had ended decades ago, the Japanese were called the ‘devil’ (The 
expression is still in use referring to the Japanese today), guizi. ‘Gui’ refers to 
ghosts that people become after their death. This colloquial epithet degraded the 
Japanese from humans to a ‘monstrosity of the unknown’ to show hatred. It 
suggested the fear of the speaker as well as a Sino-centrism-fuelled contempt 
towards the supposed culturally inferior Japanese (Ching, 2012: 712). Since then, 
Japan has become the paradigmatic ‘devil’ (Gries et al., 2016). 
In sum, the typical enemies in the confessional news discourse included 
character si, the enemies within China such as Liu Shaoqi and his ‘agents’ and the 
token enemies lurking abroad such as the Japanese and imperialists, revisionists, 
the capitalist roaders, together with their respective representatives in local 
provinces, commonly referred to as ‘them’. They played a key role in the overall 
framing of the Party’s generation of a revolutionary world and a perpetual cycle of 
hatred that bound the masses to the CCP. The textual level of analysis so far has 
revealed the various relationships presented in the confession news. It showed a 
clear signal: one needed to have strong correct emotions and attitudes towards 
different people. These strong emotions included boundless praise and trust for 
the masses and fierce hatred towards enemies. Overall, they demonstrated a clear 
attitude towards various groups of people, despite the occasional contradictions. 
However, these were by no means the only subjects that were involved in the 
framing of the confession news. The next level of analysis moves to explain the 
intertextual relationship that was indispensable to the framing of confession news. 
4.3 Interpretive Level of Analysis 
The interpretive level of analysis unpacks the production and interprets the 
constructed identities and social relations in the texts through an intertextual and 
an interdiscursive examination of what has been framed as ‘truth’ and how it was 
made convincing. I begin an examination of the intertextual reference with an 
analysis of the relationship between confessants and Mao. Mao was the most 
important subject involved in the news yet was not physically present in the actual 
events. The analysis identifies three roles that Mao simultaneously possessed at 
the time in relation to the confessants. These three identities explained the 
formation of the political norm of the time: Mao’s supreme position could not be 
openly challenged. It then highlights that the framing of confession news made 
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active use of people’s familiarity with Mao’s quotations and works due to the 
aforementioned norm. Aside from Mao, the interpretational level of analysis also 
explains how the composure of the context was designed to be interdiscursively 
manipulative and persuasive. This level of analysis concludes with a summary of 
the reasoning device identified from the enquiry so far, highlighting the personal 
responsibility in making mistakes and the role of Mao as the saviour. 
4.3.1 Confessant & Mao 
Mao played an imperative intertextual role in framing the confession 
news, just as every aspect of people’s life revolved around him at the time. Mao 
was not personally involved in any of the news, yet all sample data referred to him 
or his works multiple times. He was omnipresent, connecting tightly to all other 
subjects. Mao acquired three main identities in the media framing in relation to 
the confessant and the masses. Firstly, Mao was framed as a patriarchal figure at 
the head of the family. Secondly, he was portrayed as a wise old man who was a 
great teacher to all. Lastly, he was the emperor saviour of the people. In reality, 
the three identities often overlapped and were hard to separate.  
Firstly, Mao was framed as someone who was close to the confessant, as if 
everyone had a private ‘Chairman Mao’. In the Personal Experience Example, 
confessant Comrade Zhang and his relation to Chairman Mao were constructed 
firstly through the choice of words. As a political leader, Mao personally ‘led’ 
everyone to ‘overturn the backward situation’. However, Comrade Zhang also 
regarded Mao as a senior member of a family who deserves one’s obedience and 
respect as a junior. As the textual analysis shows, lexical choices such as 
‘duideqi/duibuqi’, ‘talaorenjia’ and ‘ting someone’s hua’ are typically used in a 
family environment. Comrade Zhang referred to ‘Chairman Mao’ as ‘talaorenjia’ 
(the respectable old man). Meanwhile, Comrade Zhang appealed to the juniors to 
‘ting someone’s hua’ (follow some’s instruction) and never to ‘duibuqi’ (let 
down) Mao. Using both of the verb phrases and talaorenjia is very common in 
Chinese family discourse when referring to the respectable ideal relationship 
between senior family members and their offspring. 
Similar framing also existed in other news articles, for instance, 
I noticed that the self-criticism of a bunch of cadres in power who had 
taken the capitalist road within the province had covered up the truth 
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regarding the issue in Qingdao. They deceived Chairman Mao and the 
Party central committee. I felt that I would have let Chairman Mao 
and the Party Committee down if I hadn’t reported the situation to 
Chairman Mao and the Party Central Committee. Thus, I exposed 
their issue to the Party Central Committee. (19670328) 
The lexical choice in the above example surrounding Mao created an illusion that 
the confessant had known Mao personally and been able to talk to Mao in person 
to report issues. Meanwhile, the confessant felt that he had a personal 
responsibility to tell to Mao that someone had hidden truth from him in Qingdao. 
However, the confessant was very unlikely to have a personal connection with 
Mao as there was no evidence in the news indicating that this was the case. 
Therefore, such framing brought Mao closer to the masses, invoking a sense of 
respect, love and obligation on a personal level towards him. Through reframing 
Mao from the public political discourse to the private family discourse, the lexical 
choices fed into the construction of an imagination of a family-like society and a 
social order that could increase the Party’s legitimacy to rule and facilitate the 
Party’s control over the masses. The explanatory analysis later looks into the 
cultural environment that facilitated this reframing in more detail. 
Mao’s second identity was as a man of knowledge and a sage-like existence, 
from whom everyone should have drawn wisdom. Thus, his words were 
frequently cited as truth and wisdom. The beginning of confession news was 
usually Mao’s quotes or a general but passionate extolling of how unstoppable the 
Cultural Revolution was. A typical example was,  
The great leader Chairman Mao teaches: ‘For those good people who 
made mistakes, (we) need to educate them. When their ideological 
consciousness awakes, (we) liberate them immediately’. Workers in 
the capital and the PLA Mao Zedong Thought Communication Team 
in Tsinghua University recalled and summarised the experience and 
situation of implementing Chairman Mao’s cadre…  (19690601)  
The example shows how a piece of confession news usually began. Mao’s direct 
teaching gave a very broad brush of how the story would be interpreted without 
explaining explicitly the link between the quote and the story. However, the quote 
does indicate how to ‘educate’ and ‘liberate’ the good people as opposed to 
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struggling against them. The lexical choice of ‘teach’ (jiaodao) means ‘to coach’ 
(jiao) and ‘to guide’ (dao), which belongs to an education discourse. The 
undertone was that Mao was more than a politician, but a great teacher as well, 
echoing one of Mao’s well-known ‘Four Greats’ titles of the time – ‘the great 
teacher’. The two relationships between Mao and confessants – ‘father/son’ and 
‘teacher/student’ – typified Mao’s crucial intertextual role in framing the 
confession discourse. I provide a more in-depth explanation in the following 
paragraphs. 
Thirdly, while Mao was framed as a wise male senior family member and 
a wise sage, he was also portrayed as a divine emperor. Mao’s personality cult 
reached the apex during the Cultural Revolution (Leese, 2011). An obvious 
indication was the drastic increase in the number of times that Mao was 
mentioned in the news. The same keyword search for the period between 1950 
and 1976 returned nineteen results, all of which referred to Mao at least once. 
Eleven articles were published before 1966 and they mentioned Mao thirty-three 
times altogether, three times per article on average. However, for the eight articles 
that were published during the Cultural Revolution, Mao was mentioned 161 
times, around twenty times per article. No other treatment of the CCP leaders of 
the time ever reaches that intensity.  
Moreover, Chairman Mao was framed as a specific kind of saviour, as 
certain lexical choices in the news carried a strong sense of emperor-worshipping. 
The aforementioned Qingdao cadre, Li, concluded his confession with the 
following rallying cry, 
Long live the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution!  
Long live the dictatorship of the proletariat!  
Long live the invincible Mao Zedong Thought!  
Long, long live our great teacher, great leader, great commander and 
great helmsman Chairman Mao! (19670328)  
Li Yuanrong 
This chanting style was not an invention of Li. Rather, ‘Long live…’ was a 
widespread slogan, frequently appearing as an inscription on the first couple of 
pages of publications during the Cultural Revolution (Wang, 2008). There is no 
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agreement13 on the evolution of the phrase ‘Long live…’ (wansui), but few 
disputes that the term was reserved for paying special respect to emperors. The 
most classic example is the phrase ‘long, long live to somebody’ (wansui, wansui, 
wanwansui). Directly translated as ‘living ten thousand years, living ten thousand 
years, ten thousand and ten thousand years’, the term is often seen to refer 
exclusively to emperors. Any other members of the emperor’s family could only 
‘long live’ a thousand years14. The arbitrarily assigned number reflects the strict 
hierarchical order – the supreme status of the emperor was unchallengeable, not 
even by his family members. Therefore, Mao and his thoughts were elevated to 
the same status as emperors. Together with the use of exclamation marks, the 
chanting created a mood of passion and exceptional dedication towards Mao’s 
order. Such expressions were very popular during the Cultural Revolution. 
4.3.2 Intertextuality 
Mao’s identity and supreme status were reflected in the frequent 
intertextual reference in the confession news. Intertextuality describes ‘the 
phenomenon that other texts are overtly drawn upon within a text, which is 
typically expressed through explicit surface textual features such as quotations 
and citations’ (Wu, 2011: 97). Intertextuality typically reveals the existing 
discourses that the current text is drawing on. Mao’s words and works were a 
typical example. Mao was a central figure connecting all subjects during the 
Cultural Revolution and was thus a core factor in the framing of the confession. 
As mentioned before, Mao’s personality cult reached its peak during the early 
stage of the Cultural Revolution, and references to him were omnipresent. Every 
piece of confession news included direct quotations of Mao’s writings or 
directions, many of which were well-known excerpts from the Little Red Book. 
Drawing on Mao’s supreme authority, the excerpts functioned to empower the 
confessant’s argument (Leese, 2011). At a time when policy changes were rather 
frequent and when everyone tried to avoid any suspicion of deviating from Mao’s 
directions, Chairman’s quotes were the ultimate source of legitimacy.  
 
13 There are sources online but none of them can be verified to be valid. 
14 A couple of historical figures are known for wanting to ‘live nine thousand years’, such as the 
notoriously powerful eunuch, Wei Zhongxian (1568-1627) and the ‘East King of the Heavenly 
Kingdom’ of the Taiping Rebellion, Yang Xiuqing (1821-1856). Neither of them was the supreme 
leaders like the emperor but the power they amassed was second to none. Yet their titles were 
still different from the emperors, suggesting the significance of the emperor. For more 
information, see Luo, Ergang (2000) The History of Taiping Heavenly Kingdom. 
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However, the intertextual use of Mao’s quotations was often out of its 
original context. For instance, ‘We should support whatever the enemy opposes 
and oppose whatever the enemy supports’ was a popular quote among 
confessants. It was originally from an article called ‘Interview with Three 
Correspondents from the Central News Agency, the Sao Tang Pao and the Hsin 
Min Pao’ on 16 September 1939. It first was compiled into Mao’s Selected Works 
and later the Chapter of ‘Two Classes and Class Struggle’ in the Little Red Book 
(Mao, 1990a). The article recorded an interview between Mao and the journalists 
from three media outlets15 about the challenge of the Japanese invasion. In 1939, 
the journalists addressed Mao not as ‘Chairman’ or ‘comrade’, but ‘Mr.’. It was a 
time when the CCP was still a guerrilla force and overpowered by the KMT; a 
time when Mao had yet to ascend to the pinnacle of power; also a time when 
China was at war with Japan and Mao appealed for ‘democracy’ – sharing power 
with the KMT - within China to fight against the Japanese invaders. What Mao 
had meant in the interview was that the CCP and the KMT had the same goal to 
protect China from the Japanese invasion, so they should not have been enemies. 
Instead of fighting amongst themselves, which would only benefit the Japanese, 
both the CCP and the KMT should have supported ‘whatever the enemy opposes’ 
and opposed ‘whatever the enemy supports’. Therefore, the ‘enemies’ in the 
original quote meant the Japanese soldiers. The most striking linguistic feature of 
this quote was its absolutism and the ‘us vs them’ dichotomy. The choice of 
words such as ‘should’ and ‘whatever’ increased the certainty of the tone of voice. 
The two sentences sent the same clear message - to do absolutely everything to 
obstruct the advance of Japanese. This position represented Mao’s military 
strategy as well as the determination to defeat the enemy during the ‘War of 
Resistance against Japan’.  
By contrast, the confession news (19670328) which cited this quotation 
was about the confessant’s hesitation to denounce other cadres in Qingdao. The 
enemies in the news were ‘a small bunch of cadres in power taking the capitalist 
road within the Provincial Party Committee’ who attacked the deputy mayor of 
Qingdao Comrade, Wang Xiaoyu. What the reader might have imagined in the 
current context was rather different from the aforementioned Japanese invasion. 
 
15 The Central News Agency: An official Kuomintang news agency; 
The Sao Tang Pao: the Kuomintang military newspaper; 
The Hsin Min Pao: the national bourgeoisie’s loyal newspaper. 
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For those who had not known the context of the quote, the absolute tone hardly 
left any room for compromise as to the attitude towards the enemies. However, 
for those who had known the origin of the quote, taking the sentence out of its 
original context in this example invited them to imagine the enemies in the current 
context as the same as an outside aggressor with whom the Chinese people must 
have had a life-or-death struggle. This could immediately escalate the conflict 
between these capitalist roaders and the people to the level of a national security 
threat.  
Aside from citing Mao’s works in a word-for-word manner, indirectly 
incorporating his writings in the confession news made Mao’s presence more 
overwhelming. Referencing the title of Mao’s well-known works and the names 
of the model heroes mentioned in these sources were two common ways to refer 
to Mao indirectly. For example, three out of four confession pieces published in 
1967 referenced laosanpian, the so-called ‘Three Constantly Read Articles’. Two 
directly mentioned the words laosanpian and one referenced the protagonists from 
it. The lack of attribution of the source indicated that it was the political norm for 
the audience to know who the author was. Similarly, as mentioned before, not all 
of Mao’s quotes were attributed. Nor were the quotes necessarily in quotation 
marks. This indicated the degree of familiarity with Mao’s work that the readers 
of People’s Daily were expected to have. 
  Laosanpian is the name of a collection of Mao’s three early essays. They 
share one theme: ‘to serve the people’. The three articles are ‘In Memory of 
Norman Bethune’ (jinian baiqiuen) – a story about a Canadian Communist and 
physician who treated wounded Chinese Eighth-route Army soldiers and rural 
villagers during the War against the Japanese; ‘Serve the People’ (wei renmin 
fuwu) commemorates a selfless Communist soldier Zhang Side who died in a kiln 
accident; and the third article ‘The Foolish Old Man Who Moved the Mountains’ 
(yugong yishan) is Mao’s take on the old Chinese fable about the Foolish Old 
Man whose family lived near two mountains and was obstructed by the mountains 
from going out. The old man decided to lead his family to move the mountain by 
digging the rock and soil away day after day, generation after generation. The core 
of all three writings is to teach people the virtue of selflessness and tenacity. It 
calls for everyone to strive to be a socialist new person through sacrificing 
personal interests for the collective good. For example, one extract in the 
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confession news read: ‘When I couldn’t fall asleep at night, I contrast myself with 
Zhang Side and Norman Bethune. I feel very much ashamed of my selfish 
thoughts’ (19670328). Through the names of two protagonists of laosanpian and 
without mentioning Mao directly, the confessant was still able to demonstrate his 
loyalty to Mao’s teaching. 
Moreover, the way in which laosanpian was portrayed in the confession 
news also showcased the confessant’s praise for and devotion to Mao. It was 
called a collection of ‘brilliant works’ (19670412), ‘a sharp weapon to remould 
people’s worldview’ (19671123) and ‘the bedrock to establish the character 
“selflessness”’ (19671123). It was the ‘thoroughly effective cure’ (19671123) 
which signalled a healing discourse which I discuss in the next section. 
Laosanpian was something that one had to ‘work hard to study’ (19671123). 
Through these praises and analogies, the confessants were further signalling 
loyalty to Mao. It is worth noting that for the data in the 1970s, the quoted works 
were no longer exclusively Mao’s. Famous Marxist works, such as Marx and 
Engel’s The Communist Manifesto and Lenin’s The State and Revolution, 
appearing alongside Mao’s work, became the claimed guiding study materials for 
the confessant (19740911). It was potentially a sign of the waning of Mao’s 
personality cult compared with its heyday from 1966 to 1969. Nonetheless, the 
theme of loyalty to Mao persisted thanks to the explicit and implicit intertextual 
reference of him and his well-known works. 
4.3.3 Interdiscursivity  
When ‘different discourses and genres are articulated together in a 
communicative event’, they are interdiscursively applied in a specific discursive 
practice. Interdiscursivity, or ‘constitutive’ intertextuality (Fairclough, 1992), 
refers to ‘the mixing of diverse genres, discourses, or styles associated with 
institutional and social meanings in a single text’ (Wu, 2011: 96). As mentioned 
above, there was an interdiscursive relocation of healing discourse from the realm 
of health to politics, just like the relocation of a family discourse from a private 
family setting to the public realm of politics. Metaphors can indicate when a 
particular frame is present, as mentioned in the review of media framing theory in 
Chapter 3. This metaphor is rooted in the Chinese culture surrounding ‘curing 
diseases’. A typical example is the slogan ‘chengqianbihou, zhibingjiuren’:  
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Punish those before, prevent those after; cure disease, save lives. Coined during 
Yan’an Rectification Campaign (1942-1944), the slogan has been in use since the 
1950s. The first part of the slogan chengqianbihou originates from Classic of 
Poetry, literally translated as ‘learning from past mistakes to avoid future ones’. It 
is also a chengyu that usually describes a four-character idiomatic phrase that 
concisely captures an educational story. Chengyu is a closed form of discursive 
regime16 features prominently in Chinese. That is to say, its meaning usually 
leaves no ambiguity as to what is right or wrong. The purpose is to end a debate 
by clearly siding with one party rather than the other (Hodge and Louie, 1998). 
Therefore, chengqianbihou exhibits the attitude that learning from past mistakes 
to avoid future ones is undoubtedly the right thing to do. Mao’s emphasis on the 
first part of the phrase was to encourage the candid exposure of one’s past 
mistakes for a better future. 
Mao added zhibingjiuren – curing the sickness to save the patient - to 
complete the phrase, highlighting the purpose of having such an attitude towards 
past mistakes. Mao originally used the phrase during the Rectification Campaign 
to deal with the killing among the communists (not the first time, nor the last 
time). The original aim of the campaign was to ‘root out spies and “rescue” 
people from secret lapses’ (Apter and Saich, 1994: 289). The way to achieve this 
goal was ‘to get people to confess and to use their guilty knowledge as a point of 
entry into the process of confession’ (ibid.). However, the campaign quickly 
turned to a witch hunt fuelled by paranoia, causing the death of many CCP 
members. Mao had to intervene to avoid the Party’s self-destruction from the 
intra-Party purge. Within this context, ‘cure the sickness to save the patient’ was 
an exercise in damage control. The target for elimination should have been 
‘illness’ and the goal was to save the person. Hence, this phrase highlighted that it 
was the error, not the person that should be under attack.  
During the Cultural Revolution, the term was not commonly cited in the 
confession pieces; this was probably due to the fact that the atmosphere was no 
longer to cure the disease and save the patient. The phrase only appeared once in 
the 8 selected pieces of confession news (19670328). Instead, the healing 
 
16 Discursive regime encompasses ‘the systems for managing and policing discourse’ (Hodge and 
Louie, 1998: 11). A Foucauldian notion is about who decides what counts as ‘true’ and under 
what conditions. These systems provide the background for discourse analysis in the thesis.  
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discourse obtained a new twist. While the confession news framed the enemies 
and their thoughts as pernicious, Chairman Mao and his works were quite literally 
called ‘panacea’. Mao’s words were able to treat all ailments, magically healing 
the curable and the incurable alike. For instance, Guizhou cadre, Yu, described 
Mao’s work laosanpian as ‘panacea’ to prevent and cure illness caused by 
selfishness (19671123). Thus, echoing what has been argued above, failing to 
follow Mao’s direction was the root of all mistakes. The absolute loyalty for Mao 
was unquestionable. As I will demonstrate in the next chapter, using healing 
discourse remains prominent in Xi’s China.  
Having discussed how the confession discourses were intertextually and 
interdiscusively linked to other discourses and genres, I now turn my attention to 
the other aspect of the discursive practice: the producer of mediated confessions 
and the relationship between the official media People’s Daily and its readers. 
4.3.4 News & audience  
In terms of the production of the confession, I analyse it from two 
perspectives: the nature of official media during the Cultural Revolution and the 
use of modalities and pronouns. In terms of the nature of the media, it had a huge 
impact on the relationship between the news and its reader. This relation was 
conditioned on the circumstance of the Cultural Revolution. The confession news 
on the People’s Daily carried the most important political messages to the whole 
nation. Prior to 1966, media and journalists were the enablers of popularising the 
Party’s political discourses such as ‘people vs non-people…’ and educating ‘the 
people to correctly understand and cherish their own state’(Chinese Academy of 
Sciences Media Research Centre, 1980). During the Cultural Revolution, as 
mentioned in Chapter 1, the majority of the media ceased publication. For the few 
remaining national publications, their task remained to convey the Party’s 
political discourse. As one of the few national official media remaining in 
operation, the People’s Daily was often the place where important directives were 
issued. There were study groups dedicating time to learn important news in the 
People’s Daily. Therefore, it was clear that readers of the People’s Daily were not 
merely information consumers who could pick and choose to read what interested 
them most. They must accept and study the political and social norms contained in 
the news without question. This means that the People’s Daily spread the 
confession news that was supposed to have happened in local villages or cities to 
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the whole of China. It revealed the problems in daily life and set examples for 
how to solve them. Through the People’s Daily, the confession was 
recontextualised into a wider political background and set up as a model for 
nationwide emulation.  
Within the actual content of news, modalities and pronouns can often 
indicate the relationship between the reader and the content producer. Modality in 
linguistics refers to ‘the logical truth or reality status of a statement or sentence’ 
(Scollon, 2014: 107) and is represented by modal verb auxiliaries such as 
‘must/mustn’t’ and ‘should/shouldn’t’. Coupled with pronouns, modalities can 
produce effects such as ordering, advising and warning the reader. For instance, 
the Personal Experience example was titled ‘We all should continue the 
revolution!’. The ‘should’, coupled with the exclamation mark, suggests that the 
speaker was making a firm and passionate demand as to what needed doing. With 
the pronoun ‘we’, the effect of such a phrase indicates the speaker actively sided 
with and was passionately motivating the readers to follow him to continue the 
revolution.  
Moreover, the modality was often coupled with first-person conversations, 
which further increased the degree of certainty of the language. Many such 
dialogues were prescriptive in that ‘you the reader’ were addressed directly to do 
something as if it is a command ‘you the reader’ had better follow (Machin and 
Van Leeuwen, 2014). For example, in the Personal Experience Example, 
Old Comrade Zhang grabbed his [the slacking young man’s] hand and 
said: ‘You must follow Chairman’s orders. As long as you correct your 
mistakes, it will be fine. You need to get a copy of the document from the 
9th Party’s Congress and study it by heart, trying your best to be 
Chairman Mao’s good worker.’ (19690906) 
Through the use of ‘you’, together with the modality ‘must’, Comrade Zhang was 
not only addressing the young man who was having a conversation with him 
(assuming that the story is not fictional) but also speaking directly to the reader to 
give advice – studying the central document and behaving yourself. Consequently, 
it increased the level of certainty of the attitude of the speaker, thus put the 
speaker in a commanding position.  
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A third way to increase the degree of certainty is to present a statement as 
a matter of fact, leaving no room for anyone to question the statement. In the same 
news, cadre Zhang gave an example of how to persuade a militia commander to 
correctly deal with the conflict between the militia and the masses. In the quoted 
conversation below, the cadre connected the liberation of the poor to the role of 
Mao as a manner of fact, 
Having said so and judging from his [the young worker’s] facial 
expression, I [Comrade Zhang] found that he was contemplating what 
I had said, thus I continued: ‘Think about it – why were we oppressed 
and forced to beg and run away from famine? It was precisely 
because we the poor had no barrel of gun or control of rubber-
stamps. Now Chairman Mao saved us from a sea of bitterness and let 
us take control of the rubber-stamp. However, you are making a scene 
- abandoning the barrel of gun and being unwilling to make a 
revolution. This is a critical issue concerning whether you are loyal to 
Chairman Mao or not… (19680613)   
The depiction of Chairman Mao’s role in liberating the Chinese people was stated 
as something that had happened and was known to all. The conversation quickly 
moved on to criticising the younger worker’s behaviour, leaving no time for 
questioning of Mao’s role. 
Therefore, through modalities, the prescriptive use of the pronoun ‘you’ 
and presenting a statement as a matter of fact, the degree of certainty of the 
language increases and the difference between the dominant and the subordinate 
manifests. Overall, the language used in the confession news, like many other 
official writings of the time, appeared very definitive and certain about the 
message they conveyed to its audience. The interpretative level analysis showed 
that Mao’s works were quoted as unquestionable truth and guidelines to be 
followed. It not only showcased the determination and dedication to study Mao’ 
works and corrected the mistakes but also strengthened the reader’s position as 
someone who needed guidance as to what to do. It also reflected the relationship 
between the official media who represented the voice of the Party elites and the 
audience: the former was there to teach and guide the latter. The latter could only 
absorb what they were told without questioning.  
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The textual and the interpretative level of analysis so far has shown the 
respective relationships between the confessant and the confessor, and between 
the masses and the enemies. Through lexical choices, use of the passive voice and 
a series of linguistic techniques, the framing of confession news established the 
identity of confessants as vague and lacking in individuality. The relationships 
between the confessant and the masses seemed contradictory. Conventionally, the 
confessant was supposed to be in a commanding position due to his leadership 
status. However, ironically, the confessant had usually been publicly shamed and 
thus felt insecure and hesitant in front of the confessor. However, self-criticism 
ultimately provided the confessant with the legitimacy to be the person who was 
capable of distinguishing right from wrong and who was in the position to lecture 
the confessor. Similarly, while the anonymous masses appeared wise enough to be 
the teacher of the confessant, they occasionally also seemed to need guidance to 
distinguish right from wrong. Worse still, despite praising the masses for their 
tolerance, friendliness and open-mindedness, the self-criticism alluded to the fear 
of the confessant in facing the masses. The linguistic features also highlighted 
three roles that Mao was playing simultaneously: the emperor, the wise senior and 
the patriarchal family head. The enemies included the Chinese character si, Liu 
Shaoqi and his local agents, the ‘US Imperialists’ and the ‘Soviet Revisionists’. 
The image of the enemies might be vague, but the attitude towards them was 
definitive. They were the worst, most evil and horrible obstacles on the path to 
communism. They were to blame, not the confessants.  
The reasoning device – the identification of, the judgement of and the 
solution to a problem - has also emerged from the two levels of analysis. There 
were three prominent sets of logical causal sequences that comprised the 
reasoning device. The first logical sequence was that failing to follow Mao’s 
direction led to one making mistakes. Confessants often attributed ‘the root’ of 
their mistakes to the ‘failure to study Mao’s brilliant works diligently’ 
(19670328). The second logical sequence was that carefully studying Mao’s 
works enabled the confessants to realise their or others’ mistakes. As one example 
shows: ‘Judging from recent work, I reaffirm my understanding that one must 
read Chairman Mao’s books, that it is unacceptable for one not to read his works 
and that one shouldn’t forget Chairman Mao’s books even for a single second’ 
(19670328). The repeated use of modalities such as ‘must’ and ‘shouldn’t’ and the 
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regurgitation of essentially the same thing demonstrated an explicitly absolute 
attitude. The double-negative phrases ‘fei…buke’ (it is unacceptable not to do 
something) underlined the impossibility of ignoring Mao’s teaching and 
articulated clearly that using Mao’s thought to criticise someone prompted the 
person to realise his or her mistakes.  
The first two logical sequences lead to the last one, i.e. that Mao, 
occasionally together with the Party, was the reason that the people were having a 
better life. Mao was framed as the sole saviour of the people from the ‘old 
society’ and its oppressor. Recalling the bitterness before 1949, Qingdao cadre Li 
Yuanrong directly credited Mao and the Party for saving him, asserting that: ‘The 
old society abused my whole family so much that we barely survived. It was the 
Party and Chairman Mao who saved me’ (19670328). 
From the three logical sequences above emerges the reasoning device: the 
framing identified the problem that confessants all ‘committed mistakes’ 
regarding lax political thought. It then came to the verdict that it was dangerously 
wrong to hold the incorrect belief. The framing prescribed the solution to correct 
the wrong beliefs and actions: the close study of Mao’s works and the following 
of his teachings. Accordingly, three confession discourses manifest themselves: 
‘the omnipresent imaginary paternal leader’ (regarding Mao), ‘the correct 
attitudes toward the masses and mass criticism’ (regarding masses/confessor) and 
‘dehumanisation’ (regarding enemies). These discourses reflected the order of 
discourse surrounding the mediated confession as they set the social, cultural and 
political contexts and boundaries. They are under closer scrutiny in the following 
explanatory analysis.  
4.4 Explanatory level of analysis: ideology & power  
To critically analyse the text is to ‘elucidate’ the ‘naturalisation’ of the 
ideological elements as common sense (Fairclough, 2010a: 31). This level of 
analysis examines the social context which facilitates and catalyses the 
naturalisation process. This section elaborates the social contexts that enabled the 
reasoning devices identified in the previous analysis. Meanwhile, according to the 
official media framing theory, appealing to cultural resonance - the relatively 
constant social and cultural background - in framing an event can increase its 
influence (Gamson and Modigliani, 1989). Therefore, this section first examines 
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how the framing of confession news appealed to the shared Confucian norms, the 
hidden reality and the healing tradition. Next, I argue that through the practice of 
confession a form of superficial consensus was constructed among the dominant 
and the subordinate in China.   
4.4.1 Confucian Value Discourse: families and nations  
The way in which Mao was framed reflected the persistent Confucian 
hierarchy during the Cultural Revolution. On the surface, the CCP was busy 
transforming China from a repressive ‘feudal’ society to a modern revolutionary 
new state by discarding the Confucian tradition while following a communist 
path. In reality, the ‘feudal’ way of thinking was not only too hard to eliminate but 
became, probably unwittingly for both the CCP and the people, useful for the 
CCP’s propaganda.  
The previous two levels of analyses revealed that Mao was omnipresent in 
the confession. He was framed as the head of a family, who everyone was close 
to, loved, respected and followed. He was also a source of wisdom that everyone 
must consult on a daily basis. Meanwhile, he was also hailed as an emperor at the 
top of the social hierarchical order. In the atmosphere of encouraging to replace 
kinship with revolutionary comradery and reverence for Mao, it was quite ironic 
that the kinship value of filial piety was used to reinforce the revolutionary 
fervour and loyalty of the masses towards Mao. As the chapter will later show, 
kinship is a recurring element in mediated confessions. It lives up to the 
importance to which Fei et al. (1992: 63) describe, 
In Chinese society, the most important relationship – kinship – is 
similar to the concentric circles formed when a stone is thrown into a 
lake. Kinship is a social relationship formed through marriage and 
reproduction. The networks woven by marriage and reproduction can 
be extended to embrace countless numbers of people – in the past, 
present, and future. The same meaning is implied in our saying 
“Everyone has a cousin three thousand miles away,” with three 
thousand miles indicating the vastness of kinship networks. Despite 
the vastness, though, each network is like a spider’s web in the sense 
that it centres on oneself. Everyone has this kind of a kinship network, 
but the people covered by one network are not the same as those 
covered by any other… Therefore, the web of social relationships 
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linked with kinship is specific to each person. Each web has a self as 
its centre, and every web has a different centre.  
By Fei’s standard, Mao should have been the most important centre for everyone 
in the vast web of social relations in China during the Cultural Revolution. This 
process of recontextualising family discourse into political discourse constructed 
Mao as a senior patriarchal figure of all of China. As Chen observes and 
summarises, during the Rectification Campaign in the 1940s ‘[a]version to 
confession seemed to be universal, and the party branch secretary had to do 
something to alleviate the participants’ fears . . . Personifying the party as a 
benevolent father who helped the participants in the rectification class make great 
headway in revealing their inner thoughts’ (Chen, 1986: 335-337). It equally 
applied to the Cultural Revolution, with the only exception that it was Mao, not 
the Party, who was personified as a benevolent father. For example, it was quite 
common for the revolutionary youths to call ‘Chairman Mao’ ‘dear father’ (Lian, 
2018). As the textual analysis shows, lexical choices such as ‘Duideqi’ and 
‘talaorenjia’ were typical family discourse. Senior people were viewed as sources 
of wisdom due to their decades of life experience in Chinese culture. Similarly, 
framing Mao as ‘talaorenjia’ corresponded to some other common expressions 
which invited people to love and respect Mao as if he were the wise head of one’s 
family (jiazhang). A popular song at the time was named ‘Father is dear, mother 
is dear, but not as dear as Chairman Mao17’. It celebrated the fact that people 
should love Mao more than their own parents. Therefore, this recontextualisation 
of family discourse into a political context in newspapers invited the reader to 
view Mao - a political leader who the majority of the Chinese people had never 
met in person or had any direct relationship with - as a senior male figure who 
they were not only close to but also indebted to. The masses, as the children, must 
respect and appreciate the wisdom of the head of the family. 
Related to the image of a respected old male in the Confucian tradition is 
the figure of a wise sage. Assuming the role of guidance and inculcation, the 
 
17 The lyrics of the song: ‘Our political party is greater than heaven and earth; Chairman Mao 
loves the people more than parents loves their children; Nothing in the world compares with the 
goodness of communism; An ocean’s depth can’t compare with the depth of friendship with our 
class; Chairman Mao’s principles are the treasure of the revolution; Whoever is against Chairman 




Chinese traditional teachers upheld the belief in 'the fundamental malleability and 
perfectibility of human beings (Lifton, 1968: chapter 20; Munro, 1977)’. They 
viewed it as a duty for themselves to give advice and for everyone to keep 
cultivating and perfecting the Heaven-bestowed self. This was why they often saw 
great potential in confession for changing to a better self (Lin, 2008). 
The previous two points combined made a powerful claim for Mao to rule 
China. According to Lü Kun (Yang, 2016), a government official and thinker of 
the Ming Dynasty18, emperors had the divine mandate of heaven to rule (shi). 
Only a sage who was moral, knowledgeable and wise could criticise the 
emperor’s rule (li). The news framing of Mao effectively scored both ‘li’ and 
‘shi’, an emperor who had the mandate of heaven and a parent figure who had 
wisdom, knowledge and experience. ‘The ruler is the master, the father and the 
teacher in one’ (Lin, 2008: 175). Therefore, as a figure of both an imperial 
emperor and wise sage, Mao became the sole most powerful figure to lead China 
and his position was impossible to challenge. 
Mao’s powerful image reflected the social and political hierarchical order 
prior to and during the Cultural Revolution. As stated in Chapter 1, even though 
Confucianism dominated China for a large part of history, its reception had been 
rather mixed since the collapse of the Qing Dynasty in 1911. Rapid changes 
affecting all aspects of life ensued. Reflecting upon China’s recent falling behind 
many western countries as well as neighbouring Japan, many intellectuals of the 
time diagnosed that the Confucian tradition was the cause of a declining China. 
Some of those intellectuals later became the founding members of the CCP, such 
as Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao (Sun, 2013). During the Cultural Revolution, Mao 
called for the destruction of the ‘Four Olds’19 in the early stage of the Cultural 
Revolution and later for attacks on Confucius directly alongside Lin Biao. 
However, as Gamson and Modigliani (1989) remind us concerning the 
dialectic elements of culture, conflicting attitudes can coexist in framing. On the 
one hand, despite Mao’s mobilisation to denounce Confucianism, it was 
impossible to completely weed out its influence on the Chinese people’s way of 
thinking. On the other hand, this seemingly modern aberration of destroying 
 
18 For a comparison of Mao and the 1st emperor of the ‘most Chinese’ dynasty Ming, see Andrew, 
Anita M and Rapp, John A. Autocracy and China’s Revel Founding Emperors (2000).  
19 ‘Four Olds’ refers to old Customs, old Culture, old Habits, and old Ideas. 
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tradition is, in a sense, a mere illusion. ‘[T]here are Confucian overtones in the 
Marxist-Maoist orchestration. The crucial role of ideology under communism 
lends particular interest to China’s ideological past’ (Fairbank, 1976: 59), such as 
the firm beliefs in the malleability of human nature and the pursuit of perfect 
humanness mentioned before. Therefore, the PRC was de facto an ‘imperial 
autocracy’ (huangquan zhuanzhi) with a Soviet-Union-style power structure 
(Yang, 2016).   
In the 1960s, China was still in the transition from a society lasting over 
two thousand years to something seemingly drastically different. Many ordinary 
people struggled to come to terms with the fact that they, not the emperor, were 
supposed to be the master of China. In the 1950s, the peasants’ understanding of 
the revolutionary discourses was still largely based on their experience of 
traditional daily life and understanding of the world (Leese, 2011: 3). Many 
people in rural China thought of Mao as nothing but a new emperor. The Party 
had to order people to stop prostrating themselves to Mao (Leese, 2011). As 
mentioned before, slogans such as ‘Long Live Chairman Mao!’ were popular 
expressions. Even within the CCP, the imperial discourse continued to exist. 
‘Baoshou pai’ (the conservative faction) had been originally called ‘baohuang 
pai’, literally the ‘protecting emperor faction’ before Premier Zhou Enlai ordered 
the renaming. In 1967, when the rebel group attacked Xu Shiyou, Commander of 
the Nanjing Military Region, Xu went into hiding in a farm in Dabie Mountain 
and declared he would rather fight guerrilla warfare than be put through endless 
struggle. Mao saved Xu by receiving him in person in Shanghai. The first thing 
Xu did upon meeting Mao was to drop to his knee (ibid.) – a traditional etiquette 
toward the senior to show submission. Not long after the collapse of the emperor 
rule, discourses as such reflected the popular perception of Mao’s status and 
society in general. These small details showed that the traditional way of thinking 
was still engraved in people’s minds, despite the great effort to denounce and 
eliminate it. 
4.4.2 The Fear of the Masses Discourse: the hidden reality 
Official news, together with slogans, quotations, songs and model dramas, 
contributed to an image of distorted reality during the Cultural Revolution. The 
passion, unity, upbeat spirit and success exhibited in the news was, more often 
than not, opposite to what was actually happening. Nonetheless, reality still 
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managed to creep into the news. The construction of the relationship between the 
confessants and the masses was a revealing example. The discourse on ‘having 
correct attitudes toward the masses and the mass criticism’ was prevalent in the 
confession news. The positive image of the masses had been established in the 
official political discourse prior to the Cultural Revolution. The masses were the 
people of good class. Mao had a simple dichotomised categorisation of the 
Chinese population in the 1950s: ‘the people’ and ‘the non-people’. ‘The people' 
were the 'good' class, including the poor, the hired, middle peasants and all those 
who were working for the CCP; the 'non-people' were the 'reactionaries', the 
landlords, the bourgeoisie, the bureaucratic capitalist class, the KMT members, 
the KMT sympathisers and the  KMT henchmen (Mao, 1965). Mao used to have 
the ambition to remould human nature in order to create a utopian communist 
society. To a degree, ironically, this determination to bend human nature was 
similar to the Confucian persistence of pursuing a perfect Heaven-bestowed 
humanness, which is mentioned in the previous section. The Confucian teaching 
of humanness rejects the idea of an incomplete inadequate human nature. Rather, 
one needs to constantly strive for self-improvement and perfection (Lin, 2008). 
Mao shared this predilection and demanded that everyone should devote 
themselves to the collective good instead of personal material gains. He 
endeavoured to create a ‘paradise on earth’ by forging a utopian kind of people 
who were selfless and united under the banner of communism (ter Haar, 2002: 
56).  
However, as the previous analysis shows, ‘the masses’ who were supposed 
to be supportive and wise, often intimidated the confessants and needed guidance 
to distinguish right from wrong. The confessants, while admitting the mistakes 
‘sincerely’, tried subtly to excuse themselves from taking full responsibility. 
Behind the fear of the masses was the bigger, yet unsurprising, picture of distorted 
reality in news, covering up the chaotic political reality during the Cultural 
Revolution. 
Emotions and revolutionary fervour were good for mobilisation but also 
inherently dangerous as they could develop in unexpected directions. Mao and the 
Party elites almost lost total control of certain provinces. Many Party cadres of 
various ranks were also under verbal and physical attack in 1966 from the 
‘revolutionary masses’. They had become Mao’s most hated class enemy within 
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the Party. These privileged bureaucrats, who were not necessarily in possession of 
a large amount of personal wealth, commanded the wealth of the whole nation 
(Djilas, 1957). They stood opposite to Mao’s ideal of selfless socialist men; thus, 
Mao wanted to cleanse the bureaucratic ranks, which he believed were threatening 
China’s communist course. The cadres knew the horrific consequence of standing 
in the wrong queue. They knew Mao’s insistence on the suppression of the 
enemies in his writings. They knew the excessive public-shaming, violence, 
torture and death in reality. The intensity of the violence contributed to the 
appearance of an anarchistic society, to suicides and to a sense of insecurity 
among people, intellectuals, local cadres and ordinary people alike. The 
subsequent insecurity left everyone vigilant and extremely careful in terms of who 
they should support. Yang (2016) accurately argued that Mao was indeed ‘the 
great helmsman’ in that, despite the personality cult, he still had to steer the 
direction all the time to maintain a delicate power balance among groups such as 
the revolutionary masses, the rebel groups, the CCRG, the senior conservative 
Party elites and the PLA. This led to frequent shifts of political attitudes towards 
the same group of people, which caused huge confusion among the population.  
The psychological fear and the physical abuse soon led to a meltdown of 
the government at various levels and the country slipped into anarchy. Mao 
reluctantly realised that he needed this group of purged bureaucrats to ensure the 
basic function of the country. Mao’s method thus changed to, as he used the 
analogy, ‘scorch’ the cadres while not letting them burn (Yang, 2016). The verbal 
and physical attack should not lead to the elimination of the cadre, but instead 
should teach them a lesson. Mao wanted them to ‘display a frozen pose’ 
(liangxiang) - a term from Peking Opera - which ‘crystallizes the emotions and 
attributes associated with a character’ (Berry, 2016: 36). That is to say, through 
the humiliating process of ‘displaying a frozen pose’, the cadres were permitted to 
return to work after expressing remorse.  Nonetheless, in reality, it was impossible 
for the cadres to know which faction of ‘rebel masses’ to support when they 
returned to work. ‘The rebel masses’ split into factions depending on their 
respective interests and protégés in the Party. Every faction claimed themselves as 
‘the rebel masses’ despite most of them being in conflict with each other.  
For instance, a telling example was the framing of the front-page news 
article published on 1st June 1969. It had a very long title: ‘Capital Worker-PLA 
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Mao Zedong Thought Propaganda Team summarising and implementing the 
experience of the cadre policy; firmly implementing Chairman Mao’s proletarian 
policy; liberating the good people who had made mistakes but now realised the 
mistakes and were ready to change’ (19690601). This extremely long title 
contained many hidden messages. ‘Capital Worker-PLA Mao Zedong Thought 
Propaganda Team’ referred to an important event in July 1968 in which Mao had 
ordered the PLA to take control of Tsinghua University and break up the student 
factions participating in violent struggles (Yang, 2016). However, the title, as well 
as the body of the article, revealed little about the physical confrontation between 
the students and the PLA. The PLA military force became ‘the communication 
team’ instead, softening the image of the military intervention. Unity became the 
key phase: the term ‘good people’ in the title set the tone: the people who had 
made mistakes belonged to the ‘good’ class. They had realised their error and 
showcased the willingness to change. Therefore, the students and the PLA were 
united as one under Mao. 
However, this was a distortion of reality. As a result of years of ideological 
campaigns, it was a well-known fact that the consequence of being ‘an enemy’ 
could be very serious. As a series of radical collectivist social changes rolled out 
in the 1950s, various Party official claimed on different occasions that the 
bourgeois class had been transformed. Even Mao acknowledged that the 
bourgeoisie could become ‘the people’ after transformation (Deng, 1956: 213-
214). In this ideal world, the enemy eventually deserved a chance to join the ranks 
of socialist new men. However, the criticism generated during the Hundred 
Flowers Movement shocked Mao. He ‘rediscovered’ the existence of class 
enemies within the Chinese society, and worse still, even inside the Party. He 
subsequently responded to it with political censure and purges, which were 
estimated to have persecuted over 550,000 people (Dikötter, 2013). The ‘rightists’ 
became the most hated class enemy. Mao (1965: 417-418) was very clear on the 
different treatments towards different categories of the people, as he elaborated; 
Who are the people? At the present stage in China, they are the 
working class, the peasantry, the urban petty bourgeoisie and the 
national bourgeoisie. These classes, led by the working class and the 
Community Party, unite to form their own state and elect their own 
government; they enforce their dictatorship over the running dogs of 
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imperialism – the landlord class and bureaucrats – bourgeoisie, as well 
as the representatives of those classes, the Kuomintang reactionaries 
and their accomplices – suppress them, allow them only to behave 
themselves and not to be unruly in word or deed. If they speak or act 
in an unruly way, they will be promptly stopped and punished. 
Democracy is practised within the ranks of the people, who enjoy the 
rights of freedom of speech, assembly, association and so on. The 
right to vote belongs only to the people, not to the reactionaries. The 
combination of these two aspects, democracy for the people and 
dictatorship over the reactionaries, is the people’s democratic 
dictatorship.  
For the success of the revolution, the happiness of the people and the liberation of 
the nation, ‘non-people’ or the enemies must have no rights and be subjected to 
oppression. 
The chaotic and cruel aspects of the mass struggle sessions were never 
directly portrayed in the news. No negative information about the Cultural 
Revolution was permitted in the news. Hence, when the mass struggle sessions 
were mentioned, they were claimed as victorious and necessary. However, the 
fear, panic, confusion and the struggle of conflicting thoughts that resulted from 
the mass criticism and self-criticism sessions were unintentionally reproduced in 
the People’s Daily. It became a way to frame the confession news. The 
confessants often felt wronged by the masses, confused, hesitant or ‘couldn’t 
understand’ who they should support. It was genuine confusion caused by what 
they had witnessed. The messy mass struggle meetings happening daily shadowed 
the idealistic heroic proletariat triumphing over evil capitalist roaders. Thus, in 
this sense, the calling ‘don’t be scared of the masses’ was not only what the 
confessant hoped to convey to others, but also something about which the 
confessant needed to persuade themselves. The contradictory images of ‘the 
masses’ was a reflection of the gap between Mao’s theoretical model masses and 
the everyday Chinese people. Such framing of the relationship between the 
confessant and masses reflected the rhetorical effort that the Party made in 
bridging the gap. 
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4.4.3 Dehumanisation & Healing discourse 
Two intertwined discourses permeated Mao’s campaigns in the first 
decade of the PRC:  ‘the heroic exploits of the good' and 'the demonic 
machinations of the bad’ (Schoenhals, 2007: 465). This ‘justice vs evil’ 
dichotomy shaped how everything should be understood. Having examined the 
discourse around ‘the good people’, it is time to analyse the opposite side. This 
section highlights the two discourses that are related to the enemies: the 
Dehumanisation Discourse and the Healing Metaphor. 
The dehumanisation of the enemy derived from a similar strategy: 
Demonisation. It was a ‘striking feature’ in Mao’s political discourse (Schoenhals, 
2007: 465). Dehumanisation means degrading human beings to animals, insects or 
other physical objects, while demonisation goes one step further to reducing 
people to monsters, spirits or supernatural elements that exist in traditional 
folklore and religion. The demonisation discourse had long been in use prior to 
the Cultural Revolution as a way to legitimise violence towards ‘the Other’ in the 
traditional cultural context. The CCP’s application of dehumanisation meant a 
continuation of this religious tradition (ter Haar, 2002).  
Although the causality of discourse and social changes is never 
mechanical or regular (Fairclough, 2003), ter Haar’s view on demonisation sheds 
light on the function of dehumanisation during the Cultural Revolution. 
Demonisation 
… functions in the setting of human targets, establishing a 
sense of legitimacy for the performance of violence, and 
presenting how actual violence should be carried out… the 
demonisation of political enemies in contemporary 
Communist China, far from being a modern aberration, is 
continuous with Chinese tradition in that the demonisation 
of the Other has always been a fundamental element in 
Chinese religious culture (2002: 60). 
In traditional Chinese beliefs, people viewed demons as the cause of plagues, 
barbarian invasions, and other natural or man-made disasters (ibid.) Ter Harr also 
argues that ‘… the basic idea that some people can be categorised as bad elements 
and should be removed from society and then eliminated by means of drastic 
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violence remained in place and in practice even gave rise to new, communist, 
forms’ (2002: 54). This deep-rooted culture facilitated the use of a 
dehumanisation discourse during the Cultural Revolution. Debasing certain 
groups of people as animals and vermin, or even demons, was to portray them as 
harmful, thus justifying the violence against and the physical destruction of these 
people. Demonisation and dehumanisation of the Other do not directly cause 
physical assault, but their use can be understood as an endorsement of the 
religious tradition to pick a target, single out enemies and threaten to destroy 
them. Furthermore, through the practice of division such as cursing the Japanese 
‘devil’ (guizi) when remembering the bitter past and fighting to remove the poison 
spread from the Chinese Khrushchev, the dehumanisation process enabled the rest 
of the people to unite around ‘the panacea’ of Mao’s works and directions.  
Unity through division meant that all of Mao’s mass campaigns needed 
enemies. Mao inherited this approach from Stalin’s ‘perpetual struggle against a 
roll call of imagined dastardly enemies who are collaborating with imagined 
Western agents to restore bourgeois capitalism and liberalism’ (Bishop, 2019: 
para 29). Without the enemy, the purpose of campaigns would cease to exist. 
Moreover, it is often easier for people to agree on things that are negative or 
generate hatred. Thus, the enemy was ‘an indispensable requisite in the armoury 
of a totalitarian leader’ (Hayek, 1994: 143). Animals, insects and poison were 
popular labels for the enemies, reducing them to non-humans. Since 1957, even 
vulgar street language made its way into the official political discourse regarding 
‘the enemies’. 
The abusive treatment inflicted on ‘the enemies’ during the Cultural 
Revolution might be similar to what had been used in many previous campaigns, 
but the identities of the enemies were more or less a pure manufactured product 
(Perry, 2001). Despite Mao’s belief in the remoulding of human nature, by the 
time of the Cultural Revolution, the consensus was that the enemy class had to be 
eliminated. They had infested the whole society and infiltrated into the Party (Sun, 
2013: 19-20). The previous mass campaigns, such as the Land Reform and the 
Anti-rightist Campaign, should have rooted out the enemies such as landlords and 
the KMT spies prior to 1966. Then who were the enemies during the Cultural 
Revolution? They were unlikely to be real landlords or spies but people who were 
simply labelled as such for some far-fetched reasons, apart from those whose 
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family backgrounds and records were so bad that they had been the crushing 
target of every single mass movement. 
Corresponding to the Dehumanisation Discourse was another culturally 
inspired discourse: the Healing Metaphor. One root of the Healing Metaphor was 
from religious faith healing practice, such as the symbolic therapy in Daoist 
tradition. The early proliferation of Buddhism in China, especially in the northern 
part of China, went hand in hand with the belief in magic. People believed that 
Buddhist monks had the magic power of healing and healing was a key attraction 
for converts (Wu, 1979). The other root operated in a secular sense, such as the 
practice of admitting wrongdoings from a student to a teacher. The foundation of 
the second root related to the Confucian belief that human nature was malleable: 
therefore, when one was imperfect, one could always strive to get better, as if the 
imperfection was metaphorically being sick, 
We must resolve to seek a new life and drastically rid ourselves of our 
errors without any concealment. Formerly King Hsuan of Ch'i, 
admitting his excessive aggressiveness, greed, and lust, confessed to 
Mencius all his faults one by one. Since he did not hold back 
anything, Mencius sincerely reassured him by saying that he was 
capable of turning his faults into good points. Our situation also 
should be like that of a patient who uninhibitedly gives a full account 
of the sources of his disease to the physician. Once the physician 
knows the roots of the disease, he can prescribe an appropriate 
remedy. Otherwise, even if there were an elixir, what good would it 
do if it did not match the disease? Now when we meet, we should be 
frank and strict with each other. Above all, let us not indulge in 
generalities. It is important that we describe the disease as it is so that 
the disease can be recognised and treated as it is. Only then can candid 
and beneficial counsel be given (Li, 1973: 13.14b).  
The ridding of mistakes was just like recovering from an illness. This excerpt used 
the ‘curing sickness’ analogy to reveal the benefits of correcting errors. Positively 
and actively tackling the illness under the direction of a doctor rather than hiding 
it was the proper way to deal with human imperfection. As the previous analysis 
shows, the CCP adopted this ‘curing illness’ metaphor, but the application of the 
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analogy was more than purely rhetorical. Recent studies reveal the social 
psychological mechanism of the faith healing discourse in confession, 
Recent studies of group dynamics underline the immense 
psychological power groups can wield over their members. In 
particular, one is impressed by the awesome pressures to conform to 
group norms experienced by individuals who are unanimously 
declared ‘sick’ or insane. The ‘patient’ is able to save himself, in the 
sense of restoring his own self-esteem as well as being reincorporated 
into the group, only by demonstrating complete acceptance of group 
values and norms. These pressures were effectively increased in the 
rectification movement through small-group study and discussions 
that included the criticism of every cadre by his peers and searching 
self-criticism (Selden, 1971: 195).   
The emphasis here was no longer to persuade the confessant to take a positive 
attitude to deal with the mistakes. Instead, it was about the social pressure – one 
‘is declared’ sick or insane, regardless of how one felt.  
In Mao’s various campaigns, the mounting pressure forced many people to 
end their lives. In campaigns during the Cultural Revolution, such as ‘Cleanse 
Class Ranks’ (1968-1970), a great number of people with their families were 
accused of being spies, for instance, and were subsequently killed. Going hand in 
hand with the witch hunt for the counterrevolutionaries was the emphasis on the 
‘practical’ policy to avoid any backlash from targeting too many people within a 
short period of time. For instance, when talking about the campaign in a 
university in Shanghai, Zhang Chunqiao, a key member of the CCRG, warned 
that, 
One needs to measure the application of the policy, otherwise, people 
jump off the building one after another, which is unsustainable. It 
doesn’t solve problems either. You [East China Normal University] 
target so many people at once, they are going to make complaints 
against you. Keep students in control. Don’t target too many at once 
(Yang, 2016: 735). 
It was rather direct and clear that confession was a strategic choice. The concern 
was about how to implement policy tactically without invoking social and 
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political backlashes instead of any concerns with human lives. Thus, the tactic 
looped back to Mao’s slogan ‘Learn from past mistakes to avoid future ones; cure 
the sickness to save the patient’: from time to time to appeal to target the mistake 
rather than punish the confessant. 
4.5 Framing Implications: Discourse and Power - A Practice of Constructed 
Consent 
The analysis so far has demonstrated how the framing of the confession 
news conformed to a certain established traditional way of thinking. It has also 
shown the justification process of turning certain people into insignificant 
subordinates. Ultimately, both framing theory and CDA are interested in the 
relation between discourse and power. Having analysed the framing of the 
confession news, this section considers the ideological implications of such 
framing. Ideology is meaning in the service of power (Thompson, 1984). 
Therefore, this section looks at how the framing was designed to serve the 
powerful. The implications are unlikely to be confined to the specific time of the 
Cultural Revolution and the form of newspapers. As the next chapter will show, it 
has a more profound and lasting presence. This section explains how the 
confession news in the People’s Daily also created an illusion of consensus as to 
the hierarchical status quo between the dominant and the subordinate in the 
Chinese population.  
Two types of confessional practices from Chinese history can shed light 
on the maintaining of the division. When studying the confessional tradition in 
China from 1570 to 1670, Wu (1979: 20) distinguished two types of confessional 
practices depending on who the confessor was. The confessors of the first type 
were divinities and the second the peers of the confessant. The content of a 
confession towards divinities typically include all human sins whereas a 
confession intended for peers was more likely to contain a more detailed 
examination of personal behaviours. In this sense, most of the confession news 
articles from the data resembled the first type intended for divinities. Only a few 
confessions in the news contained more detailed personal experience, such as the 
Personal Experience Example, resembled confession to peers. The vague, abstract 
and politically ornate language did not reveal a considerable amount of personal 
misconduct. ‘Vagueness’ was a weapon for the Party to plant fear in the mind of 
the people (Link, 2002). If it was vague, one did not know what went wrong or 
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where the forbidden line was. Thus, one became hesitant to do anything that was 
not clearly in line with the permission of the CCP for fear of unknowingly 
crossing the red line. The vague political jargon, instead, packaged into the 
confession all sorts of typical ‘sins’ of the time, such as ‘being selfish’, ‘being 
scared of the masses’ and ‘neglecting to study Mao’s works’. These ‘sins’ were so 
pervasive that these general labels became the everyday mistakes that everyone 
might commit and could articulate in confession. The whole process not only hid 
what really happened to the confessant but also underlined the dominant (the 
leader/the CCP) in comparison to the subordinate (the confessant). The individual 
personal grievances or ‘misconducts’ were rendered to a uniformed but 
meaningless self-criticism demanded by the Party. 
Such self-criticism represented a strict hierarchal order. Echoing the 
previous studies, self-criticism is usually expected from the weaker to a higher-
rank (Apter and Saich, 1994; Hu, 2012). The analysis showed that this power 
disparity in framing between the dominant and the subordinate was maintained by 
generating high psychological pressure via discourse. One way of generating 
pressure was the use of crude language to conduct self-criticism. Hu (2012: 107) 
argued that the use of vulgar language was a privilege of the criticisers and a 
suggestion of ‘the dominant status of the speaker [criticisers] vis à vis the listener 
(person being criticised)’. It accelerated the process of destroying human dignity. 
In the confession news, the framing of Mao, the masses and the enemies built up 
the mental stress. The overall effect of using damaging labels was that without 
specifying anybody or any wrongdoings, the relationship between the confessant 
and the enemy was both clear and vague. The relation between the confessant and 
the enemies was a clear boundless hatred, as demonstrated by the violent tone. 
Meanwhile, the denunciation was vague in that readers who did not know the 
confessant still had no idea who the enemies were after reading the piece. It was a 
criticism targeting essentially nobody and anybody. This imaginative enemy in 
news was handy in the sense that since enemies must have existed according to 
Mao’s instruction, a vague symbolic enemy could easily fill in the gap where a 
specific foe was either non-existent or could not be named for whatever reasons. 
The mental pressure that such labels were able to generate essentially put the 
majority of the population in an overwhelming sense of agitation, anxiety, 
132 
 
uneasiness and wariness. The physical, as well as mental welfare, was beyond 
one’s control.  
In the end, very few chose to or were able to challenge the confession and 
thus a superficial consent was manufactured between the powerful and the 
powerless in the newspaper. By admitting the accusation and agreeing to conduct 
self-criticism, confessants signalled consent and submission to the authority 
(Fiskesjö, 2017). In this sense, confession was both ‘an indictment and a verdict’ 
(Hu, 2012: 104). Regardless of whether the accusations were true or not, or 
whether the confessants were guilty or not, the purpose of criticising oneself was 
to demonstrate his or her attitude towards Mao’s and the Party’s authority. 
Arguing otherwise was never good for salvation. 
4.6 Conclusion 
In sum, the framing of the confession news during the Cultural Revolution 
was along the track of the traditional Chinese social and cultural norms and the 
CCP political norms. Through an examination of linguistic features such as word 
choices, sentence structures, and modalities, it demonstrated an often 
contradictory relationship between the confessant, the confessor, the revolutionary 
masses and the enemies. Through an intertextual analysis of dominant Mao and 
the Healing Discourse, it explains the domination of Mao at the time and a 
didactic relationship between the newspaper content producers and the audience. 
Taken together, the framing identified the root of cadre making mistakes as a lack 
of Maoist thought work and subsequently proposed the solution of studying 
Mao’s teaching more diligently. Through an examination of the historical 
background leading up to and during the Cultural Revolution, the explanatory 
analysis related the discourses to the external cultural, social and political power 
of the time. Despite the official denunciation of Confucian culture, the CCP was 
still implementing a Confucian ideal of hierarchical structure. It reflected the 
actual difficulty in changing something that had been engraved in the minds of 
many Chinese people.  
It is crucial to examine the framing of the rules or beliefs that the CCP 
adopted or changed and to identify the way in which the Party expected this 
framing to work among the Chinese population. The analysis reveals the 
ideological implication of the framing: maintaining the ideologically correct 
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position on paper at all-time despite the contradictions in cultural resonance. It 
was also an era in which it was impossible to resist any criticism without being 
accused of the hideous crime of being ‘anti-Mao, anti-Party and anti-people’ (Hu, 
2012). Thus, the confession news was a form of constructed consent spread 
through the national newspaper. It reflected as well as reinforced a sense of 
impossibility to rebut any criticism, thus reinforcing the existing domination of 
Mao. 
With the death of Mao in 1976, the Cultural Revolution came to an end. 
The Gang of Four was arrested and put on a public trial as the masterminds 
behind the chaotic decade. Wang’s and Yao’s confession, Zhang’s silence as well 
as Jiang’s defiant protest became the last memory of the Cultural Revolution. 
Politics gradually began to retreat from ordinary people’s life. So did mediated 
confessions. According to the data I collected, the number of confession pieces in 
the People’s Daily dropped after 1977. When the phrase ‘I made mistakes’ 
appeared in news, the confession was only a constituent part of a story or an 
example in a story addressing some other issues. The phrase became something 
only ‘mentioned’ rather than ‘highlighted’. Besides, the meaning of ‘I made 
mistakes’ also changed. During the Cultural Revolution, the phrase usually meant 
making political mistakes, such as deviating from the Maoist communist path, 
holding a passive attitude towards the criticism from the masses or hesitating to 
criticise others. Since the 1980s, however, the phrase ‘making mistakes’ 
(fancuowu) in news articles has carried the underlying meaning of ‘to use public 
office for private gain’ (jiagong jisi), which is the definition of corruption. Thus, 
the term became a euphemism for accepting bribes or using public status or 
profession for personal gains. According to Yang’s (2016) observation, the degree 
of corruption after the economic reform is truly worse than that in Mao’s era. 
Although there is no denying the existence of a sharp conflict caused by material 
inequality and elitism in Mao’s years, which consequently triggered some people 
to write Big Character Posters during the Cultural Revolution to criticise the 
Party, it is true that all of China was in poverty at the time and that most Party 
cadres maintained a frugal lifestyle. However, it is equally true that corruption 
troubled the CCP in Mao’s time and is an increasing challenge after the Cultural 
Revolution. Having said that, is confession gone forever? My research suggests 
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that while the confession discourse may remain unseen in newspapers today, it 


























Chapter 5. Analysis of Mediated Confession in Xi’s First Five-Year 
Term 
The end of the Cultural Revolution and the beginning of technocratic 
reform saw the political use of self-criticism fade out of ordinary people’s daily 
life. As mentioned at the end of the last chapter, the keyword search of ‘I made 
mistakes’ gradually lost its original political connotation and became obscure in 
the People’s Daily. When it did appear in the 1980s, it was mostly a euphemism 
for taking bribes. However, it does not necessarily mean that mediated 
confessions are no longer used by the CCP. In fact, Xi’s era has witnessed dozens 
of confessions involving people from all walks of life, appearing not in 
newspapers but on television. There were journalists who were said to have 
produced false reports, public intellectuals who were alleged to have spread 
rumours, celebrities who took drugs, ethnic minorities who committed murder and 
looting in Xinjiang and CCP cadres who were expelled and arrested for taking 
bribes (Yoon, 2015; Mitchell, 2016). This recent resurgence of confessions in 
media from non-Party members and the CCP cadres alike shows that the CCP 
regards this technique as being very useful once again in tackling the challenges 
that the Party is facing today. 
The purpose of this chapter is twofold. Firstly, it illustrates the social, 
cultural and political resonance that is invoked by the framing and how it 
potentially shapes and is shaped by the society in Xi’s first five-year term. 
Secondly, it dissects how language constructs the power relations and ideology to 
create the dominant/subordinate divide in Xi’s contemporary China. Both points 
are crucial to the understanding of the implication of the contemporary resurgence 
of the historical practice, which I will examine in the next chapter. For the 
analysis on the contemporary data, this thesis mainly focuses on confessions from 
two sources: three news clip broadcasts on television and a documentary on Xi’s 
anti-corruption campaign. Hence, this chapter is divided into two parts. The first 
part examines the three news clips. The second part investigates the confessions 
contained in the anti-corruption documentary ‘Always on the Road’ (2016). I 
begin both parts with an overview of the media content. Then, I start the three-
dimensional CDA of the respective mediated confessions. Both parts end with a 
brief discussion on the framing implications in terms of discourse and power.  
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5.1 New clips 
Through three TV confession news pieces, the first part of this chapter 
provides an in-depth inquiry into the framing of the relevant confession discourse. 
It highlights a common identity that the confessants share across the three TV 
confession cases: they are all framed as ‘criminals’, and are convicted by a public 
trial on CCTV rather than any court. Aside from the shared criminal identity, two 
confessants are also painted as enemies of China while the remaining one is a 
morally failed unfilial son. The analysis follows the three levels of analysis of 
CDA: the descriptive analysis pinpoints the language, metaphors and grammar 
that crystalises a certain framing. The interpretive level of analysis dissects the 
production and reception of the cases. An intertextual examination explains the 
role of the narrator and the strategic omission in guiding the interpretation of the 
confession. The explanatory analysis explores the cultural resonance giving rise to 
the framing of three types of discourses: ‘Rule of Law’ Discourse, National 
Security Discourse and Family Value Discourse. The CDA of the confession news 
shows that the CCP uses the ideology-fused discourses to strengthen its control 
over the public perception of ‘law’, ‘culture’ and ‘tradition’. The framing 
highlights two power divisions: between the morally and legally superior and 
inferior, and between ‘us’ the good and ‘foreign’ the evil. Thus, this chapter 
highlights the manipulative use of law and traditional Chinese culture by the CCP 
in the discourse and reveals the mundane nature of the TV confessions. As will be 
explained in more detail later, this mundane nature is a rather calculated strategy 
to subtly embed these carefully mediated confessions within everyday news. 
The following analysis of the news clip is organised as follows: it begins 
with a general introduction of the three pieces of confession news before moving 
on to a linguistic examination of the actual content. The interpretive analysis 
ensues before a discussion of the framing implication of the power divide the 
framing creates.  
5.1.1 General Information on the News Clips 
In the thesis, I examine three confession news clips in detail. The 
confession news clips of journalist Gao Yu and activist Peter Dahlin were 
broadcast on the CCTV 24-hour news. The case of bookseller Gui Minhai was 
featured in ‘Oriental Horizon’, a news magazine programme broadcast at eight 
o’clock in the evening, a prime time (19:30 - 22:00) TV slot in China ('China bans 
137 
 
foreign TV shows during prime time,' 2012). Despite the different stories, the 
three news pieces share similar key components: reporters’ narration, interviews 
with people involved and first person confession. For each case, I firstly provide a 
sketch of the story and then examine the linguistic construction of the key subjects 
and their relations. Then, the interpretive level of analysis connects the text and 
discourses to their counterparts outside the cases and the social background more 
generally. It also explains the relationship between the audience and the producer 
of TV confessions. Lastly, the explanatory analysis, bringing together the internal 
and external relations, provides elaboration on the social background that gives 
rise to the discourses identified. 
The Case of Gao Yu: descriptive level of analysis 
The first case is about veteran journalist Gao Yu. She appeared in a 
succinct news piece lasting ninety seconds in the CCTV-13 Morning News 
(Zhaowen tianxia) on 8th May 2014, admitting having endangered national 
security by leaking a secret document to a foreign website. However, the 
document that Gao is alleged to have leaked is hardly a national secret. It is the 
‘Communiqué on the Current State of the Ideological Sphere’ (2013), also known 
as ‘Document 9’, warning against seven ‘dangerous Western values’ (ChinaFile, 
2013). Gao’s court verdict claimed that she leaked the secret document to the US-
based media Mingjing in 2013, while both Mingjing and Gao later rejected the 
claim. ‘Document 9’ used to be unavailable to the public but was well circulated 
among cadres above the municipal level. It was then partially published in some 
local newspapers (Kuaixun, 2013). The full content is now available online; 
therefore, it is by no means a ‘national secret’(ChinaFile, 2013). There is no other 
information about Gao, such as her age, profession and motivation. The reason for 
Gao’s arrest remains murky; however, many people speculate that it relates to her 
liberal views and outspoken political writings in the 1980s and 1990s, for which 
she has been to prison twice already (Yu, 2015). Thus, the authority has viewed 
her as a ‘troublemaker’(Rudolph, 2016). She was eventually sentenced to seven 
years in prison in April 2015 and released six months later due to health issues. 
The following section lays out how Gao’s identity as ‘a convicted 
criminal’ and her relationship with the ‘foreign website’ are linguistically framed. 
There is an explicit framing of a crime story with Gao as the criminal and a strong 
presence of police. Freshly solving the case, the Beijing Police claims that the 
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then 71-year-old Gao had leaked to a certain foreign website a document 
containing national secrets and found a large amount of evidence at Gao’s home. 
Without any formal trial at the time of broadcasting, the news clip nonetheless 
portrays Gao as a criminal from both textual (the script of the news) and visual 
perspectives.  
Textually, the news directly names Gao four times, three out of which she 
is called ‘criminal suspect Gao Yu’ rather than ‘Gao Yu’ (CCTV13 Morning 
News, 2014). ‘Criminal suspect’ means that the person is only a suspect and has 
not been convicted by the court yet. However, the lexical choice has a very clear 
implication that the person is extremely likely to have committed the crime, if not 
already found guilty. Meanwhile, she is also referred to as qi – a third-person 
genderless pronoun which can refer to both humans and objects. It is a term 
commonly used in crime news because it dehumanises a person and produces a 
manner of formality, cold judgement and distance. Referring to Gao as qi is 
another way to imply her culpability. Gao’s ‘own’ words are self-incriminating 
too,  
I believe, what I did was (shi) something that broke the law, 
endangered the national interests. What I… I did was very wrong (de), 
I…I…I…I sincerely learnt this lesson, and, erm… must plead guilty to 
the crime (Morning News, 2014). 
Within two short sentences, Gao admits having committed crime and brought 
harm to national security. She pleads ‘guilty’ even before going to a court trial. 
Visually, the footage of Gao is shown from the police source. The environment 
where Gao makes her confession is a typical police station setting. Wearing an 
orange inmate vest, Gao walks into an ‘interrogation room’ (as shown in a close-
up of the placard) accompanied by two police officers. Her face is artificially 
blurred20, which is not unusual in crime news reporting (Ning, 2017). In the room, 
Gao sits opposite to and answers questions from two investigators. The footage 
also shows her signing paperwork and providing fingerprints in red ink. In sum, 
 
20 There is no clearly defined practical regulation as to when to blur the face of the people 
involved in crimes. Instead, there is only a few ‘common sense rules’. Among them, the faces of 
those who are involved in a court case which is not open to the public need blurring. These cases 
usually relate to national secrets and security. This could be the reason for Gao’s face coverage. 
Another rule relevant to Gao’s case is that the face of a person who has not been formally 
convicted, i.e. the person’s rights has not been deprived by court, should be blurred (Ning, 2017). 
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both the textual (audio) and the visual framing of Gao set her up as a convicted 
criminal. 
The incrimination of Gao is framed through the relationship between her and an 
anonymous ‘other’ – ‘a certain overseas website’ (mou jingwai wangzhan) to 
which Gao is accused of providing secrets illegally. The adjective ‘overseas’ is 
the only available information about the website, which associates ‘foreign’ with 
illegal activities. She becomes an accomplice to the unspecified overseas force 
and thus is a traitor to China. The broad term jingwai (overseas) creates a 
separation between ‘us’ and ‘them’. Literally meaning ‘outside the national 
border’, jingwai referring to anything that is outside China. The physical 
borderline becomes a metaphoric divide, which not only refers to Gao’s leaking 
sensitive information from inside China to some media outside of China but also 
pushes journalist Gao outside the legal realm and categorises her as a part of 
jingwai: a traitor who is disloyal to her motherland and breaks Chinese law. 
The Case of Peter Dahlin: descriptive level of analysis 
The second case concerns a Swedish citizen and NGO aid worker Peter 
Dahlin. On 20th January 2016, Dahlin confessed on the Morning News 
(CCTV1321) that his organisation, the Chinese Urgent Action Working Group 
(CUAWG), had broken Chinese law and harmed China’s national security by 
illegally training lawyers, inflaming local social conflicts and inciting Chinese 
people against their own government. In the news, Dahlin talks about the foreign 
funding involved, names a few lawyers he has worked with and also briefly 
comments on the fair treatment he has received so far during his detention. 
Notably, his confession is backed up by two of his colleagues, Wang and Xing, 
who provide some detail as to the daily operation of the organisation. They are 
seen as using their insider knowledge to expose Dahlin’s intention of tarnishing 
the reputation of China by fabricating human rights issues. In reality, according to 
the Guardian, the work of the CUAWG is ‘attempting to help Chinese civil 
society by offering training and support to human rights lawyers who were trying 
to provide justice to China’s disenfranchised and downtrodden’ (Phillips, 2016). 
 
21 http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2016/01-19/7723653.shtml   (24 August 2018). The linked 
website China News claims to have released the clip at the night of 19th January 2016. However, 
both the clip itself and the source link (attached under the clip from the CCTV website) show that 
the clip was released on 20th January. It is puzzling how the China News published something that 
was released the next day. It could be a website technical issue.  
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Many people believe that Dahlin’s arrest is directly linked to one of the major 
crackdowns on human rights lawyers which occurred in July 2015 (ibid.).  
One of the most eye-catching elements of Dahlin’s case is his Swedish 
nationality. Although Dahlin is not the first foreign national to be paraded in a TV 
confession, foreign confessants are still in the minority. Therefore, there are 
unique elements in his confession due to his non-Chinese nationality. One such 
element is that Dahlin not only admits to all the wrongdoings and apologises for 
‘hurting the Chinese people's feelings’, but also mentions that he has been treated 
well while under the police investigation. Such a claim does not exist in the other 
two cases that this thesis examines. He claims that, 
I have no complains to make. I think my treatment has been fair. My 
treatment has taken special circumstances into consideration, for 
example, my unique medical condition. I've been given good food, 
plenty of sleep and I have suffered no mistreatment of any kind. And 
I've also been given the opportunities to meet with representatives 
from my embassy. 
Dahlin’s words can be interpreted as a response to the accusation of human rights 
violation by the Chinese government. Many foreign governments, media and 
NGOs have criticised China for its human rights violations (Peerenboom, 2005). 
The treatment of criminals, suspects or the extra-legal detainees can be worse. In 
both Gao’s and Gui’s confessions, there are zoom-in shots of their hands showing 
no handcuffs or visible bruises and scars. Dahlin’s Swedish nationality makes the 
security agents feel more obliged to show that they abide by the law to avoid 
human rights criticism. Therefore, Dahlin’s above ‘disclaimer’ can be the best 
response to any such criticism and the proof that nothing inappropriate happened.  
Quite different from Gao’s framing, Dahlin is not visually framed as a 
criminal. In the clip, he sits in front of the camera with normal clothes rather than 
an orange vest. Dahlin is only called ‘a criminal suspect’ once and the 
incrimination is done mainly through textual (audio) framing. At the start of the 
news, the presenter claims that the police have ‘destroyed’ (dadiao) an illegal 
organisation. ‘Dadiao’ means ‘smashing, destroying or wiping out’ somebody or 
something, a lexical choice commonly associated with police actions and violent 
crimes. The implication is to suggest the illegal and dangerous nature of Dahlin’s 
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organisation. The CUAWG, according to its website, specialises in providing 
‘rapid legal aid to rights defenders with the purpose to advance the rule of law in 
China’  (CUAWG). The description contrasts sharply with the image of violent 
crimes which dadiao paints. In a similar vein, the news presenter declares that the 
criminal suspects including Dahlin have been subject to ‘criminal coercive 
measures according to law’ (CCTV13 Morning New, 2016). ‘Criminal coercive 
measures’ refers to, 
…those taken by judicial organs in accordance with the law to 
restrict the personal rights of a citizen or deny him or her of such 
rights. When a coercive measure is taken against a person, the 
person's honour, freedom and other rights are bound to be adversely 
affected  ('Criminal Coercive Measures Standardized,' 2004)). 
However, this definition is not immediately available for the audience, thus what 
it means may be unclear. Meanwhile, ‘criminal ’and ‘coercive’ bring connotations 
of severe and serious consequences. Therefore, the lexical choice related to the 
police makes Dahlin’s lawyer-training NGO appear to be dangerous, reinforcing 
the guilty nature of Dahlin without an actual trial. Dahlin makes his confession in 
English, which is translated into Chinese and shown on the screen in subtitles. He 
speaks as ‘we’, but the subtitle shows ‘I’. This inaccuracy in translation, 
deliberate or not, further concentrates all the responsibility on Dahlin alone. 
Throughout the disclaimer of his fair treatment and claiming to have hurt Chinese 
people’s feelings, Dahlin begins almost all his sentences with ‘I’ or ‘my’, 
underlining it is indeed his true feeling rather than someone trying to put words 
into his mouth.  
As Dahlin is framed as a foreign saboteur who undermines the Chinese 
government, his accusers – Wang and Xing - are more than his victims: they 
claim to be Dahlin’s accomplices. Within the eight-minute news clip, Wang 
speaks for a total of one minute and forty-seven seconds; Xing speaks for forty-
eight seconds. Together, they speak for almost one quarter of the length of the 
programme. While they are speaking, they wear normal civilian clothes, but their 
faces are artificially blurred. The same close up of Wang’s hands appeared four 
times as he speaks. Without delving into any detailed content of their accusation, 
the visual cue hints that they are no longer working for the anti-China foreign 
force and that both of them have transformed into repented accusers whose insider 
142 
 
knowledge can reveal the true intention of Dahlin. Accordingly, their role has also 
transformed from merely repenting and self-criticism to incriminating Dahlin and 
the anti-China foreign force behind him. The next section delves into the content 
of their interviews closely to reveal the relationship between Dahlin and his 
accusers. 
The relationship between Dahlin and his accusers is twofold. Firstly, they 
were colleagues as both Wang and Xing worked for Dahlin. Due to this work 
relation, Wang and Xing play an essential role in incriminating Dahlin. According 
to the narration, Wang and Xing have ‘colluded with’ (huotong) the Swede. 
Huotong is a verb with a strong negative connotation and thus is often associated 
with illegal behaviours. As Xing claims, 
…in truth, Peter is an agent of the overseas anti-China force inside 
our country. He made use of livelihood-related issues such as land 
expropriation and demolition, in order to deceive the masses and lure 
them to act against the government to fight for their own interests. He 
intended to use civilian agents like me to gather the public opinion of 
our country and negative news about local government, and then pass 
it abroad. The material will be used by the anti-China force abroad to 
attack the human rights issue of our country and damage the good 
international reputation of our nation. This further facilitates the 
foreign anti-China force’s plot of attacking the economy and politics 
of our country. 
The word choice of ‘agent’ in the quotation is rather reminiscent of a typical 
Cultural-Revolution style language. As shown in the previous analysis chapter on 
the Cultural Revolution confession news, ‘agent’ appeared frequently during the 
decade, especially in the context of describing the colluders of Liu Shaoqi, who 
was the biggest Capitalist Roader and ‘the Chinese Khrushchev’ at the time. Thus, 
being an ‘agent’ in that context implied that the person was a lackey of China’s 
biggest enemy, Liu Shaoqi. The application of the term in the current context can 
invoke the antagonistic emotion familiar to those who experienced the Cultural 
Revolution and thus escalate the hatred towards Dahlin. In a similar vein, Dahlin’s 
other accomplice, Wang, brands the organisation as ‘a pioneer station’ and ‘a 
bridgehead’ of the anti-China force to ‘place eyes inside’ China, so that ‘when the 
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time is ready, he could subvert the political power and our party leaders’  22 
(CCTV13 Morning News, 2016). ‘A pioneer station’ and ‘a bridgehead’ are 
among the favourite metaphors of the Party propaganda and were popular war 
rhetoric during the Cultural Revolution (Lu, 2004). These war-related metaphors 
appeal to a similar emotion to that of the ‘War against Japan’ and agitate the anti-
imperialist sentiments. Therefore, the careful lexical choice of the accomplices 
constructs Dahlin as an enemy of China who has plotted to undermine the Chinese 
government from within and destroy China’s reputation worldwide, while 
Dahlin’s accusers show remorse and loyalty to China by exposing his ‘crimes’. 
Meanwhile, the second aspect of the relationship is that the framing is 
trying to draw a line between Dahlin and his accusers, implying that Wang and 
Xing are actually victims. For instance, when the accusers talk about their 
involvement in Dahlin’s organisation, they both use ‘they’ to refer to Dahlin and 
his organisation, claiming that ‘their’ purpose is to ‘tarnish the good reputation’ of 
‘our’ country (CCTV13 Morning News, 2016). Such lexical choices, together 
with Dahlin’s repeated use of ‘I’, manages to shift the accusers from Dahlin’s side 
to ‘our’ side. It emphasises the fact that the accusers were lured to carry out illegal 
deeds. By condemning Dahlin as the enemy of the Chinese people, Wang and 
Xing showcase their determination to separate themselves from Dahlin.  
The Case of Gui Minhai: descriptive level of analysis 
Aired around the same time as Dahlin’s confession is the third case, which 
concerns another Swedish citizen: Gui Minhai, a bookseller who used to be based 
in Hong Kong. Gui disappeared from his house in Thailand in late 2015. He 
abruptly appeared on CCTV news in early 2016, claiming to have handed himself 
in for a drunk-driving accident which had occurred over a decade ago. Broadcast 
on 17th January 2016 in the TV programme ‘Oriental Horizon’, the ten-and-a-half-
minute-long news feature recounts an emotional tragedy. According to the story, 
Gui handed himself in to the mainland police due to his guilty conscience for 
being a criminal at large and an irresponsible son. Gui confesses to drunk driving, 
killing a female university student and then escaping abroad during probation. His 
claim is backed up by a traffic policeman’s recollection of the case and the 
mourning of the victim’s mother over her only daughter. Meanwhile, Gui 
describes the restless life of an illegal immigrant abroad. The passing of his father 
 
22 Translation from  https://cn.nytimes.com/china/20160122/c22china/dual/   
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and his sick mother prompted him to return to China to face legal punishment and 
take moral responsibility. In tears, he expresses the regret of breaking up the 
victim’s family and the failure to fulfil his filial duty to his own parents. However, 
there are multiple discrepancies throughout the programme. Small details such as 
the different Chinese characters in Gui’s name and the different T-shirts he wears 
make Gui’s confession look less voluntary. Escaping during probation was also an 
illogical choice. It contradicts a 2005 news report of the accident which described 
Gui as being ‘willing to assume “full responsibility” in the form of economic 
compensation…’ (Bandurski, 2016: para 12). These inconsistencies further 
question the authenticity of the confession. Moreover, what is unsaid is his real 
‘crime’ – publishing books about the private lives of current top Chinese political 
leaders. Many speculate that Gui’s publication about the private lives of top 
Chinese political leaders is the real reason behind his abduction, as Gui’s 
publications are sometimes ‘thinly-sourced, tabloid-style political books...which 
are outlawed in mainland China’ (Holmes and Phillips, 2015: para 22). 
Compared with Gao and Dahlin, Gui is less directly called a ‘criminal’, but 
the incriminating references are both explicitly expressed and implicitly implied. 
Gui, a hit-and-run driver who escaped abroad for many years has now finally 
handed himself in. The traffic policeman mentions Gui as the ‘driver who caused 
the accident’ (zhaoshi siji); the narrator describes Gui’s years abroad as the ‘life 
of a fugitive’ (taowang shengya). Even Gui speaks of himself as a ‘criminal 
fugitive’ (taofan). He then describes his guilty feeling, 
…After leaving the country, I had hoped that my mental pressure 
would have been alleviated. However, the pressure wasn’t reduced. In 
fact, it became worse, as my mounting feeling of guilt and shame grew 
day by day. On the one hand, I… ran away from my responsibility, 
which…further hurt the feelings of the victim’s family. On the other 
hand, I illegally left China. Not only did I escape my original 
punishment, but also break the Chinese law again… that was one 
more crime… and so… a sense of guilt and shame… made me suffer 
long-term mental unrest. (Oriental Horizon, 2016) 
Gui’s own account of shame and regret, together with the incriminating lexical 
choices, underlines the typical restlessness of a fugitive, signalling explicitly 
Gui’s criminal identity. Gui’s criminal status is also alluded to in a less direct 
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way. For instance, Gui has ‘victims’, indicating that Gui has brought harm to 
other people. At the end of the news feature, the narrator adds that Gui is under 
investigation for ‘being involved in other criminal activities’, which further 
underlines Gui’s propensity to reoffend. The details utilise and reflect the 
presupposed social and cultural norm surrounding the fear of crimes (Chang, 
1990). By portraying Gui’s guilty nature both directly and indirectly, the details 
set the scene as a crime story. 
Nonetheless, ‘a criminal’ who fled probation is by no means the only image 
that the framing of Gui constructs. The following section explains the framing of 
Gui’s second identity: ‘an unfilial son’. Filial piety is a Confucian virtue regarding 
one’s responsibility to care for and please one’s ageing parents. It is one of the 
most important virtues in traditional Chinese family values (Chan and Tan, 2004). 
From this perspective, Gui is an unfilial son, as he confesses that his fugitive 
status meant he could not take care of his frail parents,  
…However, I was a criminal at large, so I couldn’t go back to China 
and visit my… my parents were in their eighties (swallowing hard 
twice). In 2015, my dad died of cancer (sobbing). I couldn’t attend the 
funeral (crying). After this, my mother fell gravely ill, so 
(swallowing)… I missed her day and night. I wanted to (crying)… see 
her once more while she was alive (crying)… Therefore, I must go 
back to the country and hand in myself. I will shoulder my own 
responsibility. I…am also willing to receive… any punishments 
(Oriental Horizon, 2016). 
When Gui is recounting the passing of his father in tears, he says that he ‘must’ 
return to China and ‘will’ face all the responsibilities. The two modalities indicate 
a high degree of certainty of the language, showing the determination of a 
repenting son. According to Halliday (1985), verbs can indicate a sense of being, 
an action and a feeling, distinguished respectively as ‘relational verbs’, ‘material 
verbs’ and ‘mental verbs’. The latter half of Gui’s confession is composed of a 
series of action verbs, such as ‘go’ (back to the country), ‘hand in’ (myself), 
‘shoulder’ (…responsibility) and ‘receive’ (…punishments). These are typical 
action verbs that show behaviours as opposed to the abstract thoughts or 
intangible feelings. Through laying out the motion, these verbs indicate Gui’s 
willingness to take action. 
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Meanwhile, Gui’s ‘unfilial son’ identity coupled with the traumatised 
mother’s interview illustrates an emotional tragedy. Compared with the story of a 
traffic accident, a more gripping story here is the devastating consequence of 
Gui’s drunk driving presented as an emotional story told by the victim’s mother. 
Details about Gui’s victim were scarce, only that she was a female university 
student surnamed Shen in her early twenties at the time of the accident. Her father 
was so grief-stricken that he fell ill and became suicidal. Her mother shows the 
journalist Shen’s room which the parents still keep for her. With tears, she also 
explains that she keeps the photo of her daughter on her phone and key rings. The 
couple never escapes the death of their daughter. The narrator describes that her 
death means her parents have to go through ‘baifaren song heifaren’, which 
literally means ‘a person with grey hair bids farewell to a person with black hair’ 
at a funeral. It describes the tragedy that one experiences at the death of one’s 
child - one of the three most tragic scenarios in traditional Chinese culture, 
alongside losing one’s mother at an early age and losing one’s wife in mid-life. 
According to the narrator, her parents had hoped that she would soon ‘chengjia 
liye’: start a family and a career. This lexical choice is unusual. Despite the 
somewhat improved social status of women in China, the four-word idiom is 
conventionally associated with the male heir in a family. Sons are expected to 
form their families and start their careers, whereas daughters are expected to 
marry into other people’s families and focus on domestic affairs (Zhang, 2018). 
Using the term reveals the effort to frame the status of the daughter in this family: 
she was as important as a son. Consequently, the loss of the daughter is equivalent 
to the loss of a son, which marks the end of a family line from a traditional 
Chinese perspective. 
Gui is framed to have a strong tie to his own family in China and exhibit a 
sense of guilt towards his old sick parents. Gui describes himself as ‘guilty’, ‘full 
of shame’ and ‘tortured mentally for a long time’ (Oriental Horizon, 2016). He 
claims to be homeless because of the mental unrest after leaving China illegally 
and cites an old saying that ‘my home is where I can be at peace’ as proof. The 
framing magnifies Gui as the unfilial son who has not been around his parents. 
However, what is left outside the frame is as important as what is spoken out loud. 
Such framing ignores his other possible family roles, such as the fact that Gui is 
also a husband and father who has a wife and a daughter living outside China (Siu 
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and Lam, 2016). This omission presupposes that Gui’s kinship has only existed in 
China where he is the son. What is unsaid becomes non-existent so that Gui’s 
‘fugitive life’ abroad could be nothing but living alone and rootless. 
The relationship between Gui and the victim’s family is framed rather 
indirectly but is consequential. Much attention is also focused on the 
consequential recounting of the victim’s mother. The mother never refers to Gui. 
All that she says is about the traumatic life experience after the accident. The sole 
focus is on her as mother whose life still very much revolves around her daughter. 
The interview with the mother of Gui’s victim induces an emotional and moral 
response. Instead of demanding Gui be brought to justice, the framing fixates on 
the emotional devastation the family has suffered. Without directly mentioning 
Gui, such framing enlarges the serious consequence of Gui’s action and 
strengthens her position as a victim who is powerless to escape from the tragedy 
Gui has created. The construction of the relationship strengthens Gui’s identity as 
a culprit and unfilial son who escaped abroad during the probation period for a 
drunk driving case and brought huge trauma to the victim’s family as well as to 
his own family.  
Therefore, in sum, the descriptive analysis of all three cases identifies two 
types of stories that the framing tries to tell. The first type is crime stories in 
which the culprits are bought to justice. On the basis of the linguistic analysis of 
the three news pieces, it is evident that Journalist Gao Yu, Swedish activist Peter 
Dahlin and Swedish bookseller Gui Minhai are all framed as ‘criminals’ in media 
before going on court trials. Their respective relationships with the relevant 
subjects – the anonymous foreign website (Gao), ex-colleagues (Dahlin), and both 
families affected (Gui) – all strengthen the construction of their ‘criminal’ identity 
in the stories. Meanwhile, the second story carries personal framing variations. 
The framing of Gao’s leaking of the national secrets of China abroad and Dahlin’s 
working for some unspecified foreign anti-China force further implicates them as 
the enemy of China. By contrast, the treatment of the China-born Swedish citizen 
Gui is rather different. The linguistic framing of Gui underlines his link to China 
and deprives him of anything that can be related to a foreign national. He is 
branded as an unfilial son according to traditional Chinese culture as well as being 
a repeat offender. The next section explores the interpretation of what the 




5.1.2 Interpretive level of analysis 
The interpretive analysis addresses the issue of media production and 
interpretation. Just as in the last chapter, it examines some external elements of 
the discourse and their relationship with the framing. Its purpose is to identify the 
themes that the confession constructs from two aspects. The first aspect is to 
examine media production in terms of the using of verbs and modalities, which is 
able to reveal the relationship between the news and its audience. This 
relationship, in turn, indicates the purpose of the news. The second aspect is to 
examine the external references that are involved in the production of news. It 
reflects how the framing of the three news clips makes use of the existing 
discourses. Then, the analysis summarises the themes and the genres applied in 
the confession. The themes and genres are the crucial connection points to the 
larger social structures.  
The programmes & the audience 
This section examines the production of media content through modalities 
and verbs. The previous linguistic analysis has briefly touched upon some 
examples. Here I would like to put emphasis on explaining the purpose of the 
modalities and verbs in terms of what message the producer tries to convey and 
what relationship is formed through the modalities and the verbs. Verbs and 
modalities facilitate the formation of the content and reveal the intention of 
subjects  (Halliday, 1994; Fairclough, 2001). The previous section about Gui’s ‘an 
unfilial son’ identity has demonstrated the action verbs signalling Gui’s keenness 
to take action to correct his past wrongs. A similar example is also present in 
Dahlin’s confession,  
I violated Chinese law through my activities here. I caused harm to 
the Chinese government and hurt the feelings of the Chinese people. I 
apologise sincerely for these and I'm very sorry for this ever happened 
(CCTV13 Morning News, 2016). 
The action verbs – violate (law), cause (harm), hurt (feelings) and apologise – 
substantiate Dahlin’s wrongdoings and produce a compelling sense of real 
damage and the resultant regret. By contrast, the 16-second footage of Gao’s 




I believe, what I did was (shi) something that broke the law, 
endangered the national interested. What I… I did was very wrong 
(de), I…I…I…I sincerely learnt this lesson, and, erm… must plead 
guilty of the crime. (Morning News, 2014) 
Gao’s repentant attitude is clear through the use of the modalities hui (will) and 
yao (must), despite the fact that what Gao says is so vague that it reveals no 
substantive information as to her crime. What is also noteworthy is that Gao’s 
confession is the only place in the news where a determinate clause is applied. 
The relational verb shi is determinate, implying a judgement or an assertion that is 
so obvious that it is too redundant to spell it out (Hodge and Louie, 1998: 87). The 
word de roughly means ‘apostrophe-s possessive form in English’ (ibid.). ‘Built 
into the de-form is an ideological potential which is added unobtrusively to every 
particular act of judgement, contributing to features of the use of de which are 
otherwise inexplicable’ (Hodge and Louie, 1998: 88). That is to say, the 
combination of ‘…shi…de’ is able to transform a neutral descriptive sentence into 
judgement with a predilection. In this case, Gao’s self-evaluation comes to the 
judgement that she has made serious mistakes.  
The examples above demonstrate at least two purposes that the content is 
trying to achieve. The main purpose of using action and relational verbs and 
modalities is to frame the confessants as sincerely apologising. It, in turn, defames 
the confessants and enhances the credibility of the stories in their entirety. All 
confessants in the TV news clips exhibit such sincerity and ‘determination’ to 
criticise oneself. The second purpose is to make the audience forget the fact that 
the confessants have not gone through court trials, which establishes a 
presumption of guilt (Yu, 2015). Moreover, at the end of both Gao’s and Gui’s 
cases, the narrators also reveal that they are repeat offenders. The clips state that 
Gao was convicted for the same crime in 1993 and sentenced to six years of 
imprisonment; Gui is under investigation for some other crimes. This detail 
further stigmatises Gao and Gui. Gao was a criminal before; thus, it is no surprise 
that she can do it again. Gui was so morally degraded that he ran away after 
hitting a pedestrian and even escaped abroad to evade responsibility. Thus, it is no 
surprise he is involved in other crimes. Therefore, the whole interpretation of the 
confession emphasises guilt and remorse, but not the details of the ‘crime’ itself. 
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Consequently, the news aims to convince the audience that these people are 
criminals, despite the fact that they have not been convicted. 
Intertextuality & interdiscursivity 
This section examines the intertextual and interdiscursive references in the 
production of three news clips. As mentioned in the last chapter, intertextuality 
describes the reference to other existing texts in the current text. Quotations, for 
instance, are a typical example of intertextual reference. It shows that the 
intertextual application of any texts outside the three news cases is a typical way 
to reveal existing themes that the three news clips are drawing on. A prominent 
example in the data is Dahlin’s use of ‘hurting the feelings of the Chinese people’ 
mentioned above (CCTV13 Morning News, 2016). The phrase deserves particular 
attention because it is not Dahlin’s invention. Intertextually, it bears a 
recognisable mark of the Chinese government. Within the Chinese official 
discourse, this phrase has become a ritualistic term referring to the ‘bad 
foreigners’ (Rudolph, 2018). It is often associated with the conduct of foreign 
people or organisations that is deemed as inappropriate from the perspective of 
Beijing, ranging from the political, such as foreign leaders meeting with or 
showing support to the Dalai Lama, to the mundane, such as hotels listing Taiwan 
as an independent country on their booking webpages (Rudolph, 2018). 
According to my brief content analysis on the appearance of this term in the 
People’s Daily between 1949 and 2018 (see Figure 3), the term has been in use 
continually since 1978. The frequency peaked in the turbulent 1989. It was in 
constant use between the mid-1990s and the late 2000s, with a rough average 
annual use of 13 times. The nations or organisations that repeatedly ‘hurt Chinese 
people’s feelings’ include the Japanese government, which keeps visiting the 
Imperial Shrine of Yasukuni and having island disputes with China; the US 
government, sometimes together with the EU Parliament or individual EU 
countries, which intermittently meet with the Taiwanese leaders and Dalai Lama 
and ‘interfere with Chinese domestic affairs’. All three issues have been 
controversial for decades and China has always been very firm on the issue of 
Japan, Taiwan and Tibet, even during the years of ‘hiding one’s light under a 
bushel’. Despite the decline in usage since 2010, over a decade of associating the 
term with certain nations and foreign relations disputes cultivates a particular 
mindset and way of interpretation. Consequently, Dahlin’s use of the term not 
only sends a strong signal of the involvement of Chinese authority to an informed 
151 
 
audience but also escalates his offence to the same priority level with the most 
sensitive foreign relations issues. 
 
Figure 3 Number of Articles Containing 'Hurting Chinese people's feelings' in the People’s Daily between 
1946 and 2018 
The production of media is also closely linked to the genre of the text. 
Genre by itself contains unspoken assumptions and interdiscursively affects the 
interpretation of the content. I highlight two aspects here: the genre of the media 
items and the role of narration. In terms of genre, Gao’s and Dahlin’s cases are 
news bulletins, whereas Gui’s is a news feature programme. As mentioned before, 
both Gao’s and Dahlin’s clips were repeatedly shown on a 24-hour news channel. 
Like the rest of the news repeated multiple times a day on the 24-hour news, being 
on that channel adds banality to the clips. They became an inseparable part of the 
mundane news that is seemingly present over and over, yet is neglected by most 
of the people most of the time. By contrast, the brand of the programme ‘Oriental 
Horizon’ can boost the credibility of the orchestrated confessions. Debuting in 
1993, the show was China’s ‘first large-scale news magazine programme’ (Hong 
et al., 2009: 42). Its brand has been built on covering pressing domestic social 
issues with professional journalistic language in contrast to the usual empty 
political preaching. The programme itself wields respect among its audience, thus 
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Both media genres rely on the second aspect that I would like to highlight 
here: the seemingly neutral narration or voiceover of the news reader. In fact, the 
role of narration is rarely neutral. Take Gui’s case as an example. Packaged as a 
news feature, Gui’s confession is merged seamlessly with the interviews with the 
relevant people and the third person narration. This narration plays a crucial role 
in guiding the interpretation of Gui’s story by following the checklist of the three 
‘Ds’ introduced in the literature review: Deny, Denounce and Defend. To deny the 
abduction accusation of Gui directed at the Chinese government, the female 
presenter begins the programme with: ‘there have been many reports about Gui’s 
so-called disappearance in foreign and Hong Kong media recently’ (Oriental 
Horizon, 2016). The ‘so-called disappearance’ suggests that Gui did not evaporate 
for no reason. Nor was any foul play from the Chinese authority involved in his 
disappearance. It implies that what the programme is going to reveal is the ‘real’ 
truth. The news concludes with the following extract, echoing the previous ‘so-
called disappearance’, 
Narrator: 
Gui Minhai said, the moment when he had decided to return to China 
and handed himself in, he was also ready to be responsible legally for 
all his actions. Gui Minhai handed himself in to mainland police in 
October 2015. However, to his surprise, some people with ulterior 
motives sensationalised his decision.  
Gui: 
It was my voluntary choice to come back and hand myself in. It had 
nothing to do with anyone else. I don’t wish any individuals or 
organisations, including the Swedish authority, to be involved or 
interfere with my returning to China. Although I hold Swedish 
nationality, I really feel that I am still Chinese. My root is still in 
China… Therefore, I hope the Swedish authority can respect my 
personal…choice, my privacy and right to make this decision. Let me 
myself solve my problems. (Oriental Horizon 2016) 
In the example, the narrator guides the interpretation of Gui’s confession by 
speaking on behalf of Gui first. The narrator leads the audience to believe that Gui 
is genuinely ‘surprised’ that the Swedish authority and foreign media are looking 
153 
 
for him. Such framing makes Gui indirectly denounce the Swedish authority and 
the foreign media as ‘people with ulterior motives’ who ‘sensationalised’ his 
disappearance. Gui’s own words are only heard after the narrator lays out the 
important causal relations. Emphasising the voluntary nature of his return to 
China, Gui is defending his captors and their actions. Hence, through summarising 
the account of the events and fulfilling the ‘three Ds’ task, the narration ensures 
that what the confessant says can only be understood in a certain way. 
In sum, as shown in the descriptive and the interpretive analyses so far, the 
reasoning device identifies one crucial problem that is shared across the three 
stories - all the confessants have broken the Chinese law. Consequently, all three 
subjects are framed as criminals and all three clips share a common theme of 
criminal justice. Further exploration of the crime committed by the confessants 
shows that two of them are related to threatening national security. The only 
exceptional case spends much effort in creating a tragedy of two families 
following a car accident. The reasons for the confessants to break the law vary, 
but they all have to show remorse. The genre of the media item and the role of 
narration reveal the message that is embedded in media production. The unspoken 
assumptions are coded into the news programmes that people are watching. The 
intertextuality and interdiscursivity already hint at the wider social, cultural and 
political environment, or ‘cultural resonance’, that gives rise to the framing of the 
theme of criminal justice, national security and family values. The next 
explanatory level of analysis examines the discourses surrounding the themes and 
how they come into existence. 
5.1.3 Explanatory level of analysis  
The explanatory analysis explains that the discourses used by framing 
appeal to the current social, cultural and political environment. Such an 
environment has been established or is under the active construction by the CCP. 
It is important because it explains the rationale behind the framing of the three 
confession cases and reflects the CCP’s ideological steering process. It paves the 
way to reveal the power disparity in Chinese society today. The three discourses 
that are identified in the data are the ‘Rule of Law’ Discourse, the National 
Security Discourse and the Family Value Discourse, which I unpack next. 
‘Rule of Law’ Discourse 
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The shared identity of ‘a criminal’ among all three confessants signals a 
strong ‘Rule of Law’ Discourse. It is worth noting that the ‘Rule of Law’ 
Discourse here is a shorthand for ‘socialist rule of law with Chinese 
characteristics’, which is the official translation of Xi’s definition of ‘ruling the 
country according to law’. It underlines the indispensable and leading role of the 
CCP in building the legal system in China and distinguishes itself from any other 
forms of ‘rule of law’ (Li, 2018: 3).  
The ‘Rule of Law’ Discourse appeals to the aforementioned 
institutionalised resonance of establishing a system of socialist rule of law with 
Chinese characteristics. Since the late 1970s, Chinese top leaders have made an 
effort to avoid the ‘Rule of Man’, especially the kind characterised in Mao’s late 
years (Brown and Bērziņa-Čerenkova, 2018a). Much effort has been put into 
building the legal framework and raising general legal awareness. Between 1949 
and 1978, there were merely 134 laws passed (111 were later deemed invalid), 
among which only one was passed during the Cultural Revolution in 1975. Within 
the two decades after 1976, the NPC and its Standing Committee passed over 337 
laws (Pei, 2001). The numbers of law firms and lawyers also rose from 1,456 and 
5,500 in 1981 to over 8,300 and 110,000 within the two decades (Peerenboom, 
1998). Meanwhile, the Party has been raising legal awareness and cultivating an 
ethos of respect towards law-based rules among the public. The  institutes 
promulgating law began publicising laws and this practice has become a part of 
the Five-Year Plan (Peerenboom, 2002). The official media produced more law-
related programmes. CCTV initiated its legal channel in 2002: CCTV-12 Society 
and Law (its name changed to National History on 1 January 2019). The official 
website declares its mission:  ‘to implement the state policies of “rule of law” and 
“rule of virtue” to achieve the goal of building a ‘harmonious society’ (CCTV12). 
Many other CCTV channels also broadcast legal programmes, such as “Legal 
Report” (1999-now) on CCTV1. The result is the creation of a basic legal 
structure and a general legal awareness among the public. Thus, it is fair to 
conclude that China has moved away from the kind of prevalent lawlessness that 
characterised the Cultural Revolution and the ‘rule of law’ has become common 
Party vocabulary today (Peerenboom, 2002; Minzner, 2011; Chen, 2016).  
Xi also claims to prioritise ‘rule of law’ in his political agenda. The year 
2012 was the 30th anniversary of the 1982 Constitution and Xi declared that China 
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‘must firmly establish throughout society the authority of the constitution and the 
law’ (Zhao, 2012b). Two years later at the Fourth Plenum of the 18th Central 
Committee, ‘rule of law’ became the core topic of the plenum for the first time 
(Peerenboom, 2015). The plenum issued the important document ‘CCP Central 
Committee Decision Concerning Some Major Questions in Comprehensively 
Moving Governing the Country According to the Law Forward’ (Decision, 2014), 
signalling a potential further reform in the legal area. The official rhetoric 
continues showcasing Xi’s commitment towards the ‘rule of law’ since he came to 
power in 2012. 
However, law remains a tool for the Party when it deems it necessary 
(Radin, 1989; Peerenboom, 2002; Zhang, 2017). In pre-modern China, law was an 
instrument for the state to carry out its plans and policies instead of a justification 
of the rightful existence of the state. The Chinese emperors did not have a ‘right’ 
to rule, but a ‘duty’ – Mandate of Heaven – to govern (Bünger, 1987; Li, 2015). In 
this sense, the role of law in China has largely remained unchanged. As 
mentioned before, Xi clearly rejects the notion that law should ‘impose 
meaningful restraints on the state and individual members of the ruling elite’ 
(Peerenboom, 2002: 2). ‘Decision 2014’ unapologetically underlines the leading 
role of the Party in the implementation of the ‘socialist rule of law with Chinese 
characteristics’ (Peerenboom, 2015; Pils, 2015; Zhang, 2017), thus legitimising 
the use of public naming and shaming to discipline and intimidate the confessants. 
Moreover, Minzner (2011) argues that, since entering the twenty-first century, 
China’s legal reform has been in regression. deLisle (2015) also predicts that law 
will assume a more repressive role in dealing with political changes. In the name 
of maintaining social stability, the Party has installed a top-down policy which 
encourages the court to mediate any disputes, rather than to follow legal norms. 
Apart from TV confessions, Xi’s flagship anti-corruption campaign has been 
largely carried out through extra-legal investigation (Peerenboom, 2015). The 
recent crackdown on human rights lawyers and the incarceration of Uyghurs in re-
education camps in Xinjiang are two very telling examples that, in areas such as 
social stability, the Party is ruling over the law.  
The TV confessions were conducted at the expense of the human and legal 
rights of all three confessants and the rights as a foreign national in the case of 
Gui and Dahlin. This use of public naming and shaming to discipline and 
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intimidate the disobedient is the opposite of the liberal democratic definition of 
rule of law. Thus, law is still very much a tool of the ruling elites to consolidate 
their position rather than a means to limit the powerful. The use of the ‘Rule of 
Law’ Discourse in the framing can be seen as a means to create a rather distorted 
picture of justice. 
National Security Discourse 
Closely related to the ‘Rule of Law’ Discourse is the National Security 
Discourse. As seen from both the cases of Gao and Dahlin, they are accused of 
‘leaking secret documents abroad’ (CCTV13 Morning News, 2014) and 
‘committing criminal activities related to endangering national security’ (CCTV13 
Morning News, 2016). Xi’s term has witnessed the spread of the crimes in the 
name of endangering national security to punish, intimidate and silence dissidents. 
National security can be defined as ‘an idea, a doctrine, and an institution, 
designed to bridge the traditional division between the interests of the state abroad 
and those of the state at home, and to merge the culture of everyday life with that 
of the defence of the national interest’ (McSweeney, 2004: 20). The concept 
means it is critical to align people’s interests as much as possible to national 
interests. However, it is crucial to note that national interests vary depending on 
the internal logic of the state at a given era. Thus, what national security entails 
changes over time. Therefore, borrowing from Katzenstein (1996), it is more 
important to ‘define’ national security than to ‘defend’ it. The framing of the cases 
gives a glimpse of how the CCP under Xi defines national security.  
Xi has expanded the definition of ‘national security’. The National 
Security Law was passed in July 2015 after the establishment of the National 
Security Commission (NSC) on 15 April 2014. The law gives an extremely broad 
coverage of areas related to national security, ranging from the more traditional 
aspects such as military, territorial, political and economic, to the new cultural, 
cyber, ecological and religious areas, or what Xi called in the first meeting of the 
NSC ‘a holistic view of national security’ (Xi, 2014). Moreover, this overarching 
definition of national security means that Xi endeavours to make everyone 
responsible for national security. As Gao and Dahlin’s accusers Wang and Xing 
show, the people are both potential instruments and enemies. Gao was a journalist 
who was ‘convicted’ by the media for threatening the national security of her 
motherland. Wang and Xing, who were once the accomplices of Dahlin, repented 
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and helped convict their Swedish ex-colleague. All three seemingly ordinary 
Chinese people were relatively unknown to the public prior to their TV 
confessions. The framing of their confession warns that it is possible for ordinary 
people to be involved in serious national security issues.  
The concept of national security demarcates geographically, linguistically, 
culturally, historically who ‘we’ are, and thus what ‘we’ are for and against. In 
this regard, the national security discourse draws from as well as feeds into the 
existing Century of Humiliation Discourse23 and the China Threat Discourse24.  
Both discourses stimulate the rise of the need to improve China’s image as well as 
to undermine the foreign image (Callahan, 2005). The framing of the confession 
relates to the social unrest within China as a result of hostile foreign forces. The 
accusation from Dahlin’s two accomplices is a good example. While implicating 
Dahlin, his accomplices mention that they have gathered negative information 
from ‘petitioners’ (fangmin), ‘relocatees’ (chaiqianhu) whose houses are facing 
compulsory demolition and those who are ‘at the bottom of the society’. The 
accomplices’ account provides a glimpse into China’s current internal conflicts 
between the ordinary people, especially the poor people, and the government with 
regard to housing, personal rights and forceful, even violent, policy 
implementation at the local level of government. The framing selects these issues 
as a warning that should anyone come across such people who are organising or 
staging public discontent over these issues, be aware there can be a foreign anti-
China force meddling. This linkage represents a well-established logical chain 
that distrusts foreigners. The CCP often brands foreign organisations as ‘the black 
hand behind the scene’ of some domestic unrest, such as the Soviet Union’s 
attempts to incite Xinjiang’s independence in the 1960s, the student movement in 
 
23 The Century of Humiliation discourse was born out of a series of military defeats, colonialism 
and imperialism from 1883 to the mid-twentieth century (Callahan, 2004). The Party has 
deliberately utilised this national scar to promote the inviolability of China’s territory and 
sovereign integrity. Therefore, international disputes such as the long-term row over the East and 
the South China Sea and the more recent the trade war with the US are described by some 
ordinary Chinese as ‘the foreigners are bullying us again’ (Larmer, 2018: para 3). Some Chinese 
people are very aware of such issues and are attuned to interpret them in the context of national 
humiliation. 
24 The China Threat Discourse became particularly topical in the 1990s. The rapid economic 
growth in China made many people wonder whether China would challenge the current world 
order and regional security in the near future (Roy, 1996). The China-threat side criticises China 
as ‘a bully’ who ‘tries relentlessly to expand its reach’ (Krauthammer, 1995: 72), while its 
opponent fought fiercely back by calling out these comments as ‘arrogant’ and ‘an idiot's 
gibberish’ ('US Urged to Abandon "Cold War" Syndrome', 1995: 44). 
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1989 and the Umbrella movement in Hong Kong in 2014. Consequently, ‘the 
abroad’ is often framed as the main source from which most of the ‘mad’ criticism 
about China comes (Li, 2009: 20). The new National Security Law signed by Xi 
has a particular emphasis on espionage as it replaced the Counterespionage Law 
(Tatlow, 2014). As directly manifested in Dahlin’s case, the aforementioned 
development foresaw a series of investigations of foreign NGOs in China for fear 
of a gradual and peaceful subversion (Lampton, 2015). 
The ideological function of the National Security Discourse can be viewed 
as a framing strategy to tackle mainly internal threats by diverting the attention of 
the public to the ‘foreign’. As McSweeney (2004: 21) rightly points out: ‘a nation 
can only be mobilised for national security in peacetime if the majority of people 
identify the state and its enemies as the highest expression of their own personal 
security and fear’. Moreover, the notion of ‘the state’ in China is often blurred 
into ‘the Party’ because the Chinese people are represented by, and only by, the 
CCP. The CCP has tried to equate the love for the nation with the support for the 
Party, and Xi’s era only sees the escalation of such indoctrination (Zhao, 2005). In 
this sense, national interests become regime interests and national security the 
CCP’s regime security (Zhao, 2016b: 94). Thus, it is not surprising that the CCP 
regards praise as love and criticism as subversion. The National Security 
Discourse oversees the escalation of disagreements or challenges towards the 
Party to the subversion of China. Such logic helps deflect the Party’s own policy 
failures (Lampton, 2015). The result is that the international tension manages to 
dilute the intensity of the domestic pressure threatening the Party’s rule. Despite 
the risk accompanying such a strategy, it can distract the population from the 
immediate social unrest, at least temporarily.   
Family Values Discourse 
The awareness of national security issues is not the only concept that has 
been codified, as there is also a trend to bring tradition under formal regulation. 
The most prominent example is filial piety exemplified in Gui’s confession. The 
framing of Gui as a genuinely repentant son aims to resonate with the most 
ingrained and important social relationship in China – kinship (Fei et al., 1992). It 
has been done through legal measures as well as moral pressure. Xi’s era 
witnesses the spread of filial piety to the public and legal domain. On 1 July 2013, 
the revised ‘Protection of the Rights and Interests of Elderly People’ came into 
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effect. Its Eighteenth Article demands that ‘family members living apart from the 
elderly shall frequently visit or greet the elderly’ (Congress, 2012). People were 
astonished at the moral decline; visiting parents had descended from virtue to the 
realm of law. There has been an individualistic moral turn (Yan, 2010). For years, 
the government has warned everyone against a morally degraded materialistic 
society, which has fatally eroded the traditional social virtues. The Party thus 
vows to protect this virtue by codifying it into law.   
However, considering the fact that this legal regulation exists more on 
paper than in practice, it is social pressure and moral judgement that are the more 
prevalent weapons for the Party to regulate the people’s behaviours. Through the 
recontextualisation of ‘starting a family/career’ rhetoric from the son to the 
daughter, Gui is framed as a bad person who not only neglects his filial duty but 
also deprives the parents of another family of being taken care of by their only 
daughter. This exemplifies a challenging yet less-discussed social issue: shidu 
family. Shidu family refers to parents, under the One-child Policy (1979-2015), 
who lose their only child and are unable to have another one (Fong, 2016). 
According to official estimation, there had been over one million such families by 
2010 and the number is stilling rising (Wu and Dang, 2013). Losing one’s child is 
universally tragic, but what makes it worse in China is the child’s indispensable 
role in caring for the ageing parents (Hesketh et al., 2005; Han, 2017). According 
to the most recent 2010 population census at the time of writing, there are around 
177 million people above 60 years old in China (Ma et al., 2010). Social security 
and medical insurance are supposed to cover city residents, but it is only available 
to 40 million people. The rural population is neither fully covered, nor does it 
enjoy the same standard of service (Yi, 2013). The lack of care facilities and 
medical expenditure means that most of the elderly have only their children to 
turn to.  
Shidu families do not even have children to turn to. The government had 
promised to take care of the parents when promoting the One-child Policy in the 
early 1980s (Bao, 2013). Slogans such as ‘Family planning is very good. 
Government helps raise the old’ (Wang, 2018) provide a glimpse of the picture. 
However, in reality, there is a huge gap between the needs of shidu families and 
the local implementation of the relevant policy (Han, 2017). Therefore, when 
facing the grieving parents of Gui’s victim, assigning blame solely on the culprit 
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distracts the audience from questioning the government’s responsibility. 
Consequently, the framing underlines the moral condemnation of Gui, which 
eventually outweighs the legal consequence. The framing constructs Gui’s 
causing death by drunk driving as less serious than the ‘real’ crime - breaking up a 
family and forcing the parents to experience the death of their only child.  
Similarly, the Family Values Discourses also reveals that the framing is a 
strategic choice in dealing with a series of subsequent issues of the ill-thought-
through One-child Policy. By advocating filial culture, the framing shifts the 
responsibility of retirement care completely onto the younger generation, who are 
likely to be the only children to their parents and are themselves facing the 
mounting pressure of working and child-rearing. Their failure to take care of their 
own parents can now have legal consequences. However, in the era of the revival 
of traditional Confucian culture, moral stigmatisation is more detrimental 
(Minzner, 2018). It forces a sense of guilt in adult children, as demonstrated in 
Gui’s tears when remembering his absence while his parents were ageing. 
5.1.4 Framing implication 
Having conducted the CDA of the TV news confessions of journalist Gao, 
NGO worker Dahlin and bookseller Gui, this section reflects on the social and 
political power divide that the discourses in the framing reveal. I highlight below 
the fact that it has been done in a subtle and strategic way. 
There are two main divides and the most obvious one is that the 
confessants are morally inferior (legally inferior can be integrated into morally 
inferior because whoever breaks the legal bottom line is very likely to have 
broken the moral bottom line) to their accusers. They are criminals who are 
harmful to society; they are repeat offenders who are beyond salvation; they are 
feckless adult children who selfishly ignore the needs of their parents and escape 
cowardly from their legal responsibilities; they are malicious foreigners who are 
plotting to sabotage the rightful rise of China. They deserve to be subjected to 
legal and moral condemnation from the victims, the audience and the nation. 
The second divide is between ‘us’ and ‘the foreign’, or ‘the anti-China 
force abroad’. As the analysis shows, all three cases have various degree of 
foreign involvement. Gao sent national secrets to a ‘certain website abroad’. The 
report Dahlin’s organisation produced is ‘the so-called Human Rights Report’. 
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The news narrator describes Gui’s disappearance as ‘the so-called missing’. The 
distrust towards ‘the foreign’ is coded in the wording which implies that the 
foreign organisation is suspicious, the report is untrue and Gui did not truly 
disappear. Such wording forms the almost cliché response to a familiar 
accusation. It sets the tone that the foreign, also including Hong Kong given its 
freer media environment, media’s reporting on China-related affairs often lacks 
credibility. It invokes another familiar stereotype: according to the Chinese 
authority, the western media is biased when covering China. Their coverage of 
China is predominantly negative (Stone, 2017). Instead, the news story from the 
CCTV is going to reveal what really happened.  
This divide sets the tone that anything ‘foreign’ or ‘abroad’ is likely to 
enlarge the negative perception of China and even instigate illegal subversive 
activities in order to undermine China’s development. This force remains largely 
faceless and anonymous. Such media presentation not only means that any foreign 
countries can become the ‘anti-China force overseas’ at any time when they 
challenge China, but also creates the dichotomy of ‘China’ against ‘the non-China 
world’. It simplifies the complex world in that any non-China territory morphs 
into one entity which is hostile toward China. It resonates strongly considering the 
deep-rooted memory of the Century of Humiliation upon which the national 
salvation is based (Callahan, 2004). Even in the era of Xi’s national rejuvenation, 
the threat from the outside is still there. The framing becomes a simple divide 
between ‘good vs evil’ and ‘China vs the world’. Border generation is one crucial 
function of nationalism (Anderson, 1983; Billig, 1995). Here what we are 
witnessing is a process of border building, albeit in the mind. It is the ‘foreign’ 
and ‘abroad’ that defines what China is, instead of culture, custom or values 
which are the conventional defining characteristics that distinguish one group 
from the other (Conversi, 1995). In this sense, ‘culture’ is indeed a concept for 
manipulation as a result of the ‘foreign/China’ divide fanning nationalism.   
Having discussed the two kinds of division, I now explore the two 
important corresponding observations regarding the division. Firstly, the 
accomplices of the confessant, as shown with Dahlin’s ex-colleagues, demonstrate 
the fluidity of this dominant/subordinate divide. They were originally in the same 
category as the confessants so they had to conduct self-criticism. However, they 
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also provide incriminating evidence and criticism of the confessant. This process 
reveals signs of the ‘bad elements’ reintegrating into the people. 
Secondly, and unsurprisingly, the politically dominant CCP is defining 
what legally and morally correct norms are, despite the contradictions existing in 
the discourses. The final words from Gui in the confession nicely capture this 
conflict (see Excerpt Two in the section of ‘Rule of Law’ Discourse). Gui has 
been forced to claim that his return to China is voluntary and to identify himself 
more as Chinese. This leads him to request the Swedish authority to skip the 
relevant legal proceedings, even though it is a legally guaranteed right of a foreign 
national in China. Despite the emphasis on the ‘rule of law’, Gui’s self-
identification as Chinese (having been born and raised in China, having Chinese 
parents, citing Chinese classics, etc.) is framed as overriding his legal status (a 
Swedish passport holder). After recontextualising the family value discourse to 
the national level, the filial duty of a Chinese son to his motherland triumphs over 
law and order. Meanwhile, Gui asks the Swedish authority to ‘respect’ his 
‘personal rights’ which ironically are protected by the law that he has just been 
made to undermine. The battle between the discourses rightly captures as well as 
reinforces the current Party-centred legal structure and the definition of what it 
means to be Chinese. What we are witnessing is a selective application of legal 
regulations and interpretation of Chinese culture to alleviate the pressure on the 
Party under Xi in the face of many thorny issues.  
Therefore, I argue that the framing of the three confession news clips 
means that the propaganda value of TV confessions of those who are neither Party 
members nor well-known figures lies in this banality. For the domestic audience, 
the three confession cases are not a show-trial type of media spectacle. Kellner’s 
definition of a media spectacle highlights its popular nature: they often ‘disrupt 
ordinary and habitual flows of information’ (2016: 3). The cases are hardly 
‘disruptively’ popular among the domestic audience. CCP propaganda is usually 
pompous and overbearing. However, the three cases represent the subtle 
persuasion inundating society. The three confession cases, like many other TV 
confessions, take the form of crime news (Yoon, 2015; Gardner, 2018). As 
mentioned earlier, there are numerous TV programmes designed to familiarise the 
public with the concept of law. They are camouflaged nicely among them. From 
people’s existing ideological foundation, the confession churns out the familiar, 
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even clichéd, bad foreigners, re-offenders, traffic accident tragedy, morally failed 
fugitive, irresponsible son and eventual triumph of justice. In turn, the confession 
reinforces the associated stereotypes and norms. However, banality does not mean 
harmlessness (Arendt, 1963; Billig, 1995). Such TV confessions can quietly 
function to prime people for a society whose cultural and political norms are 
increasingly at the mercy of Xi’s ideology. The periodic injection of such 
mundane confession news of ephemeral popularity insidiously develops emotional 
and expectational immunity towards governance failures. It placates and pacifies. 
The analysis demonstrates that the framing of TV confessions clearly 
shows a dominant/subordinate divide, with the accusers and the victims 
occupying the moral and legal high ground as opposed to the criminal confessants 
and the anti-China foreign force behind them. The framing encourages the 
condemnation of the confessants who display total submission to whatever 
criticism is inflicted on them. The framing also defends the Party’s legitimacy to 
rule by deflecting responsibilities of governmental failures and maintaining the 
CCP’s dominance in China.  
5.1.5 Conclusion  
In sum, the first half of the chapter has focused on the analysis of three TV 
confession news clips. The descriptive analysis examines how the identities of the 
confessants and their relationships with other important subjects are linguistically 
framed. All three confessions are part of crime news with them being strongly 
implied as criminals, despite there being no court trials prior to the TV 
confessions. Both journalist Gao and NGO activist Dahlin are labelled as 
‘criminal suspects’ and, more importantly, the enemies of China. In comparison, 
bookseller Gui’s other identity as ‘an unfilial son’ is as important as, if not more 
than, his criminal identity. The interpretative analysis examines how the framing 
borrows from the existing political discourses, such as ‘hurting Chinese people’s 
feelings’ and reveals the unspoken role of the narrator and the genre of official 
news in shaping the interpretation of the confessions. In the end, the explanatory 
analysis links everything to the wider political agenda of the socialist rule of law 
with Chinese characteristics alongside the promotion of national security and 
certain traditional family values in Xi’s China. The finding demonstrates that 
mediated confessions capture in a microcosm the Party’s logic for promoting 
certain social, cultural and political norms.  
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In an ideal world, when someone agrees to go on TV to confess, this 
person is effectively vindicating TV confessions as a legitimate method and 
showing submission to the authority who demands the confession. However, it is 
extremely likely that all three confessions were orchestrated and forced (Fiskesjö, 
2017; Safeguard Defenders, 2018). At the time of writing, Gui is still missing. 
Roughly a month after Gui’s confession on 17 January 2016, Hong Kong’s 
Phoenix TV broadcast another televised confession that involved Gui and his 
colleagues apologising for trading ‘unauthorised’ books in mainland China 
(PhoenixTV, 2016). Since then, Gui was said to have lived under surveillance 
outside official custody before disappearing again. On 20 January 2018, he was 
taken away from two Swedish consular members who were accompanying him on 
a train to Beijing for medical reasons. Three weeks later, Gui appeared on a third 
TV confession and expressed the ‘shame’ he had for ‘leaking national secrets’ and 
being ‘tricked’ by the Swedish authority into attempting to escape abroad again. 
Gui was seen claiming that ‘Sweden used me as a pawn against China’  ('Gui 
Minhai in Government-Arranged Interview: Sweden Used Me as a Pawn against 
China,' 2018). The rest of the year of 2018 saw the worsening relationship 
between China and Sweden. Small incidents such as Chinese tourists’ bad 
behaviours in Sweden and the alleged racist comments from Swedish media kept 
flaring up on both sides (Agerholm, 2018; Withnall, 2018). In this sense, TV 
confessions are by no means a genuine form of consent.  
However, it is clear that TV confessions can strategically and conveniently 
mould both cultural norms and legal regulations to justify the Party’s actions. This 
has a crucial practical implication: ‘Traditional culture’ has been dubbed as the 
‘root’ or the ‘soul’ of the nation, increasingly so after 1989 (Perry, 2017a). In 
facing a decline of political trust in the past two decades (Wang and You, 2016), 
the CCP needs to restore its credibility by making it difficult for everyone to think 
critically. Compared with the Maoist style propaganda, the current official 
persuasion, adorned with themes of ‘traditional culture’ and ‘law and order’, is 
much subtler, and potentially more effective. As the TV confessions show, the 
framing distracts the audience from the governance failure and shifts the blame 
onto individuals. At the same time, it reproduces the moral panic of an ever more 
economically polarised society under the siege of foreign saboteurs. Ironically, 
‘traditional virtues’ or ‘law and order’ conveniently become the excuse for the 
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Party to justify its own immoral and illegal behaviour in dealing with its domestic 
social conflicts. 
Apart from the practical implications, the analysis also contributes to a 
new understanding of the propaganda value of televised confessions. For those 
who have heard of the abduction of Gui and the arrest of Gao and Dahlin, TV 
confessions are chilling intimidation, showcasing the capability of the Party to 
coerce someone, both physically and mentally, into destroying themselves. 
However, for those who are oblivious to the deceptive nature of TV confessions, 
all three cases are just more examples of the triumphant ‘justice has long arms’ 
cases on TV which have been regularly broadcast to increase the awareness of the 
law among the public. The three confessants were all little known to the Chinese 
public prior to, and probably after, the confessions. Therefore, instead of viewing 
the TV confession as a political-showtrial style of media spectacle, I argue that it 
resembles more ordinary crime news. Its domestic propaganda value lies precisely 
in its banality, which blends into the Party's everyday narrative of what the world 
looks like, who the Chinese should be and how they should behave. As mentioned 
earlier, confessions were originated from the Party disciplinary tool of criticism 
and self-criticism. Therefore, the CCP members are certainly not immune to the 
resurgence of the confessional practice. The second half of the chapter examines a 
documentary in which the confessants are all Party cadres.  
5.2 Documentary: ‘Always on the Road’ 
Apart from taking the form of news on TV, mediated confessions also find 
their way into other media forms. CCTV, as an active collaborator and participant 
(Safeguard Defenders, 2018), has produced documentaries which make heavy use 
of confession. Different from the TV confession news, the confessants in the 
documentary tend to be the CCP cadres. The structure of the second half of this 
chapter is similar to that of the first half: it starts with a brief introduction of the 
documentary before going into the three-level CDA examination of the framing. 
The purpose of this section is to explain the way in which the confessions are 
conducted by a different group of people on a different media genre for a different 
purpose. The analysis argues that the confessions of the fallen officials contribute 
to the education of the public about the causation of corruption, which ultimately 
contributes to the legitimation of the CCP’s current rule. 
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The documentary I examine in this chapter is ‘Always On The Road’ 
(2016), which consists of eight episodes featuring Xi’s anti-corruption campaign 
since 2013. It is co-produced by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection 
(CCDI) and the CCTV. It was broadcast on CCTV1 at eight o’clock in the 
evening – the primetime hour in China - between 17th and 25th October 2016 
(Chenhua, 2016). According to the online introduction of the documentary, the 
production team visited twenty-two provinces, shot over forty classic corruption 
cases, and interviewed more than seventy experts, scholars and discipline 
inspection cadres25. It features fallen cadres at or above the provincial level, which 
provides a ‘very strong warning and educational purpose’ (program intro). While 
eight episodes in length, the documentary tells one story repeatedly – the 
reasoning device: from the Party’s perspective, how the Party cadres become 
corrupted and how the Party has been successfully tackling corruption since the 
18th Party Congress in November 2012. Every episode deals with a specific sub-
topic about corruption (Table 1). Orchestrated confessions are weaved into the 
framing of the story.  
 
25 Discipline Inspection cadres refer to the staff of the Commission for Discipline Inspection at 
various levels. The Central Commission for Discipline Inspection is the highest internal control 
authority in charge of control cases involving cadre corruption and other misconducts. 
26 Translation is from the China Daily, 
http://cn.chinadaily.com.cn/fanfusuji/201610/27/content_27798301.htm  (3 October 2018) 
Episode  Programme Title26 Content 
One Winning Or Losing 
Public Support 
People are the ones the CCP must serve. 
Two Setting Good 
Examples 
The importance of the exemplary role of a 
leader; Xi is a model for emulation. 
Three Leaving Marks When 
Treading On Stones 
The crackdown on drinking, eating or 
purchasing other services by using public 
funds. 
Four Swords Shown Buying and selling government positions. 
Five Discipline First The important role of the Party discipline. 
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Table 1 Summary 
of the Episodes 




that it includes 
cases of many 
‘tigers’ – a 
nickname for high-ranking corrupt Party officials. For instance, when the narrator 
introduces the documentary at the start of the first episode, it uses the footage of 
the court hearings of four high-level officials, including Zhou Yongkang. Zhou, a 
member of the 17th Politburo Standing Committee who was in charge of the 
Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission, is one of the biggest tigers that 
Xi’s anti-corruption campaign has captured as of 2019. The emphasis on the 
‘tigers’ is to distinguish Xi’s anti-corruption campaign from the previous ones, 
which shows that Xi takes corruption seriously. However, the court hearing 
footage is the only place where Zhou and other ‘tigers’ appear. The documentary 
reveals no more details about them than the little information that has already 
been available to the public.   
The following analysis addresses the confessions that make up the 
documentary through three levels of CDA. The first level of linguistic analysis 
investigates the textual features that establish a causal relation – the reasoning 
device - for explaining the Party cadre corruption. The second level examines the 
production of the confession. The third level provides an explanation of the 
framing process that the confession invokes and how they, in theory, can 
legitimise the Party’s rule. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of the 
implication of the use of confessions in the documentary. I argue that the function 
of the confessions is didactic, despite the confessions appearing to be self-critical 
and humiliating. They are designed to prevent the audience from making their 
own judgement and incite them to feel indignant by invoking emotional responses 
at both the family and national level. 
Six Bring Down Both 
Tigers And Flies 
The huge damage of corruption at the 
local level. 
Seven Skynet Hunting Arresting corrupted cadres who have 
escaped abroad. 
Eight Addressing Both the 
Symptom And the 
Cause of Corruption 




5.2.1 Descriptive level of analysis  
The documentary tells a story of the fallen officials and the self-salvation 
of the Party: it diagnoses the issue of corruption, investigates the cause and 
prescribes a treatment. That is to say, the reasoning device is the central framing 
issue. The following section has two parts as it examines the two main subjects 
directly involved in the documentary confession: the confessants and the 
supporting figures who either echo the confessants’ reflection or show 
endorsement of the Party’s anti-corruption campaign. 
Confessants: the fallen cadres 
There are forty-one cases of confessions in the documentary and they 
exhibit the following patterns. The content of the confession usually consists of 
five parts:  
1) The disbelief and disappointment about their current disgraced situation;  
2) Recalling their own misbehaviour and the resultant bad influences on 
others;  
3) Analysing the cause of their behaviour;  
4) Showing support for the Party’s crackdown on themselves;  
5) Showing deep remorse. 
The framing of the Party cadres falls into the following pattern. The cadres often 
come from a poor family background. They looked up to the Party when they 
were young, joined the Party during their most impressionable years and devoted 
decades working diligently and outstandingly at the local level, as exemplified in 
Episode 1, 
Narrator: Zhou Benshun was born to a deprived family. He also 
started from the bottom, working at the local level and gradually 
ascended to a senior cadre.  
Zhou: We have suffered a lot of hardship since childhood, so I came 
out of a poor family. I have hated corrupt officials since childhood. 
(Ep1) 
The narrator firstly provides an overview of Zhou’s climbing the ranks from a 
poor upbringing. Then, Zhou’s own words demonstrate how much he was against 
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corruption, even mildly suggesting a degree of linkage between corruption and the 
cause of poverty. In other words, his ‘roots’ were good and he only became 
corrupt gradually and very recently. Appendix 1 contains more such examples 
from different fallen officials featured in the documentaries. 
One prominent characteristic of the above framing is that it sets the 
message that anyone can become corrupt. Sun Yeli, deputy director of the Party 
Documents Research Office of the CCP Central Committee, describes in the 
documentary: ‘An official might have been a good cadre yesterday, but today this 
same cadre has already become a captive’ (Ep5). Instead of long-term work and a 
life process, corruption is framed as a sudden fall to disgrace as a matter of sharp 
difference (indicated by the use of ‘but’) between yesterday and today. Such a 
framing of corruption creates a sense of randomness and inevitability in the sense 
that everybody needs to be vigilant about corruption because even the best trained 
cadre who comes from a poor background and hates corruption can become 
corrupt overnight.  
The individual stories of the downfall may vary but the framing of the 
cause of corruption is largely the same. It has both internal and external factors, 
but in the end, the main reason is personal and internal: the erosion of personal 
beliefs and morality, the lack of spiritual pursuit, and the contempt for law and 
Party regulations while possessing public power. When they talk about their own 
corruption, most cadres acknowledge that without the power in their hands, many 
of their ‘friends’, ‘relatives’ and ‘businessmen’ might not have bothered to 
cultivate a friendly relationship with them. That is to say, the reason for becoming 
corrupted is very subjective and up to the individual. Typical examples include, 
Bai Enpei, former vice-Chairman of the NPC Environment Protection 
and Resources Conservation Committee: 
With the gradual promotion and the influence of the environment, I 
became increasingly more self-centred. Especially after 2005 when I 
hit sixty years old, I fell seriously ill. My thought work ‘dropped 
anchor’ so I started to pursue the monetary and the material. (Ep.1) 
Liu Guanglong, former vice-Chairman of the Political Consultative 
Conference in Lüliang, Shanxi Province: 
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Comparing with the past, I indeed have relaxed, quite a bit, the self-
discipline in recent years. Psychologically, I feel that I’ve been a 
cadre for a long time. The thought that the life of a cadre [should be] 
better than that of the ordinary people led me to crimes. I also feel 
really ashamed that having been a Party member for over thirty years 
and leading cadre for over twenty years, in the end, I fell into this 
situation. (Ep.4) 
Both confessants admit having loosened their self-control over the years. Such an 
excuse holds the individuals’ subjective attitude primarily responsible for their 
corruption. The lexical choice of ‘psychologically’ (xinlishang) is a 
straightforward way to focus on Liu’s personal feelings. Similarly, Bai puts the 
blame on his lax thought work (sixiang) as being caused by the promotion, the 
environment, his old age and illness which has lured him to let loosen his guard. 
The mental verb ‘feel’ (juede) further emphasises the role of Liu’s subjective 
feelings. Therefore, xinlishang, sixiang and juede are used here in a way that 
emphasises the person’s individual perception. This thought work and self-
control, just like a person’s physical condition, is at the mercy of the environment 
and can deteriorate over time. It is also worth noting that when Bai laments over 
his own corruption, his self-description is first and foremost ‘charmed by ghosts 
and losing one’s mind’ (guimi xinqiao) before going back to criticising his losing 
‘beliefs and spiritual pursuits’. Guimi xinqiao describes Bai’s incredulity at 
becoming so materialistic. The lexical choice figuratively blames supernatural 
power rather than Bai himself, highlighting the proclivity and susceptibility of 
turning corrupt and echoing the aforementioned inevitability of turning corrupt. 
Once they pinpoint the cause of corruption, the confessants prescribe their 
own treatments. Firstly, some of them praise the punishment from the Party, 
defending the CCP’s disciplinary measures against themselves. Bai claims that, 
I am corrupt, but I very much hope that the central Party can increase 
the anti-corruption force. Since the 18th Party Congress, the central 
has adopted a series of actions, such as seeing Party self-governance 
exercised with rigour, to tackle corruption. This is the Party’s hope. 




Bai’s words justify his own arrest by the Party disciplinary apparatus. His use (or 
the script that is given to him) of the reference to being ‘our Party’ reveals that he 
still views himself as a part of the CCP despite having committed financial crimes 
and being officially removed from the Party and the public position, according to 
the caption in the documentary. I will come back to this point later when 
discussing how the framing creates power disparity. Here, I highlight the fact that 
it is a common practice among the confessants. 
Next, the confessants express regret because had they followed strictly the 
Party discipline and the order from Xi, they would not have fallen to disgrace. As 
Zhou Benshun - former Party secretary of Hebei Provincial and a member of the 
provincial People’s Congress Committee - reflects, 
China has always been a society of etiquette and favour. For example, 
if everyone gets together, the ties and relationship cannot be 
expressed without eating and drinking together. Why did the Central 
Committee stipulate the ‘Eight-point Regulation’? What benefit can it 
bring to the working style of the whole Party? What importance does 
it carry? [I] didn’t make an effort to understand it thoroughly and 
didn’t pay real attention to it in my mind. So [I] have problems now. 
(Ep.1) 
The use of ‘so’ is an illustration of a simply drawn causal relationship: Zhou’s 
neglect in not paying attention to the Party regulation led to his wrongdoings. The 
series of questions turn the confession into an interrogation of his past self and a 
current repenting self. He makes this self-conversation audible to the audience. 
Meanwhile, such framing also implicitly deflects any possible failures of the Party 
in the occurrence of corruption. This is done by repeating that the Party and Xi 
have distributed policies and regulations, in this case the ‘Eight-point Regulation’ 
and set a good example for emulation. Therefore, it is not the Party’s fault that 
someone still violates the discipline and breaks the law.  
Many confessants acknowledge the pernicious effect caused by corruption. 
In the story of cadre corruption, one can find the family story of the cadre: apart 
from being politicians, a number of confessants in the documentary also assume 
the family role of father and son. They admit that they have disappointed not only 
the people who they ‘avow to serve’, the Party who they admire and the 
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colleagues with whom they work, but also bring harm to their families. Many 
repenting cadres tearfully regret the harm that they have brought on their families. 
The cases of Tan Xiwei, Su Rong and Liu Tienan are very illustrative. Tan, 
former deputy director of the Chongqing Municipal People's Congress Standing 
Committee, admits that he fails ‘the expectation of his parents’ (Ep8). Su, former 
Party Secretary of Jiangxi Province, blames himself for harming his family, 
I not only destroyed myself but also entrapped my wife and harmed my 
son, leading the whole family into the abyss of financial crimes. Had 
they not been the wife or the son of a Party secretary, or had I not 
been provincial Party Secretary, they could’ve done nothing. And 
there would have been no such problems now. (Ep4) 
Through a series of action verbs such as ‘destroy’ (huidiao), ‘entrap’ (keng) and 
‘harm’ (hai), Su’s confession is grammatically an active process which establishes 
the relationship between the actions and the actor ‘I’. It holds Su responsible for 
the actions.  The subjunctive mood expresses Su’s personal wishful thinking that 
things could turn out differently, which reflects his regret. In a similar vein, Liu, 
former Director of the National Energy Administration, confesses that ‘using my 
own power to help him [Liu’s son] live a good life – this is essentially the reason, 
or I wouldn’t have broken the law’ (Ep8). In the interview, Liu calls his adult son 
a ‘small child’ who ‘has neither skills nor money or in other words, has limited 
professional knowledge’. Such wording reflects that although in his thirties, the 
adult son continues to be treated as a child who needs help from his father Liu. 
Tan Xiwei’s case exhibits a similar pattern, except that Tan is the ‘child forever’. 
In the eyes of other people, Tan seems to be a filial son. Before being 
investigated by the Party, he sensed that the situation would be bad 
and that he might not be able to see his mother again. He went back to 
his hometown, kneeled down in front of his mother and admitted his 
big mistakes and letting his parents down. Hearing his confession, she 
slapped him. Then they huddled together and cried. (Ep8) 
Tan’s case is similar to Liu’s in that the adult sons in both cases are treated as if 
they are still children. Tan is a cadre and middle-aged adult, yet he kneels in front 
of his mother who eventually slapped him. Kneeling is a Chinese hierarchical 
tradition which has mostly disappeared in the big cities today. But it is certainly 
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still in use in certain areas such as rural places. Regardless of whether one still 
practises kneeling or not, the meaning of the action and the hierarchical order 
encoded into it are clear: however old he is, he is a son to his mother forever and 
thus subject to the teaching of his mother.  
Meanwhile, the two cases also present different parent-children relations 
existing today. The two cases show two almost reversed kinships within 
contemporary Chinese society. Tan, who is from rural China, holds a traditional 
filial son image – obedient to his mother and visiting her presumably one last time 
after sensing that he would be damned under investigation by the Party and could 
no longer take care of his ageing mother. His case highlights the traditional family 
relationship between the parents and the children. Liu, however, spoils and is 
willing to do anything for his only son. The documentary does not specify what 
exactly he did for his son, but it is reported that his son is involved in almost all of 
Liu’s bribery (Southern Metropolis Daily, 2014). Such examples demonstrate that 
in the story of corruption, the theme of family is tied into many confession cases; 
in the realm of politics in China, time and time again, the role of the family is 
indispensable.  
In sum, the Party cadre confession pictures their shared trajectory of 
downfall. As ambitious and diligent youths, they joined the Party and worked hard 
to gain their current position. However, they have paid insufficient attention to the 
Party discipline for the past few years and thus relaxed their guard against a 
comfortable material life and some business associates. They were also influenced 
by reproducing a corruption culture that enriches their families and themselves. 
Their own accounts, sometimes with tears, are supported by various other 
subjects. I will analyse these supporting subjects in the following section. 
Supporting Voices: central and lower-level inspection teams & the CCP 
To make the confessions from the fallen officials convincing, the 
documentary includes a variety of supporting voices. There are sixty-nine 
interviewees altogether: they are investigators from the central and local 
Commission of Discipline Inspection (CDI), Party researchers and academics 
specialised in CCP history, former colleagues of the fallen officials, involved 
business company representatives, family members and the police. Among these 
groups of subjects, it is the first two that form the most audible supporting voice 
and are under close examination here. 
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The most frequent appearance is from the Discipline Inspection Department 
and the Party members at both central and local levels. Thirty-nine CDI staff and 
nine Party cadres appear in the interviews in the documentary. CDI staff are the 
ones who deal with the cases first-hand; thus, their main task is to witness the 
scale of corruption. For example, the staff from the CCDI Zhou Tao provide 
additional information about the scale of corruption of Bai’s wife, 
Just to deal with merely these things, we spent altogether around a 
dozen days. Like emerald bracelets…we use this - a string - to tie them 
[the bracelets] altogether. Grab them like this. This gives you an idea 
of the scope [of their corruption]. (Ep1) 
In the interview, without the presence of the actual bracelets to reify the bribery, a 
series of action verbs from Zhou neatly portray the busy actions that the staff had 
to take in order to confiscate the ridiculous number of emerald bracelets that Bai’s 
wife managed to accumulate through Bai’s position. As a witness, Zhou provides 
a vivid glimpse into an enormous amount of material wealth that Bai’s wife alone 
possessed and substantiates the evidence of Bai’s abuse of public power. 
As to the Party cadres who are interviewed at various levels, their roles are 
twofold. Firstly, they denounce their former colleagues, some of who are their 
predecessors. Their second task is to use the Party discourse to express approval 
of the measure to tackle corruption. However, there are two special cases: ex-
senior-manager of China National Petroleum Corporation, Wang Daofu, and ex-
Deputy-Secretary-General People's Government in Jilin Province, Wang Shusen. 
Both of them are like the ex-colleagues of the Swedish activist Peter Dahlin: the 
former describes himself as ‘both a perpetrator and victim’ (Ep8) because he only 
committed crimes under the instruction of his boss. In a similar vein, the latter 
implicates his boss Gu Lichun while conducting self-criticism, 
The pair of us had a quite bad influence. The two of us had dinner 
parties every day, of course, the location is secretive right? Actually, 
[we] had realised it, but still left it to chance – no worries, you may 
not be able to catch me. (Ep2) 
The use of ‘the pair/two of us’ ties Wang and his boss Gu together. Wang is then 
able to go on speaking on behalf of Gu, showing Gu’s involvement in the dinner 
parties. Such pronoun choice expands the role of the confession to more than 
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repenting and apologising for the confessant’s own behaviours – it can function to 
implicate others. The purpose of their confession, considering their minor 
positions, is more to bear witness to the crime of their bosses than seek their own 
salvation. 
Supporting voices: the Party researchers and the academics in China 
Apart from the CDI staff and Party cadres, the second most frequently 
interviewed people are the Party researchers and the academics within China. 
Thirteen of them are cited and three of them make repeated appearances in 
different episodes. The main task for this group of people is to provide theoretical 
support to the expectation of the causal linkage behind the corruption admitted by 
the confessants. They selectively draw upon experiences from the historical 
background contained in the Party-approved history, political theories and 
Chinese culture. 
The historians who are interviewed in the documentary cite the stories of 
well-known historical figures to prove that an individual’s personal conviction is 
the key to combating corruption. ‘Using history to allude to the present’ has been 
a common but important practice for the Chinese literati class to voice their 
political opinions, be it flattering or subversive (Unger, 1993). It is an apt, subtle 
and relatively safer means for the intellectuals to participate in political 
discussions. In Episode Four, History Professor Han Sheng from the renowned 
Fudan University in China refers back to one of the most internationally well-
known Chinese eras: the prosperous Tang Dynasty. According to Professor Han, 
Emperor Taizong (598-649) was extremely tough in punishing corrupt officials. 
They were even excluded from the national level pardons, meaning corruption 
was unforgivable under any circumstances. Shen uses Tang as an example to 
implicitly justify and praise Xi’s anti-corruption campaign, which is seen as being 
as tough and unforgiving as Emperor Taizong’s zero-tolerance policy. 
Meanwhile, it is also implicit praise for Xi’s China and compares today to the 
Tang Dynasty when China’s prosperity was widely recognised around the globe. 
The underlying message is that as long as Xi keeps acting tough on corruption just 
like Emperor Taizong, China will once again become a strong nation with 
international fame. Similarly, Episode Eight presents the example of Fan Jingwen 
(1587-1644), a Ming Dynasty politician who was famous for his rejection of 
bribes from both families and strangers despite the extremely corrupt political 
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environment at the time. Fan is used as a role model for the cadres today to 
remain ethical in the highly corrosive environment.  
Apart from the history of China, intellectuals also reiterate the CCP 
sanctioned Party history. Xie Chuntao, Director of the Party History Research 
Centre in the Party School, articulates the importance of the will of the people and 
reaffirms the Party’s historic mission, 
The will of the people (what people’s hearts are for and against) is 
very important. Once it is lost, it is very hard to win it back; there may 
not even be chances to do so. The CCP won the right to rule China 
and it must be the choice of history and the people. It makes good 
sense. However, this choice doesn’t solve all the problems once and 
for all. Today, realising the China Dream and making people’s lives 
better are our more important tasks and responsibilities. Not only 
getting economically more affluent, but the incorruptibility of our 
Party and government is, I believe, what is very important to 
laobaixing (ordinary people). Only by ensuring the Party’s fine 
conduct can corruption be prevented and reduced or convince 
laobaixing of the advanced nature of the Party members. (Ep1) 
Xie builds up the legitimate role of the Party in China step by step. First of all, 
Xie describes the Party as destined to rule China as a manner of fact. The 
modality ‘must’ is a strong indication that it is unquestionably true that history 
and the people have chosen the Party.  Having established this fact, Xie talks 
about what the Party needs to do. Despite his prescription to deal with corruption 
within the Party, Xie establishes an unspoken assumption that all the discussions 
about the Party corruption must acknowledge that the CCP is the only legitimate 
force to lead and rule China. These examples illustrate the way in which 
contemporary intellectuals use historical allegories to add credibility to and justify 
Xi’s anti-corruption campaign. 
Subjects – who are also involved?  
The documentary produces various subjects for a certain purpose. The 
descriptive analysis has touched upon the most prominent subjects – the fallen 
cadres and a range of supporting voices - who are involved in the framing of the 
Party’s story about the Anti-corruption Campaign throughout the documentary. 
The following is a brief summary of the less prominent but nevertheless important 
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subjects that are referred to in the episodes: Xi Jinping and the Chinese people. 
They are important mostly due to their intertextual function, which will be 
analysed in the interpretive analysis later, so it worthwhile to examine briefly here 
how these subjects are linguistically constructed. 
Xi is undoubtedly the exemplary leader and CCP member according to the 
documentary. Despite only making a limited number of indirect interview 
appearances in the documentary, Xi is an overarching figure who links other 
subjects together. Xi is directly named thirty-six times throughout the eight 
episodes; only one of the episodes does not mention Xi at all. The second episode 
alone names Xi eighteen times, as it is an episode that is devoted to Xi and its 
theme is the importance of the exemplary role of the leaders at various levels. Xi 
certainly is portrayed as the epitome of such a figure. He is an erudite speaker, 
quoting classics. He gives speeches, holds meetings and instructs the whole party. 
The episode also shows him walking side by side with villagers, visiting their 
homes and sitting with them in a crossed-leg fashion on a traditional Northeast 
Chinese heatable adobe bed. The visual footage gives Xi a common touch and 
paternalistic care while having a seemingly less improvised conversation with the 
villagers.  
Meanwhile, there are also multiple times when Xi is attributed indirectly. 
For example, ‘the 18th National Congress’ is mentioned thirty-one times 
throughout all episodes except for one. The 18th National Congress of the CCP 
was held from 8 to 14 November 2012. Despite Hu Jintao still serving as the 
president at the time, this NPC marked the beginning of Xi’s era as he took over 
the CCP as well as the military from Hu (Branigan, 2012). He vowed to tackle 
official corruption during the National Congress. Therefore, the repeated 
expression of ‘since the 18th National Congress’ is a reminder of and an emphasis 
on Xi’s era. Xi’s appearance represents and showcases the highest excellence of 
the Party, which is a common practice for the official media to depict the top 
leader in China. What is unusual is Xi’s direct link to Mao and a certain version of 
the Party history, which I will elaborate further in the intertextual analysis. Now I 
turn my attention to the people who Xi vows to serve. 
The Chinese citizens in the documentary are unequivocally supportive of 
Xi’s anti-corruption campaign. The satisfaction rate of the government anti-
corruption effort in a survey in the documentary shows an improvement from 75 
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per cent in 2012 to 91.5 per cent in 2015 (Ep1). There are also street interviews 
with passers-by in Shanghai (Ep5). The interviewees claim that they are able to 
see ‘the hope for the young generation’ now because the anti-corruption effort is 
‘for real’ this time (Ep5). Guangzhou citizens can now relax in a park which was 
exclusively reserved for the local officials prior to the anti-corruption campaign 
(Ep2). Ethnic minority villagers encourage Xi to keep ‘smacking flies’ in their 
village (Ep6). These interviews are primarily to provide evidence that corruption 
has harmed the ordinary people and demonstrate the effectiveness of and support 
for Xi’s latest effort at cracking down corruption.  
As mentioned in the descriptive analysis, when the fallen cadres refer to 
the Party, they still use ‘our’ Party even though they have already been expelled 
from CCP. It may be that the script that they were given required them to say so, 
or that it is hard to change a habit of years overnight. Regardless, the use of such a 
pronoun gives an impression that the cadres are a part of ‘us’ the Party. The CCP 
belongs to them regardless of what they have done. I will discuss the implication 
of this later. 
The descriptive analysis so far has presented the reasoning device of 
articulating the causal factors surrounding corruption through the linguistic 
construction of the confessants and those who are closely involved in their 
downfall of them. The two groups of people present the same causal relationship 
from two different perspectives. In the confession of the fallen officials, they 
themselves unanimously blame their own relaxed discipline and failure to 
implement the Party’s teaching for their downfall. They apologise for their past 
behaviour, express willingness to repent and even shed tears for failing the 
expectations of the Party, the people and their families. A range of supporting 
voices represented by the CDI staff at various levels and the Party scholars 
validate the causal relationship. A specific version of the Party history, the Party’s 
theoretical foundation, Chinese culture and history are among their repertoire of 
support for the anti-corruption campaign. In sum, the most competent and caring 
cadres could succumb to the temptation of money and power. Their degradation is 
gradual and recent. They themselves are to blame for their corruption. Meanwhile, 
Xi is seen as the ideal leader who enjoys absolute support from the people. Such 
framing on top of the corruption cases can shed light on the production of the 
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documentary and the purpose of such framing. I discuss this in more detail in the 
next section. 
5.2.2 Interpretive level of analysis 
Building on the descriptive analysis, the interpretive level examines how 
the production of the documentary influences the interpretation of it. The purpose 
of the analysis here is to identify the relationship between the confession 
discourse and the external elements that are crucial to the production of the 
discourse. Firstly, it examines the intertextual role of Xi and Mao in promoting 
the cause of Xi’s anti-corruption campaign. Xi and Mao are both external subjects 
who make no direct personal appearance in any of the confessants’ stories. 
However, they are the most important subjects that feed into the construction of 
the overall background of Xi’s anti-corruption campaign. The analysis then 
examines the intertextual references of Xi and an interdiscursive transformation of 
the healing discourse into the political realm, where one may find a similar 
phenomenon to that of Mao’s era. The analysis next explores the production of the 
subtitles and the often unquestioned role of the narrator in the documentary as a 
media genre. The analysis concludes with a brief discussion of the prominent 
themes that come to the surface after the first two levels of analyses. They 
function to connect the linguistic elements to the wider social background of Xi’s 
China.  
The people & Xi & Mao  
Xi is featured fairly frequently in the documentary. As mentioned before, 
he appears not as someone directly involved in the confession cases, but an 
overarching political figure looming over China today. He can be seen chairing 
the government meetings and having direct interaction with villagers. In multiple 
occasions when Xi is giving speeches at different meetings, he speaks of ‘our’ 
Party, which aligns himself with the representatives of the CCP. As we shall see 
in the next example, this alignment enables Xi to become a bridge that connects 
the poor village in the heartland of China to the powerful political elites like 
himself in Beijing. In the second episode, when Xi visited the farmers in 
Zhenjiang, Jiangsu Province in 2014, the footage shows that the villagers are 
waving at and shaking hands with a smiling Xi. An old villager says to him: ‘you 
are an invincible opponent of the corrupt officials and a lucky star for Chinese 
people. We Shiye people welcome you’. This old man assumes the role of a 
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spokesperson for his local Shiye people as well as the whole nation to thank and 
welcome Xi. In another scene, surrounded by Liangjiahe villagers, Xi speaks, 
The first step of my life was at our Liangjiahe. I stayed for as long as 
seven years, from 1969 to 1975. However, when I left the village, my 
body left but my heart remained here (applause). At the time I said (to 
myself), if opportunity allowed in the future, I would go into politics 
and do a job that brought benefits to the people (applause). (Ep2) 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, despite his experience as a youth sent down to the 
rural area because of the purge of his father, Xi’s princeling background could not 
be more different from the local villagers. However, the pronoun ‘our’ 
immediately closes the distance between Xi and the villagers and the applause 
from the villagers showcase their approval of Xi’s words.  
Nevertheless, none of the staged performance above is new or unique to 
Xi. What distinguishes Xi from his predecessors is the link between Xi and Mao. 
Thanks to Xi, Liangjiahe has ascended to become a politically ‘secular shrine’ in 
China (Buckley, 2017) – its history, poverty and love for the Party have to exist 
for the sake of the CCP’s myths. Xi and his Liangjiahe in Episode Two remind the 
audience of Mao and his Yan’an, which is mentioned in Episode One. In the first 
episode, Xie, Director of the Central Party History Research Department, explains 
the ‘ideal’ communist society in Yan’an under Mao in the mid-1940s. In Mao’s 
Yan’an, according to Xie’s description, nobody was idle and everyone could write 
directly to Mao through the suggestion boxes along the streets. Such direct 
supervision from the people was the solution to the seemingly inevitable decay of 
a prosperous era and the means to create an everlasting dynasty. According to the 
Party ideologues, there is a natural law explaining the rise and fall of the dynastic 
life cycles in the long history of China (People's Daily Online, n.d.).  It is a very 
Confucian historiographical understanding of China’s past and future (Unger, 
1993). Every dynasty eventually comes to its demise and a new one arises out of 
it. The cyclical process continues. However, the CCP under Mao’s leadership has 
claimed to have found a way to escape from this cycle, also known as Lishi 
zhouqilü. Mao attributed the reason for the end of all dynasties to the corruption 
of emperors and political elites caused by a lack of power supervision. Therefore, 
as long as the people effectively supervise the CCP, the Party, in theory, can avoid 
the cyclical route. In this way, the documentary seamlessly draws connections 
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between Xi and Mao, Liangjiahe and Yan’an, and corruption and the supervision 
of the people. Consequently, a saviour-return story emerges: Xi had devoted his 
youth to Liangjiahe, accumulated work experience in other places and eventually 
returned to Liangjiahe as a strong supreme leader to fulfil his promise. The 
framing of the village is to freeze Liangjiahe in time so that it remains an 
underdeveloped place perpetually waiting for and needing saving from the Party 
leader. The ‘secular shrines’ function to invoke the people’s memory of a hard 
time, imagined or not, that the Party shares with the people and the ideal (or 
utopian) society that the Party strives to build. Such a connection lends Mao’s 
legitimacy to Xi and validates the current anti-corruption campaign with historical 
experience. 
The presence of Xi can also be felt through many other intertextual 
references. When framing the causal relationship concerning cadre corruption, 
there is much existing political jargon and many clichés associated with Xi’s 
political agenda in the documentary. As mentioned in the descriptive analysis, 
‘the 18th Party Congress’ is an implicit way to refer to Xi and the government 
since 2012. The documentary also uses television clips of show trials in which the 
Party cadres are seen confessing in public court trials. It showcases Xi’s 
ostensible respect for law. Another typical framing device is the use of healing 
metaphors in the documentary. There are three popular four-word healing related 
chengyu within the official Party parlance which originate from old Chinese 
idioms. They express the Party’s determination to eliminate corruption through 
highly animated verbs, 
• Mengyao quke: ‘(corruption is) a disease that calls for powerful 
drugs’,  
• Guagu liaodu: ‘to scrape the toxins off the bones’, 
• Zhuangshi duanwan: ‘(a real brave man is willing) to cut off one’s 
own snake-bitten wrist to save his life’. (EP1) 
They were used by Xi when giving a speech on the importance of Party discipline 
during the third Plenary Session of the 18th CCDI in 2014 (Dong, 2014). The 
action verbs paint vivid pictures of the enormous physical sacrifice a brave man 
needs to make in order to rid himself of the disease and survive. The metaphor 
thus equates the excruciating physical pain to the agony that the Party is willing to 
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go through to remove corruption. Xi’s speech was later reported by Xinhua News 
Agency just before Zhou Yongkang’s official downfall as the rumour about it 
began to circulate. Zhou’s case is subsequently viewed as the ‘hand’ that the Party 
painfully but determinedly decided to cut off. Such metaphors, popular since the 
1940s, find their way not only into Party documents and news but also 
documentaries and other forms of media. They not only appeal to Chinese culture 
and language, which easily resonate among the people, but bear the trace of the 
highest command of the Party - the authority of Xi. 
Apart from unveiling the trace of the official Party discourse under Xi, the 
healing metaphor also has an interdiscursive purpose. Its relocation to the realm of 
politics not only highlights the urgency to deal with corruption but also implies 
the curability and hope after the pain and sacrifice caused by Party discipline and 
legal justice. Thus, the implication here is that Xi and the Party are very much in 
control of China’s current situation; therefore, the political, social and cultural 
values that Xi is promoting must be legitimate and obeyed. 
Narrator & audience 
Having discussed the relationship between the confession discourse and its 
external factor, Xi, I now direct my attention to the construction of the 
relationship between the documentary and its audience. I discuss three main 
aspects of this documentary: the subtitle translation, the genre of documentaries 
and the choice of verbs. 
The subtitle translation in the documentary, besides its usual function as 
the visual facilitation for audio information, guides the understanding of the 
audience as they listen to an unknown language and make sense of it by reading 
the subtitles simultaneously. In the documentary, there are many interviews with 
the ethnic minorities in China who express their approval of Xi’s anti-corruption 
campaign in their own local languages. In Episode Six, for example, there is an 
interview with a Xinjiang Uyghur villager being translated from a verbal 
conversation to a textual subtitle. The subtitle goes, 
Corruption is something we very much detest. It is very good that the 
country is making a big effort to fight against corruption now. We are 
very happy to see the country fighting against corruption. (Ep6) 
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I asked a native Uyghur speaker to translate the interview using the closest 
Mandarin words. The translation is the following, 
Regarding this thing, my opinion is that it is not right. The current 
policy is to eliminate these things, and it works very well. We are very 
happy after the introduction of this policy. 
The original subtitle involves transformation from a colloquial Uyghur language 
(phonetic) to a written form of Mandarin (graphic) (Rosa, 2001).  For this kind of 
transformation, the original content is subject to adaptation due to limited space 
on the screen, a reasonable amount of time to read and a proper match to the 
visual image (ibid.). To complicate things further, there is also the inherent issue 
within translation itself. A comparison between the two versions shows that the 
villager does express a similar meaning, but the subtitle modifies the meaning to 
make it closer to the theme of the documentary. The use of the pronouns ‘it’, 
‘this’ and ‘these things’ are ambiguous, and their meaning can change depending 
on the context. It is possible that the translation makes his words closer to what he 
intends to mean. It is equally plausible that his words were taken out of their 
context. Whichever case it is, there is no denying that the purpose of the Mandarin 
subtitle is to guide the audience’s interpretation of the interviewee’s words. 
Besides, to ‘detest’ something carries much more emotion than to merely feel ‘not 
right’. Regardless, the translation is not incorrect but does alter the tone of voice. 
The translated version expresses firmer and clearer support for Xi’s anti-
corruption campaign. Ignorant to the language, most of the audience have to rely 
solely on the subtitle to understand the Uyghur interviewee, leaving no possibility 
for alternative interpretation. 
Secondly, the genre of documentaries can reveal its relationship with the 
viewers. According to an arbitrary yet analytically informative categorisation of 
the documentary, ‘Always on the Road’ falls mostly under the ‘expository 
mode’27 of a documentary. This kind of documentary uses an old-fashioned 
 
27 Apart from expository documentary, according to Nichols (1991), there are three more: 
observational, interactive and reflexive types. An observational documentary supports an 
unobtrusive record of what is happening and eschews the moralising elements of expository 
documentaries. An integrative documentary highlights the role of filmmaker and strives to 
engage with individuals actively and directly. Reflexive documentaries use similar devices to the 
others but aim to provoke a more nuanced understanding among the audience of what kind of 
effect these devices have on their understanding of the documentary. ‘Always on the Road’ is 
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method of storytelling by applying ‘voice-of-God commentary and poetic 
perspectives sought to disclose information about the historical world itself… 
even if these views came to seem romantic or didactic’ (Nichols, 1991: 32-33). 
‘Always on the Road’ is a narration led documentary in which the producer tells 
the audience what to think through the voice over. Through the voice of the 
narrator, ‘Always on the Road’ introduces the audience to the ‘natural law’ about 
corruption and to the historical mission of the Party in rejuvenating China. The 
omnipresent voiceover provides information that is not immediately available to 
the viewers and sounds ‘both reasonable and logical as well as irrationally 
selective’ (Bruzzi, 2006: 57). It sounds ‘reasonable and logical’ because the 
audience often expects what they hear in the documentary will be true. The 
combination of masculinity and anonymity creates the so-called ‘voice of God’ 
model which disguises itself as being neutral and presenting the truth. The deep, 
slow-paced male voice in the ‘Always on the Road’ reaffirms the confessants’ 
description of their own past and reinforces the simple linear causal relation of 
corruption. It thus sounds ‘authoritative’ when informing the audience about the 
way to understand cadre corruption and leaves little room for other possible 
interpretations. However, this authoritative voice is often selective and presents 
only a certain perspective without specifying the reason for ignoring the others. It 
is due to both the length and the purpose of the documentary. Consequently, the 
narration often sounds didactic (Drew, 1983; Kozloff, 1988; Bruzzi, 2006). This 
reveals a potentially cynical function of the narration: it orders the viewer what 
and how to think.  
That is to say, ‘Always on the Road’ resembles more of a talk show 
revealing stories behind scenes with a didactic purpose. It shows the audience 
how the CCDI works to capture the wicked officials who then share the ‘real’ 
experience of treading on the wrong path. Through regurgitating the Party 
discipline, Xi’s historiography and a Confucian morality, the confessants educate 
the audience about the Party-sanctioned social, political and cultural norms. The 
interviews all occur outside the courtroom. The venue is usually bright and neat. 
Despite having been convicted, the confessants are not wearing any outfits that 
indicate their criminal identities. Such visual cues are designed to downplay the 
 
highly scripted Party propaganda which is very far removed from the aforementioned three 
modes of documentary. 
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fact that they have committed serious financial crimes and allow the officials to 
continue educating the public. Consequently, the documentary is not meant for the 
audience to raise questions, to feel outraged or to deliver judgement. Rather, it is 
an opportunity for the fallen officials to teach them a lesson to accept the reality 
and entrust the Party to handle corruption.  
Thirdly, the intention of the media production is often coded into the use 
of verbs in the confession script. Different confessants use a variety of colloquial 
verbal terms to express their repentance, showing ‘regret (huiheng)’, ‘feeling 
guilty (neijiu)’ and ‘losing face (diulian)’. This selection of mental verbs can 
illustrate a state of mind in which the confessants have clearly realised their past 
errors. The purpose of using the guilt related mental verbs can demonstrate the 
sincerity for repentance by showing the mental thought process of the confessants. 
Similarly, the action verbs used in the healing metaphors mentioned above are 
also very effective. Such metaphors that involve a graphic language evince the 
unwavering determination to remove the disease of corruption in spite of the 
agonising pain: it is for the longevity of the Party and China. The Party packages 
such determination as a strength. Xi’s anti-corruption campaign distinguishes 
itself from the previous ones as the most serious effort so far. The purpose is to 
stress to the audience that the process of treating the disease is painful, but the 
disease is ultimately curable. By the same token, the CCP may be riddled with 
rampant corruption now, but the framing of the documentary sends a clear 
message that the Party will eventually defeat it and that the Party keeps thriving. 
In sum, the interpretive analysis enables the audience to draw specific 
experience and existing knowledge to decode the content of the documentary. 
Intertextually, the framing convinces the audience of the causal relation of 
corruption; interdiscursively, it proves the popularity of the campaign and restores 
people’s trust in the Party. Both are used in the construction of the relationship 
between this particular documentary and the broader social and political reality 
today. From the analysis so far, three themes have emerged in terms of the 
framing of the causal relation of and the solution to eliminating corruption. 
Firstly, the link connecting Xi and Mao in terms of a good example of discipline 
and respecting the will of the people invokes a Party discipline theme. Second, 
Xi’s Liangjiahe and the old generation of the Party members form a theme 
surrounding the nostalgic historiography of the glorious past of the Party. Lastly, 
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despite the documentary being about politics, a family theme remains visible in 
the confessions. The next level of explanatory analysis steers the discussion 
towards how the framing connects to the broad social, cultural and political 
background of Xi’s China, with an emphasis in terms of the three themes.  
5.2.3 Explanatory level of analysis: ideology & power  
The explanatory analysis zooms into the discourses that have emerged 
from the three themes identified by the previous two levels of analysis: the Rule 
of the Party Discipline Discourse, the CCP Historiography Discourse and, once 
again, a Family Values Discourse specific to Xi’s era. The analysis ends with a 
discussion of the power division reflected by the framing of confession 
documentary. 
Rule of the Party Discipline Discourse  
As mentioned in the interpretive level of analysis, the documentary 
frequently uses CCTV news clips showing the footage of confessions, the 
repentance of the captured ‘tigers’ and their respective trial sentences. This media 
spectacle is to showcase the so-called ‘rule of law’. However, the ‘Rule of Law’ 
Discourse here is not so prominent as the Party Discipline Discourse due to the 
fact that it is mainly the CCDI that supervises, punishes and decides whether a 
specific corruption case of a CCP cadre would be referred to legal prosecution. 
That is to say, as the title of Episode Five ‘Prioritising the Compliance with the 
Party Discipline’ suggests, Party discipline plays a more imperative role than the 
law in dealing with the corruption cases of the Party members. 
Xi has been strengthening the Party discipline through the mass-line 
campaigns reminiscent of Mao’s in order to tackle the rampant ‘formalism’, 
‘bureaucracy’, ‘hedonism’ and ‘extravagance’. They are known as ‘four work 
styles’ relating to the irresponsible work approach and attitude of the Party cadres, 
and they can fatally erode the legitimacy of the Party (Zhao, 2016b). The Sixth 
Plenum of the CCP’s 18th Central Committee convened in October 2016 had a 
particular emphasis on the Party discipline (Miller, 2017). Xi explained that the 
Plenums of each year since the start of his term were devoted to one of the sub-
themes of his ‘four comprehensives’ – ‘deepening reform’ (2013), ‘ruling the 
country by the law’ (2014, as mentioned in the first half of this chapter), ‘building 
a moderately well off society’ (2015) and ‘governing the party strictly’ (2016). In 
2016, the Party discipline was high on the agenda. 
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One disciplinary measure that Xi has seen to implement is actually the 
formalisation of the long-lasting practice of self-criticism, the so-called 
‘democratic life meetings’ (minzhu shenghuo hui). The Sixth Plenum issued 
‘Guidelines on Inner-party Life in the New Situation’ to regulate how to conduct 
such meetings. The Party’s disciplinary apparatus sends out supervisory teams 
which consist of leading Party members at the same administrative level to collect 
reports at various levels (Zong, 2013). Cadres have to both make self-assessment 
and pass information about their colleagues and even superiors to the supervisory 
team. They must ‘combat fears that one may lose face’ ('Explanation on the Code 
of Conduct for Intraparty Political Life under New Circumstances', 2016).  The 
guideline reassures that reporting on one’s senior will not hurt one’s future 
promotion. High-ranking officials must be setting good examples in implementing 
the guideline. It is an updated version of the 1980 ‘Guidelines on Inner-party Life’ 
issued under Deng. Many people regard Deng’s landmark guidelines as successful 
in tackling the rampant ‘special-privilege mentality’ within the Party after the 
Cultural Revolution (Baum, 1994: 140). Xi’s new guidance expresses a similar 
admiration in terms of restoring order and uniting the Party to reform 
('Explanation on the Code of Conduct for Intraparty Political Life under New 
Circumstances', 2016). Therefore, the new guideline, especially Clauses Nine and 
Ten, holds the principle of ‘unity - criticism - unity’ on paper at least.  
However, the Rule of Discipline Discourse is designed to tackle mostly the 
subjective elements in corruption, which is reflected in Xi’s new guideline. The 
central message explaining the fall of cadres in the documentary is that it is the 
self who gradually relaxes the discipline, thought work and studying the Party 
directives. Accordingly, many interviewed Party intellectuals and CCDI staff 
recommend a strict implementation of the Party discipline as the solution. This is 
echoed in the first guidance of the document: ‘be firm in our ideal and conviction’ 
towards socialism with Chinese characteristics, which champions the importance 
of individual subjective determination. Xi also re-elevated the importance of the 
individual ideological beliefs once he took up the helm of the Party in 2012. He 
used the demise of the Soviet Union to reiterate the indispensable role of 
ideological beliefs. The once hopeful saying in the 1950s ‘Soviet Union's Today 
Is Our Tomorrow’ sounds eerie today. Xi thus committed himself to stand up to 
the laxity in ideological beliefs (Grammaticas, 2013). In the documentary he is 
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seen demanding the Party cadres to ‘focus on self-purification, self-improvement, 
self-innovation, [and] self-awareness’ through a colloquial expression of ‘looking 
in the mirror, grooming oneself, bathing, and seeking remedies’ ('The CCP Work 
Meeting on the Mass Line Convenes; Xi Jinping Gives an Important Speech', 2013). The 
four ‘self’s in this framing device highlights the role of individuals’ personal will 
and determination. The set of self-care actions similarly underlines that it is the 
self that is responsible for one’s downfall in the area of corruption. In the face of 
mounting social conflicts, economic development bottlenecks and potential 
political unrest (Zhao, 2016b; Brown and Bērziņa-Čerenkova, 2018b), the CCP’s 
governance performance become the most crucial element for the legitimacy of 
the Party. The CCP desperately needs any measures to reduce the pressure and 
certainly prevents intra-Party corruption from threatening its rule. The result of 
such framing is the exoneration of the Party from being blamed for having 
appointed these corrupt officials to important jobs in the first place. By shifting all 
the blame for corruption onto the individuals who are unable to face the enticing 
material luxury, the framing exempts the CCP from any possible major 
responsibility.  
Moreover, in this age of rampant Party corruption, the CCP cannot afford 
to take the blame for creating a comfortable environment for corruption. This is 
why the objective structural factors that cause corruption in China’s political 
system are conveniently left out. Andrew Wedeman, whose book is cited out of 
context in the documentary to support the anti-corruption campaign, claims in the 
very same book that the CCP is essentially above the law, let alone the Party 
discipline, and that the anti-corruption efforts so far have not addressed the 
structural cause of corruption (Wedeman, 2012). There has been much literature 
about the root of corruption which identifies the institutional flaws as one of the 
most important factors (Lu, 2000; Bai, 2014). However, the framing of the 
confession attributes the cause of corruption almost exclusively to subjective 
reasons. While the cadre apologises and feels compelled to toe the Party line to 
blame their own subjective manner for their corruption, they may unintentionally 
express their own perplexity as to why they are caught. When the fallen cadres 
talk about their corruption experience, there is sometimes a sense of puzzlement 
(moming qimiao). As shown before, Bai speaks of taking bribes due to ‘being 
possessed by a ghost’. Such expression gives a sense that corruption is beyond 
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self-control, as the cadre seems to be under the influence of a supernatural power. 
The framing avoids talking about the structural reasons for corruption and blames 
a person’s subjective attitude and morality, which could be vulnerable, especially 
in the face of a social environment that is structured in a way that makes vital 
personal connections in all spheres of life (Gold et al., 2002).  
Naturally, in order to eradicate corruption, the Party needs to enhance its 
members’ awareness through Party discipline. From this perspective, the Party is 
presented as a victim of corruption, as it loses the trust and the heart of the people. 
Meanwhile, it is also a self-correcting entity that is supposed to consist of 
advanced-natured28 and disciplined members. According to its own parlance, the 
Party is destined to lead China. This powerful claim contrasts strongly with the 
image of a victim riddled with rampant corruption, which is exactly how the self-
salvation of the Party looks like: the CCP is powerful and weak at the same time; 
the process is easy and hard at the same time. In the end, it is very questionable 
how effective morality and self-control can be. According to Yan’s (2009) 
anthropological study in the village, his interviewees express doubts about 
whether they would have no involvement in corruption had they had more power. 
The villagers admit that in the face of an almost social norm of corruption, an 
individual’s morality is too weak to fight against the trend (Pei, 2017). 
Highlighting only the human will as the root of corruption is a deliberate 
diversion of attention away from the objective factors which can be argued 
convincingly as the root of corruption (Peerenboom, 2002). The consequence of 
such framing can be severe in the long run. As studies show, the collective or 
institutionalised behaviour that undermines trust between people is much more 
detrimental than individual actions (Gong, 2006; Yan, 2010). The largely 
overlooked structural cause of corruption will continue to damage the social trust 
and morality of the whole Chinese society. 
The CCP historiography: a nostalgia for rectitude – the role of intellectuals 
and historians 
 
28 ‘The advanced nature of the CCP’ is a phrase describing the Party’s self-claimed advanced 
understanding of the world and how to better transform the world accordingly. As a Marxist-
Leninist party, the CCP believe that its political theory and campaigns have a more positive 
impact on society, thus, such advanced understanding makes the CCP superior to other political 
parties. Consequently, the CCP believe that this advanced nature is critical to its rule (Heath, 
2014).   
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When people are dissatisfied with the current situation, they tend to 
idealise the past (Yan, 2009: 49). Such an observation is especially germane to a 
fast-changing society like China. It is the task of intellectuals, especially 
historians, to create such a past. The task of some historians is to ‘provide a 
legitimising historical perspective as the basis of the national project’ (Conversi, 
1995: 74). Their mission is not to produce knowledge based on investigating the 
past. Instead, they are writing fictions for a specific purpose, creating a collective 
memory or even making myths. This is certainly true in the context of the CCP 
historians and their missions. As the documentary shows, dozens of interviews 
with historians, scholars and intellectuals contribute to the Party framing of 
corruption through creating the history of the CCP and China. Together with other 
Party institutes, they create a CCP Historiography Discourse that includes two 
main framings. Firstly, corruption within the Party is a rather recent phenomenon 
and, secondly, the old generations of the CCP members were in some way purer 
and should be the role models for today. The discourse paints a glorious nostalgic 
past of the Party centred around Mao. Mao’s quotes and conversations with 
others, like during the Cultural Revolution, become a distinctive source of 
wisdom and proof of the legitimacy of Xi and the CCP today. 
Firstly, the CCP Historiography Discourse generates a sense that it is only 
within recent years after the rapid economic growth that the self-discipline of the 
cadres began declining. As multiple confessants testified, they grew up in a poor 
environment and worked their way up gradually before only recently being 
tempted by material gains. However, such a picture of corruption within the Party 
is distorted. Despite the unprecedented scale of corruption in terms of the number 
of people and the amount of power and money involved, corruption has always 
haunted the CCP (Wedeman, 2012; Fewsmith, 2018). Even during Mao’s time, 
there were the ‘Three-anti/Five-anti campaigns’ tackling the bureaucratic 
misconduct in the 1950s (Lu, 2000). In 1952, the infamous case of Liu Qingshan 
and Zhang Zishan ended up with the execution of the pair of senior Party officials 
and revolutionary heroes (Fiskesjö, 2017). Corruption continued to be a threat to 
the CCP afterwards, from the Red Guard Movement (1966) to the popular 
discontent that ensued after the Cultural Revolution (1978) and to the student 
protests (1989) (Barmé, 2018). The data collected for the thesis also echoes this 
claim. As mentioned at the start of this chapter, the keyword search of ‘I made 
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mistake’ in the People Daily shows that it turned to a euphemism for ‘I took 
bribes’ in the 1980s. Thus, it is an illusion that corruption is only a recent 
phenomenon. 
Secondly, the discourse establishes a pure image of the older revolutionary 
generation so that the Party today can draw legitimacy from it. It has been a usual 
tactic for the CCP (Meng, 2018). Examples such as the society in Mao’s Yan’an 
and Tan’s old revolutionary mother not only praise but also create a sense of 
nostalgia for the idealised past. Xi is the mediating figure linking today to the 
glorious past under the leadership of Mao. What makes Xi stand out among his 
recent predecessors is, firstly, the scale of his presence in media. In terms of the 
appearance in the People’s Daily within the first eighteen months of the 
presidency, Xi (4725 times) is only second to Mao (almost 7000 times) which is 
also far ahead of the third highest frequency of Hua Guofeng (2605 times) (Qian, 
2014). Secondly, Xi is the connecting figure also in the sense that he tries to 
bridge the divide between the Maoist and the post-Mao eras (Brown, 2016; 
MacFarquhar, 2018). The conventional way to understand China’s recent history 
is that 1978 marks the end of Mao’s radical communist experiments and the 
beginning of the reform opening era. It was since then that China had moved 
away from the Maoist self-destructive mass campaigns and made tremendous 
economic progress. Despite moving away from the Maoist route to manage China, 
Deng once claimed that ‘we will never do to Mao what the Soviets did to Stalin’ 
(Kristof, 1989). Thus, the official verdict on Mao remains tha6t his positive 
contribution outweighs his mistakes. Even this small percentage of bad was 
caused by manipulative people like the Gang of Four. Nevertheless, Xi does not 
even want to interpret the past half a century as such. Instead, Brown (2016: 102) 
rightly argues that ‘Xi has focused on the common vision between the two eras – 
creating a strong country through a strong party – rather than on the lack of 
unified means by which to do this’. When speaking of the lessons offered by 
Mao’s deadly campaigns, Xi glosses over the detrimental consequences of the 
Cultural Revolution and the GLF and promotes the ‘Two Undeniables’: 
The historical period after economic reforms [1978] must not be used 
to deny the historical period before economic reforms; and the 
historical period before economic reforms must not be used to deny 
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the historical period after economic reforms (Treating the Two 
Periods Before and After the Reform Correctly, 2013). 
The ‘Two Undeniables’ assert that there should be no rupture between Mao’s and 
Deng’s eras, which is clearly to underplay the disastrous part of Mao’s campaign. 
Once again, these ‘Two Undeniables’ mirror Xi’s attitude towards Gorbachev’s 
attack on Stalin, which fatally undermined the legitimacy and stability of the 
Soviet regime, and could not be allowed to occur in China (Zhao, 2016b). 
The urgent task Xi is facing is to combat ‘historical nihilism’. The term in 
China refers to the ‘public scepticism about the Communist Party’s version of past 
events’ (Whitehead, 2017). One way to fight against ‘historical nihilism’ is to 
enforce the correct Party and China history. Directives as such signal the end of 
what Schwartz calls ‘progressive reclaiming of Chinese history’ which has taken 
place under Deng to restore the reputation and position of those who were 
enemies of the people (Vogel, 2011: 661). In the late 1970s,  
…it is clear that modern history still serves politics in China. 
However, there is a difference between a situation - such as prevailed 
during the Cultural Revolution and even before - in which historians 
are told by the political leadership what to study, how to study it, and 
what conclusions to reach, and one in which historians, although 
consciously or unconsciously responsive to shifting political and 
ideological winds, are relatively free to look at the evidence and draw 
conclusions on the basis of what they find. It seems evident to us that 
Chinese historians have broken out of the first situation and are 
moving towards the second (Cohen and Goldman, 1980: 52).  
Cohen and Goldman’s observation shows that the officially sanctioned past 
existed after the Cultural Revolution, but disagreements on the Party’s past were 
tolerated to a degree. History is uniform again four decades later and decorated 
with revamped myths about the Party martyrs and exceptional leaders. As 
Callahan (2015:13) observes, the official discourse today on China’s future is 
‘singular, inevitable and undeniable.’ For example, some people who pursue a less 
fettered version of the Party history began questioning the credibility of the heroic 
acts of some of the most well-known communist model soldiers and workers. The 
doubts not only undermine the heroic image of the Party but also erode the 
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credibility of the claims from the Party. To tackle the issue, the NPC makes it 
punishable by civil law for ‘those who infringe upon the name, likeness, 
reputation, or honour of a hero, martyr, and so forth, harming the societal public 
interest’ (The National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China, 
2017: Article 185). The well-known wartime heroes and martyrs have been given 
state approved status, which is used to prevent people from questioning the degree 
of truth behind all their heroic legends (Zhen, 2018).  
The CCP Historiography Discourse that is present in the documentary 
framing means that to idealise the past and to blur the Maoist and post-Mao eras 
are always based on the abuse of power in some way (Yan, 2010). Consequently, 
the legal and disciplinary measures have been put in place to deter people from 
deviating from where the CCP wants them to look. By Cohen and Goldman’s 
standard, Chinese historians are backtracking to the first situation they mention in 
the quote. Be it realistic, exaggerated or fantasised, the CCP’s victory promotes a 
shared national identity through education and media (Volkan, 1997: 48). The 
tradition, memories and myths that are framed in the documentary breed 
nationalistic strength, which is ‘the most reliable claim on the Chinese people's 
loyalty' (Smith, 1999; Zhao, 2016a: 1169). 
Family Values Discourse: a changing morality    
Despite the fact that confessions in the documentary are largely about the 
law, the Party discipline and politics, the Family Values Discourse remains. The 
filial culture and the relocation of the discourse from the family to the national 
level that featured in the analysis of the Cultural Revolution data are present in the 
documentary too. Xi commits to prescribe traditional Chinese culture as a 
treatment for cadre management and corruption (Angle and Zhang, 2013; 
Schuman, 2015; Anderlini, 2017). One prominent manifestation in the framing is 
the filial culture. The confessants often become very emotional when talking 
about the harm they have brought to their families. Tan and his honest old CCP 
member mother, in a way, reveal an ideal revolutionary-traditional family relation. 
The communist revolutionary mother bears the full responsibility for educating 
her son, thus Tan the adult son always ‘listens to the words’ of his mother. The 
revolutionary lineage continues in the family in which the mother is mother and 
the son is son, regardless of their age and life experience.  
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However, a more prominent phenomenon within the Family Values 
Discourse than the traditional filial culture is nepotism. Some confessants mention 
that their corruption is related to their families, especially the children. Some 
explain that they only hope to provide their children a living condition which is as 
good as businessmen can afford. Or, they allow their children to benefit illegally 
from their own positions in terms of job opportunities. Even when the children 
become adults, they continue to take advantage of their parents’ social and 
political status, sometimes illegally. The confession reflects a trend which 
reverses the traditional filial roles. Children no longer need to provide monetary 
or physical care because their parents have accumulated enough wealth and 
enjoyed a host of state-provided privileges. Moreover, these adult sons and 
daughters are viewed by their parents as being too young to be capable of 
anything. They continue to live under the wings of their parents whose social and 
political resources can be at their disposal (Sun, 1983).  
The two cases echo the observation of scholars such as Yan that there is a 
‘changing moral landscape’ in the filial culture since the reform era in China 
(2009: 36). In Xi’s China, the one child in a family has become the centre and the 
parents and grandparents work hard to raise this one child. This family structure is 
called ‘descending familism’ as opposed to the traditional ‘ascending familism’ 
centring on the senior generation (Yan, 2009). The descending familism is 
reflected in several confession cases in which the offspring of the confessants are 
either directly or indirectly involved in the corruption. The shake-up of the filial 
culture means that many audiences may find the confessants, to a degree, 
understandable, as most parents today share a similar difficulty in bringing up 
their only child. Meanwhile, a surging number of young people today believe that 
to make their parents happy (fulfilling the filial duty), they need to make 
themselves happy. Their parents have told them that their own happiness depends 
on the children’s well-being (Yan, 2009). However, what makes the younger 
generation happy is sometimes in conflict with what traditionally considered filial 
behaviours. Thus, in the documentary, what the framing advocates is the 
traditional filial culture. It obliquely criticises the new morality by linking it to 
causing corruption (parents hoping to provide their children with the best 
opportunities possible). In this sense, it clamps down on the most contemporary 
twist of what filial piety is and promotes the more traditional family values.  
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What the changing family values reflect is a shakeup of the moral and ethics 
in China since the 1970s. During and prior to Mao’s time, the ethics of 
collectivism was the official discourse. As Yan accurately summarises, 
From Confucian ethics and traditional culture to the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) and the People’s Republic, the emphasis [on 
the collective] continued; what had changed was merely the 
replacement of the family, kinship groups, and the emperor with 
socialist collectives, the Communist Party, and Chairman Mao (2009: 
42). 
The relocation of the Family Values Discourse from the private to the public 
political realm echoes Yan’s argument. However, that is not to deny that there is 
sometimes a gap between the actual practice and the advocacy of selflessness. 
This means that the dominance of the Communist-backed moral ethics makes it 
impossible even to publicly acknowledge the legitimate existence of selfishness. 
The end of the Cultural Revolution saw a gradual collapse of such collective 
ethics while a new individualism has been on the rise. Since the 1980s, 
individualism has spread in Chinese society as China has become materially 
wealthier. The Party thus drew legitimacy from satisfying both the individual and 
the national desires by moving away from the Maoist socialist experiment to a 
‘state-initiated discovery of universal human nature of individual desires…’ 
(Rofel, 2007; Yan, 2009: 47). As Deng’s Southern tour in 1992 reaffirmed the 
opening-up policy, the state-induced awareness of the self soon became 
unstoppable. Many people working in the public sector flocked to the burgeoning 
private sector to make money, including cultural and political elites. It was a time 
when the behaviour of those elites fundamentally changed the view of the 
ordinary Chinese on ‘making a profit’: it was no longer disgraceful or dangerous 
to be rich. It was desirable. It was after this change that the rampancy of the 
corruption jumped to unprecedented levels, despite the Party rhetoric warning 
against the moral crisis.  
The more traditional Family Values Discourse, relocating from the family 
to the national level, is another effort by the CCP to try to not only tackle the 
moral crisis but also garner mass support. As part of the Party discourse, Xi is 
branded as not only a caring husband but also the patriarchal figure to China. 
Considerable media propaganda actively draws such parallel to encourage its 
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audience to view the country as a big family – to love it and to obey its rule 
(CCTV, 2018). The family discourse exists implicitly, despite the Party having 
banned calling Xi ‘Xi Dada’ – a term from the north and northwest China 
referring to one’s father or those who are older than one’s father - for fear of 
invoking the memory of Mao’s personality cult during the Cultural Revolution 
(RFA, 2016). Present in the narrator’s concluding remark of Episode Two, Xi 
encourages the Party cadres to ‘keep a child’s heart of innocence and purity’ (chizi 
zhixin). It describes the relationship between the Party and the people as the child 
and the parents. The purpose of such framing is to showcase the loyalty and the 
commitment the Party has towards the people. By doing so, the Party hopes to 
continue to repair and advocate its performance-based legitimacy to rule which 
includes moral performance and all other government functions (Zeng, 2016). 
However, a quite contradictory framing simultaneously exists in the documentary, 
which frames the people as being in constant need of the Party’s guidance and 
support. The Party unapologetically demands loyalty from its people.  
Through the Rule of the Party Discipline Discourse, the Party 
Historiography Discourse and the Family Value Discourse, the framing the 
confession in the documentary reflects the social and political direction at which 
the CCP tries to steer China. The following section explains the relevant 
implications of such framing. 
5.2.4 Framing implications  
Having completed the CDA, this section addresses how the representation 
of the world, identities and relations that are underlined reflects the issue of power 
in the confessions in the documentary. Deriving from the above analysis, the 
framing of the documentary showcases two sets of power imbalances in the 
mediated confession. Firstly, it unveils the Party’s rationale behind the preference 
for public self-criticism and the expectation of what the mediated confession is 
able to achieve. The preference reflects that the CCP has dominant power over its 
members in a towering fashion. Secondly, as a result of the first implication, the 
framing of confessions also unwittingly reveals the way in which the CCP 
demands everyone to know their places in a subtle manner, reinforcing the current 
social and political hierarchical divide.  
One of the interviews with a Party cadre reveals the sinister purpose of the 
confession. The Party-building expert Huang Weiting boasts in the documentary 
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about the effectiveness of public naming and shaming. The metaphor that he uses 
vividly portrays the detrimental effects of being shamed publicly, 
For many people, the scariest thing is being named (laughing). This is 
because many of our cadres, especially our Party cadres, care a great 
deal about their ‘face’ (laughing). If you are named and shamed in 
public, some of you feel like as if your face is ripped off in public and 
you have nowhere to hide. By using this method of naming, the 
purpose is, on the one hand, to teach the person a good lesson; on the 
other hand, and more importantly, to teach the masses and the cadres 
around them a good lesson. It is to educate more Party cadres in order 
to ensure them to be cautious.  (Ep3) 
Huang’s laughter suggests that he is satisfied with and proud of embarrassing 
cadres in public as a punishment and warning. The effect not only makes the 
confessants ‘lose face’ but lose face in an extremely shameful way. It is exactly 
this burning sensation on raw flesh that the Party is trying to achieve. Huang’s 
words show that the purpose of public naming and shaming is to ‘teach a lesson’ 
in a particular way: it is designed to warn and terrorise any disobedient cadres and 
the public. Meanwhile, whoever is subject to such naming and shaming, as we 
have seen, does not appear to have any way to resist. They have to be seen to be 
criticising themselves, denouncing each other and even implicating family 
members. The lack of resisting voices is the total domination of the Party over the 
individual members. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that this total domination of 
the CCP over its members is by and large a ‘non-antagonistic’ power divide. That 
is to say, most of the corrupt CCP cadres are malleable ‘good’ people worthy of 
forgiveness. As previous examples show, the use of ‘our’ Party by the fallen 
officials reveals that the confessants, despite their illegal behaviours and their 
official removal from the Party, are still allowed to view themselves as a part of 
the CCP – ‘our’ Party.  
Within the Party, there is an elevation of Xi above the rest of the political 
elites. The relationship constructed between Xi and Mao reinforces each other’s 
position. On the one hand, the documentary pictures Xi as respecting the will of 
the people and implementing tougher Party discipline, which it links to the ideal 
society of Mao’s Yan’an. Such linkage strengthens Xi’s position as a reliable 
political custodian for China. On the other hand, Xi only awakens the memory of 
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Mao’s constructive rather than destructive role so that Mao’s public appearance in 
Xi’s China can be overwhelmingly positive. In such a way, the two CCP leaders 
legitimise each other. For Xi, such a comparison distinguishes him from the other 
Party members as well as his past few predecessors, posits him closer to ‘Mao the 
China saviour’ and moves away from a sense of collective leadership. 
The second rift is the ‘inside/outside the CCP’ divide. The divide of 
in/out-groups has been a traditionally strong characteristic based on a low in/out-
Party mobility and distrust of strangers in Chinese society (Yan, 2009). On the 
one hand, becoming a CCP member is very difficult, let alone ascending to the top 
rank. On the other hand, the traditional individual person-oriented hierarchical 
association means the rights and the duty of a person are only relevant within this 
association (Fei et al., 1992). Thus, the social distance between two strangers is 
rather wide and this is why the distrust of strangers has been wisdom passed 
through the generations (Chen, 2006). Taking both factors into consideration, the 
divide between the ordinary people and the Party members is explicit on both 
ends. The difficulty in joining the Party means that only a small portion of the 
Chinese people are a part of this network which possesses a vast amount of power 
and wealth. Hence, it is not news that the Party cadres, especially those of high 
rank, have always had their privileged living compound and hospital. On a 
personal level, the confessants feel less responsible for the people who are outside 
of the confessants’ circles of association than they do for their immediate family, 
friends and colleagues.  
Moreover, there is a stark contrast between how people are treated 
differently when they break rules and laws depending on whether one is a CCP 
member or not. The Party claims to encourage people to supervise and report any 
cadre’s illegal behaviour. Hence, in theory, the Chinese people should be in a 
dominant position because the cadres are at their service and accept their 
supervision. While ordinary people must obey Chinese law, the CCP members 
are, first and foremost, subject to the Party discipline scrutiny, which is supposed 
to be a stricter code of conduct. However, the Party’s self-supervision is a flawed 
system and cannot be relied on as the primary measure to curb corruption, thus 
subjecting cadres under the Party discipline often means that they can escape the 
same law and punishment that other ordinary non-Party people will have to face. 
The corrupt ones are not necessarily undergoing proper disciplinary or legal 
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process; those who do go through the disciplinary processes may not necessarily 
be punished for a pure corruption reason (Yuen, 2014). Therefore, the rule of 
discipline, to a degree, is undermining the rule of law. Moreover, a double 
standard emerges between the ordinary people and the CCP members regarding 
legal and disciplinary punishment. Consequently, even when the Party members 
serve legal sentences, they may be placed in a designated prison with treatment 
and facilities that are different and unavailable to ordinary prisoners - Qincheng 
Prison29 is a good example. From the verbal to the physical, the gap between the 
Party and the non-Party has always been wide. The framing of the confession 
documentary only widens the gap. 
In sum, the second half of this chapter shifted the attention from the 
confessions in news clips to documentaries. In ‘Always on the Road’ (2016), the 
confessants are overwhelmingly Party cadres and government officials convicted 
or under the investigation of the CCDI. The documentary claims to expose the 
background stories of the fallen top-ranking officials. However, a close viewing 
says otherwise. Nothing detailed about their cases is revealed and the trajectory of 
their downfall remains opaque. What the documentary does show is the official 
narrative of corruption. The linguistic framing of identities as fallen officials in 
Xi’s anti-corruption campaign helps construct the logical sequence of the rampant 
corruption from the CCP’s perspective. As the confession is often echoed and 
reinforced by a range of supporting voices, the presence of a healing metaphor in 
the framing of the intra-Party corruption is noticeable, countering the ominous 
prediction that corruption would really lead to the downfall of the Party (Pei, 
2017). The framing aims to strengthen Party legitimacy through borrowing 
creditability from Mao and a certain version of the Party’s revolutionary history.  
 
29 Qincheng Prison is a max-security prison in Beijing run by the Ministry of Public Security instead 
of the Ministry of Justice. Built in 1958 with the assistance of the Soviet Union, QinCheng was 
originally designed to imprison high-ranking war criminals in the Sino-Japanese and the civil war. 
It eventually turned into a place which incarcerated many high-ranking cadres who were targeted 
by political purges during the Cultural Revolution. Since then, it has been the prison for the most 
important political prisoners in China (Guo, 2012). Among them were people who were involved 
in the Gang of Four (Mao’s last wife Jiang Qin), the Tiananmen crackdown in 1989 (Bao Tong, 
secretary of Premier Zhao Ziyang) and high-profile corruption cases (Bo Xilai). The treatment of 
these prisoners in Qincheng is often a political decision, thus they may enjoy certain privileges or 
suffer deliberate abuse depending on their individual cases. While abuse in prison is not 




As a programme co-produced by the CCDI and the CCTV, its role is to 
inform and educate the audience about corruption instead of initiating a debate 
about it. The core message for the audience is that corruption is a recent event 
caused by mainly subjective reasons. Thus, the way to deal with it is to strengthen 
personal willpower and determination, combined with harsh punishment from the 
Party as a deterrent. Consequently, carefully studying the Party policy and 
checking one’s behaviour against the Party Constitution is the key method to 
avoid making mistakes. However, the framing distracts people from the structural 
flaw of the CCP as the root of corruption and encourages them to believe that the 
Party is the crusader spearheaded by Xi against such individual decay (Murphy, 
2007). The constructed causal relation that is to blame for the rampant Party 
corruption prevents the audience from questioning the existence of any other 
causes of corruption, as long as this one logic stands. The CDA reveals the Rule 
of Party Discipline Discourse that, yet again, shows that the CCP is operating 
above the law. The CDA also discovers a concentrated effort from the CCP to 
construct certain myths about its own past and Xi’s agenda of rewriting the post-
Mao memory. Family values remain a recurring discourse in the framing of the 
confessions. The Party tries to reverse the trend of the ‘descending familism’ in 
which the only child in a family occupies the central position (Yan, 2009).  By 
invoking of the traditional filial kinship within a family and even at a national 
level, the framing of the confessions distracts the audience with the love for ones’ 
family and nation from possible indignation, judgement and actions against the 
CCP.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
5.3 Conclusion 
After fading out from ordinary people’s lives for around three decades, 
Xi’s era has seen a comeback of mediated confessions, not in newspapers, but on 
the official television CCTV instead. This chapter moves on from the data 
collected from the Cultural Revolution period and examines the contemporary 
mediated confession cases. Taken together with the news clips of journalist Gao 
Yu, Swedish activist Peter Dahlin and Swedish bookseller Gui Minhai alongside 
the documentary ‘Always on the Road’, the chapter reveals that the active use of 
mediated confessions by the Party to popularise a particular framing of reality. 
Firstly, a ‘foreign anti-China force’ is lurking behind the foreign media, NGOs 
and even among some Chinese. They threaten China’s national security and 
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undermine China’s rightful peaceful rise. Secondly, the CCP emphasises the rule 
of the law with Chinese characteristics and the Party discipline to the confessants 
and the general public, despite the fact that their very use of mediated confessions 
reflects the opposite. Such emphasis is on educating the audience as to how to 
correctly understand certain challenges China is facing today, such as corruption. 
Last but not least, the traditional filial values must be upheld to counter the recent 
moral turn related to the economic growth and the negative consequences of the 
One-child Policy. It is not only to be obeyed at the family level but at the national 
level as well.  
The framing of the mediated confessions in both the news clips and the 
documentary showcase the power disparity among different arbitrarily created 
groups. The confession from non-Party members creates an ‘inside China/good vs 
outside China/bad’ and a ‘moral/legal superiority vs inferiority’. Meanwhile, there 
is also an inside/outside Party divide which privileges the insider. Within the 
Party, there is total domination of Xi over the individual members. None of the 
power imbalance is new, as much of this imbalance is partly constructed through 
intertextual references. The framing functions mainly to reinforce the existing 
social-political structure. In terms of the undesirable changes in society such as 
the moral crises and declining trust in the CCP, the framing pinpoints them and 
asserts the Party-preferred cultural values in an attempt to reverse the damage. 
Having examined the data from both the historical and contemporary periods, I 
put the results together in the next chapter in order to discuss the similarities and 











Chapter 6. Changing Stage, Changing Repentance? 
There have been many social and cultural changes from the early days of 
the PRC to Xi’s era, yet the CCP remains. The stage for mediated confessions has 
changed, but how about the framing of confessions? The previous two analysis 
chapters have shown the changed as well as the unchanged discourses in the 
framing of the mediated confessions from both Mao’s Cultural Revolution and 
Xi’s first five-year term. The purpose of this concluding chapter is to piece 
together the results from both periods in order to understand the nature of the 
evolution of the framing and answer the research question posted in Chapter 1: to 
what extent is the framing of mediated confessions from Chinese official media in 
Xi’s era a revival of that during Mao’s Cultural Revolution? The resurgence of the 
practice itself is a sign of Maoist political control. Besides, many more alarming 
elements represented by the leader’s personality cult, his swelling personal power, 
the traditional hierarchical order and an overall tightening control of the political 
sphere make a reappearance in Xi’s China. Furthermore, they play a crucial role in 
the framing of the contemporary mediated confessions, which in themselves are a 
clear reminder of Mao’s chaotic decade. Meanwhile, the changes in framing 
reflect the fast adaptability of the CCP in disciplinary measures. These elements 
together create a sense of déjà vu of the criticism and self-criticism during the 
Cultural Revolution.  
This chapter first summarises the continuities and changes that I observe 
from the data. Overall, two persistent discourses and two changes stand out from 
the last two chapters. The theme of families and the dehumanisation of the enemy 
together with the healing metaphor have been in use in the confessions of both 
eras. I argue that both discourses persisting throughout the two periods 
demonstrate that the norms about families, dehumanisation and healing metaphors 
are the relatively constant cultural elements that have been specific to the Chinese 
society for at least the past century. Thus, their existence is likely to continue. The 
changes occurred in the areas that are related to the different political agendas of 
Mao and Xi, and consequently different confession styles. This chapter then 
discusses the ideological implications of the power divide, as a result of the 
different framings, that the two chapters have summarised. The result shows that 
P-ideology outweighs S-ideology as demonstrated in the framing of mediated 
confessions. It indicates a strong tendency of the CCP to use coercion and to 
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downplay the aspect of mutual dependency between the CCP and the Chinese 
people in Mao’s and Xi’s era alike. Next, I summarise the main contributions of 
the thesis and point out directions for future research to gain a more 
comprehensive understanding of mediated confessions, their resurrection and 
consequences today. This chapter concludes with a critical reflection of what the 
framing of the mediated confessions may suggest about the future political 
atmosphere in Xi’s China. 
6.1 Continuities 
In terms of the discourses in each confession framing, some of them 
persist from the Cultural Revolution to today. In fact, they existed even before the 
1960s and are likely to last in the future. The discourses relating to traditional 
family values and the dehumanisation/healing metaphor are both present in the 
two periods. I argue that the identification of these recurring discourses shows that 
they are firmly grounded in the deep-rooted Chinese culture that has remained 
largely constant over the generations.  
6.1.1 Traditional Family Values Discourse 
The most prominent discourse that existed both in the Cultural Revolution 
and today in mediated confessions is the Traditional Family Values Discourse. 
Exemplified by filial piety and the patriarchal hierarchical order, this discourse 
not only makes use of the accepted power relationship among the family 
members, but also tries to defend this relationship in the face of the erosion and 
shift of traditional moral standards in an increasingly materialistic Chinese 
society. With the old and the new morality entangled together, people often justify 
their behaviours by applying their preferred morality and ethics. So does the CCP. 
In Chapter 5, the conflicting discourses demonstrated in ‘morality vs law’ 
illustrate the complexity of the interpretation of what is right and wrong (Yan, 
2009; Davis, 2010). Thus, the framing is a strategic move of flexibly appealing for 
morality and ethics in order to make individual citizens shoulder more personal 
responsibility when the CCP cannot effectively deal with the social issues caused 
by growing wealth gap and lack of a social safety net.  
There is also the tendency to recontextualise the family discourse into the 
bigger political realm. Filial piety, a pervasive discourse under Xi’s ideological 
advocacy, has a broader implication than a virtue within a family unit. It can be 
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elevated to a national level, becoming the starting point of patriotism and, more 
important, party loyalty. That is to say, the leader of the CCP assumes the role of 
the head of the family and demands respect, loyalty and obedience from his 
‘children’. This is consistent with the literal analogy as well as the dynasty 
governance philosophy – the ‘Tianxia’ trope (Dreyer, 2015). Families, nations and 
tianxia (all under Heaven) are packaged together. The order of the world all under 
Heaven is the same as the order of a nation; the order of a nation is the same as 
the order of a family. From family values, the CCP demands the Chinese people 
follow the morality of self-sacrifice for the family. This morality emphasises the 
use of introspection and personal willpower to overcome difficulties in real life, 
instead of questioning the CCP’s policies and political agenda (Brown, 2016 ). 
Thus, patriarchal leaders, such as Mao and Xi, often play a central role in 
the framing of mediated confessions for the purpose of building Party legitimacy. 
However, there is no clear and legitimate top leader appointment procedure, thus 
the personal power of top leaders varies depending on the way they ascend to the 
position. Mao is undoubtedly the most powerful leader in China since 1949. The 
official media reflected this unparalleled power in the countless quotations and 
exhortations of Mao, which were highly intense, ahistorical, and out-of-context, as 
shown in Chapter 4. Deng was the supreme leader who initiated the reform era 
despite not having the official title of the Party General Secretary. Jiang, Hu and 
Xi all were or are the General Secretary, but the personal power of the former two 
cannot compete with that of Xi. Just like during the Cultural Revolution, Xi’s 
political agenda today often taps into Mao’s legitimacy by quoting his words and 
works. Despite not being on the same quantitative scale, both periods witness the 
use of Mao’s quotes out of context, either to suit their current argument, which is 
totally different from, if not entirely opposite to, the original context, or to hide 
certain inconvenient facts or terms deemed too sensitive at the time of use. The 
contemporary reference to Mao also functions to elevate Mao’s status among the 
younger generation who are less aware of Mao’s deadly campaigns due to the 
change of textbooks on the Party history. Therefore, the discourse of Traditional 
Family Values lives on, not only shaping the moral ethos within family units but 
also cultivating people’s unquestioning loyalty and obedience at the national 
level. In facing the danger of shifting traditional hierarchical order, the CCP’s 
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determination to defend against the cultural turn is clear in the official media 
framing. 
6.1.2 Dehumanisation Discourse and Healing Metaphor 
The contemporary framing of mediated confessions remains fond of using 
Discourses of Dehumanisation and Healing. The Party routinely denigrates 
‘enemies’ and corrupt officials by giving them derogatory names such as insects, 
animals or toxins. Such dehumanisation helps fuel the public resentment and 
justify the physical and mental abuse of the ‘enemies’ and corrupt officials. In a 
similar vein, the Party is fond of the analogy of healing. During the Cultural 
Revolution, a few confessants were merely ‘sick’, so they were not the ‘enemies’ 
despite their past mistakes. It was possible to cure them, even though the process 
(of naming and shaming in public) might be very painful. Similarly, in Xi’s 
China, the corruption that plagues the CCP has made the Party sick to the point 
that even Xi himself admits that corruption is endangering the CCP and 
threatening its legitimacy (Wang, 2017). However, as the framing of the mediated 
confessions of the fallen officials tells, Chinese people should remain optimistic 
about the CCP in that it promises to have the courage to endure the pain and rid 
this disease under Xi’s anti-corruption campaign.  
As explained in Chapter 4 and 5, the discourses of Dehumanisation and 
Healing have a history stretching back to ancient Chinese religion and culture. 
They persist through the changes in history and remain durable. That is to say, 
similar to the traditional family values mentioned above, the Dehumanisation 
Discourse and the Healing Metaphor are part of the relatively stable Chinese 
culture. They become part of the cultural resonance that the Party framing can 
reliably and readily draw on. The relative stability of the culture also means that 
the persistent use of both discourses is likely to continue. Moreover, such 
discourses keep seeping into other media spheres that the CCP tries to regulate. 
As noted by the China Media Project (CMP), some prominent critical voices 
online were labelled as ‘internet pests’ and ‘harmful pests’ by the official media 
today (Bandurski, 2018).  
Xi’s era witnesses the return of mediate confessions of CCP cadre as well 
as non-CCP members. The discourses on traditional family values, 
dehumanisation and healing are both prominent in the framing of self-criticism 
and confessions during the Cultural Revolution and in Xi’s era. They can be seen 
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as the order of discourse of mediated confessions in that they both specifically 
regulate the Chinese people’s attitude towards each other and the CCP. Together, 
they contribute to a paternal image of the CCP and familial respect, loyalty and 
love among the people to the Party while demonstrating clear hatred toward the 
‘enemies’. These discourses within the framing of the mediated confessions 
invoke the memory of the Cultural Revolution. Having traced the continuities in 
the confession framing, I turn my attention to what is unique to their own periods 
of time. 
6.2 Changes 
There are two noticeable changes between the two periods: the political 
and the subsequent cultural shifts reflected in the discourse and the changes in the 
media framing technique of confessions. I argue that the former is largely due to 
the different agendas of different generations of the Party leaders; the latter is 
related to the changing mode of persuasion due to the social changes since the end 
of the Cultural Revolution. 
6.2.1 Political and cultural themes  
Due to the aforementioned ‘Party Principle’, it is the task of the official 
media to disseminate and promote the political agenda of the current political 
leader. The political themes of various CCP leaders certainly differ as they face 
different challenges. From the fear of the masses during Mao’s chaotic Cultural 
Revolution to Xi’s hailing ‘rule of law’, the Party discipline and punishing those 
who endanger national security, the changes mostly reflect the political agenda of 
the time. For instance, the CMP has developed a ‘heat index’ to monitor the 
frequency of certain phrases in the Chinese political discourse in the People’s 
Daily (Beijing Language and Culture University, 2018; Qian, 2018). The two 
discourses identified in the contemporary analysis - ‘national security’ and 
‘socialist rule of law with Chinese characteristics’ – are categorised in the rank of 
the ‘red hot sector’. This refers to the second most frequently used political 
terminologies, as opposed to the ‘blazing category’ which is the first rank. The 
framing of mediated confessions surely reflects some of the agenda of the political 
leader of the time. 
Despite the lasting theme of traditional family values, there is a noticeable 
change of attitude towards the traditional culture overall. As Qin (2015) astutely 
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points out, the culture that characterised the ‘evil old society’ in the past has 
officially transformed into the ‘excellent tradition that has lasted thousands of 
years’ today. Consequently, the Chinese cultural norms have changed from being 
officially criticised to being selectively revived and promoted (Li, 2009). At the 
same time, China has changed from a socialist country (1950s), first to a third 
world country (1960s-1970s), then to a reforming and modernising ‘socialist’ 
state (post-1978) (van Ness, 1993). Such changes in the attitude of traditional 
culture and the identity of China mean that different framing strategies are needed 
to make the official persuasion effective. 
6.2.2 Confession framing techniques 
In terms of the style of confessions, it has changed from repentance to a 
deity (shown in Chapter 4) to a self-reflection against the moral standard or law 
and order (shown in Chapter 5). The former tends to lump together abstract 
human sins, such as selfishness during the Cultural Revolution, into self-criticism, 
making huge yet empty apologetic claims. By contrast, the latter seems to have 
moved away from the ‘feudal superstition’ towards a more modern and logical 
society. It seems to be more effective in persuading the population today. Despite 
the consistent presence of the political rhetoric of Mao and Xi, the language style 
characterising the confessions during the Maoist era was very aggressive and 
charged with Marxist buzzwords. Its contemporary counterparts, by contrast, are 
much more restrained. For instance, the anti-foreign discourse is explicit in the 
contemporary mediated confessions, yet none is as antagonistic and bellicose as 
that of the Cultural Revolution period. Compared with the Maoist style 
propaganda and the Post-Mao empty political slogans, the official persuasion 
adorned with ‘traditional culture’ and ‘law and order’ is subtler, and potentially 
more effective. Thus, it is quite clear that both cultural norms and legal 
regulations can be instruments to strategically and conveniently justify the Party’s 
actions in different historical periods. 
Such a style change has a crucial practical implication: as we think we 
have moved on from the political mind control from the Maoist era, thought 
restrictions can creep in from other directions. For the public who have been 
educated to be proud of their long continuous history and tradition, it is natural to 
accept anything with a label of ‘traditional culture’ or ‘virtues since ancient time’ 
without a second thought. ‘Traditional culture’ is often dubbed as the ‘root’ or the 
208 
 
‘soul’ of the nation, and as such it is particularly difficult to think critically about 
its potential manipulative role. Nonetheless, as the TV confessions show, the 
framing often distracts the audience from governmental policy failure and shifts 
the blame onto individuals. Having summarised the historical continuity of the 
traditional family values, the dehumanisation discourses and healing metaphors as 
well as the changes in the political and cultural themes and the persuasion style of 
mediated confessions, it is now possible to revisit the research question that I set 
out at the start of the thesis and to summarise the findings.  
6.3 The role of the official media 
At the start of the thesis, I laid out the research question: To what extent is 
the framing of mediated confessions from Chinese official media in Xi’s era a 
revival of that during Mao’s Cultural Revolution? I select an underexplored 
perspective to answer this question: mediated confessions. In this concluding 
chapter, I revisit the research question and the finding of the similarities and 
differences between the practices of two different eras. The continuity and the 
change summarised above are both important in that they reveal that the 
confessional practice in Xi’s era is a revival of criticism of Mao’s era in the 
following sense: in terms of the confession practice, there is an active effort from 
the CCP to reintroduce the revamped disciplinary measure of self-criticism that 
has long been in the toolkit of the CCP since its early days. Like in the Cultural 
Revolution, during Xi’s reign, people outside the Party have been subjected to 
mediated confessions. In a number of cases, even foreign nationals have 
apologised for their anti-China behaviours. In terms of the framing, the official 
media CCTV packages many confessions as a part of legal programmes, which 
are largely created to strengthen the legal awareness of the general public. 
However, for those who know the political motivation and the coercion that goes 
behind the production of mediated confessions, it is chilling intimidation. The 
same logic runs in the mediated confessions of the CCP members who have fallen 
in Xi’s anti-corruption campaign. The confessants are all eager to blame their lax 
mental self-control and failure to follow Xi’s instruction for their misconduct.  
The continuity in the practice as well as the framing mean that, although 
decades of reform has witnessed the political and social ebb and flow, the Party’s 
survival remains at the core of the Party’s interest. It is particularly pertinent in 
Xi’s era. The continuity also shows that the CCP has been proficient in utilising 
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the traditional cultural and moral value and the media for its legitimation and 
motivational purposes. Meanwhile, the change in both the confession technique 
and framing demonstrate the CCP’s adaptability to the social and technological 
changes. 
The continuities and changes in framing shape and reflect the power 
dynamic of the two periods of time. Going back to Hodge and Louie’s (1998) P-
ideology and S-ideology mentioned in Chapter 3, the framing implications 
mentioned in Chapter 4 and 5 are illustrative examples in terms of the operation of 
ideology. The binary power divide, such as the morally superior confessors and 
masses as opposed to the inferior confessants, the defendant ‘us’ as opposed to the 
evil foreign saboteurs, and the inside/outside Party framing in the anti-corruption 
campaign documentary, normalises the social and political hierarchical divide 
between the CCP and the non-CCP members. It reflects the P-ideology, which 
distinguishes ‘the non-powerful’ from the ‘powerful’ through showcasing the 
power of ‘the powerful’. Some of the examples of how this is achieved are 
through showing the CCP cadres’ acute awareness to correct their mistakes and 
teach others and the different treatment they have after breaking the discipline or 
law. Meanwhile, S-ideology maintains solidarity and underlines the 
interdependence between ‘the powerful’ and ‘the non-powerful’. This is done 
largely through the healing metaphor, which selectively and nominally calls for 
unity between those who have made mistakes and those who criticise them. 
Overall, as the analysis shows, P-ideology has a more prominent presence than the 
S-ideology during both periods of time. The imbalanced P-/S-ideology 
indoctrination can be an indication of great social unrest, which the Party is 
extremely cautious and nervous about. The CCP needs to insert and showcase 
more domination more directly. It reflects that the CCP considers, for the time 
being, direct control over the population to be more effective than stressing 
‘interdependence’ between the Party and the masses. Xi, just like Mao, demands 
more obedience and loyalty from the Chinese people. Thus, the CCP inclines 
towards coercion rather than cooperation today. 
Xi’s obsession over ‘party purity’, ‘criticism and self-criticism’, ‘the mass 
line’ and ‘the hostile Western liberalism’ is a direct tribute to Mao’s ideology. 
Brown and Bērziņa-Čerenkova rightly describe Xi’s anti-corruption campaign as 
‘a controlled “intra-Party” Cultural Revolution’ (Brown and Bērziņa-Čerenkova, 
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2018: 7). The framing of the confessions in the anti-corruption documentary also 
recasts Mao’s Yan’an period as a communist utopia. The particular historiography 
is a part of the most recent revamp of the Party history, downplaying the disaster 
such as the Cultural Revolution and re-embalming the myths of Mao and model 
communist martyrs. The Party has been trying to turn its own history from a 
burden to a source of legitimacy (Brown, 2016 ).  As the analysis shows, the 
fundamentally unchanged political structure, in spite of the back and forth reform 
experiment, means a fundamentally unchanged role of the official media in China. 
They remain by and large a nation building tool in the service of the Party’s 
interests (Zhao, 1998). The use of mediated confessions both within and outside 
the CCP facilitates the assertion of control and power over the Party members and 
everyone else living in China.  
However, there is no denying that this interpretation of the CCP’s rationale 
for using mediated confessions cannot guarantee the expected interpretation from 
the audience. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to investigate whether the 
audience is sophisticated enough to make a judgement about, or even care about, 
such news. However, it does not negate the fact that it is important to know the 
actual reception and impact that mediated confessions’ framing has. A more 
audience-oriented inquiry is needed to address the audience-reception questions 
so that there will be a more comprehensive understanding of the impact of 
mediated confessions and the legacy of the Cultural Revolution in China today. 
Besides the question of audience reception, this thesis also opens up other 
interesting questions that deserve academic attention. Firstly, it is worth noting 
that it was not only the Chinses nationals who were subject to mediated 
confessions and the physical coercion behind it, foreign nationals such as the 
British and the Swedish were also involved. In the era of Xi’s rejuvenation of 
China, not only in terms of the domestic living condition but also China’s position 
in the world, what is the possible purpose and ramification of such use of 
mediated confessions in the eyes of the Chinese and the world? Secondly, the 
thesis showcases the long-lasting influence of deep-rooted culture.  Just like in the 
west where there is a confession culture, so there is in China and possibly in a few 
more countries influenced by the Chinese culture, such as Japan and South Korea 
(Fiskesjö, 2017).  Scholars such as Tayler (2009) have traced the genealogy of the 
confession culture in the west from Augustine to Foucault. A conventional history 
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of confessions seeks evidence from the past to confirm why confessions are the 
way they are now. It aims to summarise a universal purpose of confessions: it 
assumes that ‘there is a transhistorical human need or psychological compulsion 
to confess’ (Taylor, 2009: 6). Inspired by Foucault, Tayler articulates that 
‘…genealogy uses history to cut open the present in order to create the space in 
which transformation can occur’ (2009: 6). A genealogy of confessions seeks any 
disruptive elements to refute this universal claim about the therapeutic and 
psychological need to confess. In terms of the confession culture in China, what is 
the universal assumption about confession? What transformation can the new 
understanding bring about? To shed light on these questions, I call for a similar 
study on the confession culture in China. It may also provide insight in terms of 
the popularity of self-criticism and confession with the CCP. 
This chapter so far has summarised the discoursal continuities and changes 
in the framing of mediated confessions. Overall, the continuities of traditional 
family values, dehumanisation and healing metaphors come from the same 
cultural root that has been relatively constant for at least the past century in China. 
Their existence is likely to last in spite of the recent cultural and moral shifts. The 
changes in framing here, in essence, are the style modifications which relate to the 
shifting sociopolitical background, such as the different political agendas of Mao 
and Xi and different tactics for political persuasion in Maoist and Xi’s China. 
Overall, Xi’s era witnesses the use of more subtly and sophisticatedly framed 
storytelling confessions in contrast to the rigid repetitive stories full of the same 
abstract political jargon during the Cultural Revolution. In his first five years in 
office, Xi not only revived and revamped the form of Mao’s model of criticism 
and self-criticism, but also maintained the ideological framing strategy to produce 
discourses that control the society and the people. Similar to Mao, Xi is prone to 
ideological coercion by highlighting the distinction between the powerful CCP 
and ordinary people while paying lip service to their potential interdependence. 
Unlike his past few predecessors, Xi has significantly more personal power, 
creates a direct link to Mao and revives the supposedly glorious memory of Mao 
through particular historiography. It is in this sense that Xi is the new Mao 
(ChinaFile, 2013). The last section of the thesis looks back at Xi’s first five-year 





Literally: Failing to correct the wrongdoings leads to the formation of bad habits. 
Metaphorically: Failing to correct the problems of Mao’s era leads to the appearance of Xi’s era 
(Li, 2019). 
In 2016, the above saying appeared on Weibo – a popular social media 
platform in China - during the traditional Chinese New Year. It was initially 
published by Zhang Yihe, who claimed that it was her spring festival couplets to 
celebrate the new year (Suiyuejinghao, 2016). Zhang Yihe is the daughter of 
Zhang Bojun, an intellectual who was labelled ‘China’s number one rightist’ 
during Mao’s anti-Rightist Campaign30. The above couplets are an ingenious 
succinct literary aural pun of traditional Chinese elegance and full of acute 
political awareness. She indirectly yet sharply criticises the way in which the CCP 
handles the consequence of the Cultural Revolution and Mao’s legacy. She 
suggests that hurriedly burying Mao and the memory of his time to put them out 
of sight does not address or solve the problem of that era at all. It only takes a 
person like Xi to retrigger some of Mao’s policy and agenda.  
6.4.1 Xi’s first five-year term 
The thesis sets out to study how official Chinese media facilitates the 
creation of a sense of a revival of the Cultural Revolution since Xi took office in 
2012. In particular, there is an important observation of the notable return of 
mediated confessions. Public self-criticism was very common during Mao’s 
Cultural Revolution and some made it to the official newspaper circulating 
nationwide. Since the end of the Cultural Revolution, there has been pendulum-
like political and economic reform. The development of media has thus been at 
the mercy of this tug of war development, experimenting with commercialisation 
and western liberal ideas. In Xi’s first five-year term, we are once again 
experiencing a contraction period in which social and political control over people 
is on the rise.  
To study the phenomenon of mediated confessions, I selected data from 
both eras, focusing on eight news articles from the People’s Daily during the 
 
30 He and many others who were labelled as ‘Rightists’ suffered repeated criticism and struggle 
before and during the Cultural Revolution. Some of their self-criticism was published on the 
People’s Daily according to the data that I have collected for the thesis. Zhang Bojun is seen one 
of the five biggest ‘rightists’ to this day (Vidal, 2016).  
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Cultural Revolution which contain the cadre’s and ordinary people’s criticism and 
self-criticism. Through three TV confession news clips of journalist Gao Yu, 
Swedish activist Peter Dahlin and China-born-Hong-Kong-based Swedish 
bookseller Gui Minhai and the anti-corruption campaign documentary ‘Always on 
the Road’, the contemporary analysis chapter examines the phenomenon of the 
resurgence of mediated confession both inside and outside the CCP. Transformed 
from an intra-party disciplinary technique to a mass campaign catalyst during the 
Cultural Revolution, mediated confession has evolved into a tool that consolidates 
the Party’s rule in both eras. While CDA cannot provide a quantitative analysis of 
the characteristics across the various confessions, it can provide deep insights into 
the framing of the confessants and their stories. It points out the manipulative 
purpose of the CCP official framing. 
From the perspective of media framing theory and with the assistance of 
CDA, the thesis has revealed that during the Cultural Revolution, the confession 
framing made use of the Confucian Values Discourse in relation to Mao - the 
most important figure during that time. From individual families to collective 
communities, the patriarchal hierarchical order had to be followed. Mao, as the 
combination of both the emperor of the land and the father of the nation, must be 
respected, loved and obeyed. In relation to the masses, despite the repeated appeal 
to trust and learn from the masses, the framing also unwittingly reflected the 
chaotic social conditions through the Fear of the Masses Discourse. In relation to 
the enemies, the Dehumanisation Discourse was used to justify the verbal and 
physical abuses directed at them. Meanwhile, the Healing Metaphor was used to 
defend those who were not class enemies and to show leniency, however feeble 
the effort was. Mediated confessions during the Cultural Revolution exhibited a 
strong resemblance to confession towards a deity in the traditional Chinese 
confession ritual. That is to say, the confessant apologised for all human sins 
instead of the specific misdeeds that he or she had done, which further 
consolidated Mao’s supreme position in China.  
Half a century later, the ‘Rule of Law’ Discourse and the National 
Security Discourse have become prominent in the televised confessions. In other 
words, confessants are framed as criminals who admit that they have violated 
Chinese laws, such as compromising national security. However, the Family 
Values Discourse, exemplified by filial piety, also exists alongside the crime 
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story. Such framing condemns the confessant by defining them as both a legally 
and morally degraded person. The confession cases are all politically motivated, 
and are thus framed as pure crime stories to create a strategic diversion from the 
political reasons behind their downfall. These politically motivated cases are 
camouflaged in the ordinary crime news so that the general public, who are 
unaware of real reasons for the arrest of the confessants, take the news at its face 
value. The banality of crimes news certainly does not mean it is harmless. Its 
discourse power primes the people to always take personal responsibility in the 
face of hardship and difficulties in daily life instead of questioning the role of the 
government, which can easily be overlooked and under-estimated.  
At the same time, the confessions of the fallen Party officials are compiled 
into the anti-corruption campaign documentary ‘Always on the Road’. The 
framing of their confessions invokes the Rule of the Party Discipline Discourse 
and a particular Party Historiography Discourse that romanticises the earlier 
generations of the CCP members through the connection between Mao and Xi, 
and creates a nostalgic illusion of a lost past in the face of an increasingly 
materialistic society brought about by negative influences from the west. Family 
Values Discourse can still be found in the framing, extolling the filial duty in 
tackling the challenge of a reversed family hierarchical structure brought about by 
the consequence of the One-child Policy. The traditional filial duty exhibited in 
the Party cadre family contrasts sharply with some fallen officials’ excuses for 
corruption: providing a better material environment for their children. The 
framing elevates the status of Xi among the CCP by connecting him and his early 
years in Liangjiahe to Mao and his idealised Yan’an. The framing also creates an 
inside/outside CCP divide. When the fallen officials confess, they never assume 
the identity of the criminal but remain ‘cadres’ of the CCP who are punished by 
the Party discipline instead of laws.  
It is now clear that some discourses have persisted throughout the 
confession framing of the two periods. The use of the discourses of the Traditional 
Family Values, Dehumanisation and Healing metaphors in both periods show that 
these are the cultural elements that have been relatively constant in China. These 
traditions have been deeply ingrained in the subconscious of the general Chinese 
population. They are likely to persist in the years to come. At the same time, 
changes occur when different political leaders assume power. The different 
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political and social challenges they face mean that they prioritise a different 
political agenda. As a result, the discourses that are related to the political agenda 
of the leader and the style of mediated confessions have changed. In comparison 
to Mao’s Cultural Revolution, the persuasion style of mediated confessions is 
much subtler and more sophisticated in Xi’s China. The storytelling is no longer 
full of abstract, universal human sins, repetitive political slogans or devoid of the 
real substance of today. Crime news, family stories and anti-corruption pieces are 
all relevant and compelling stories to the Chinese people today.  
However, these changes in discourses and style do not negate the fact that 
in Xi’s first five years in office, he has not only revived and revamped the iconic 
model of criticism and self-criticism of Mao’s era but has also maintained the 
ideological framing strategy to produce discourses that control the society and the 
people. In terms of the mediated confession among the CCP members, the revival 
and the standardisation of such a practice is a chilling reminder of the Cultural 
Revolution and Mao’s era in general. There may not be any public struggle 
sessions initiated by the people right now, yet the fallen officials are often paraded 
in the show trials and their treatment is often outside the legal realm. In terms of 
the mediated confessions among non-CCP members, the thesis provides a 
different understanding of the practice. Instead of viewing it as a media spectacle 
which is ‘disruptively’ popular, I argue that such mediated confessions are quite 
the opposite: as I mentioned before, they blend into the ordinary crime news and 
appear to be mundane after decades of ‘law and order’ indoctrination from the 
CCP in the Chinese media. The banality of mediated confessions, however, can be 
dangerous. It sends an intimidating message to the specific audience who know 
the staged nature of mediated confessions. For those who are unaware of the 
amount of orchestration behind the mediated confessions, they are part of the ‘law 
and order’ and ‘culture’ teaching in the media, which controls the population 
while excusing the CCP from the abuse of legal power and policy failures. 
This thesis has three main contributions. Theoretically, instead of the 
conventional journalist-centred theory, I argue for an official framing-centred 
framing theory when applying the theory in countries with a tightly controlled 
media system. In the environment in which media framing theory was originally 
developed, media is often viewed as a public sphere where individual journalists 
need to take into account various views involved in the story while reporting. The 
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relationship between the journalists and the various people involved in the 
production of the story influences the framing of the published piece. These 
people range from those who participate in the event, spokespeople for 
organisations, politicians, as well as editors within the media organisation. It is 
clear that media framing is a process of selecting, combining and balancing all the 
different voices. The media system in China today means that media framing is a 
rather different process, especially in terms of the official media. Although neither 
China nor the CCP is monolithic, it is safe to say that aggressively promoting the 
CCP’s interest has become the priority of the official media in Xi’s China. As 
mentioned in Chapter 2, the tightening of media control has been felt not only in 
the official media but it has also spread to the relatively liberal publications. 
Therefore, the CCP, as in the past but more so today, plays a decisive role in 
media framing. 
The second contribution lies in the application of CDA in a non-
Anglophone environment. The grammar, syntax and metaphors which are part of 
the analysis were predominantly developed according to the English Language. 
However, the application of CDA requires adjustment for use in non-Anglophone 
environments. It follows the rules that apply both to Mandarin and English as well 
as takes into account the linguistic feature that exists in Mandarin but not English. 
My application is certainly not the first example of CDA’s application in 
Mandarin, but it joins the overall effort to de-westernise CDA by adding diverse 
examples and experiences to human knowledge. 
The third contribution is that this thesis heeds the call to refocus on the 
CCP’s recent history in order to better understand the China of today and its 
future. Perry identifies that a current impediment in the field of the Chinese 
politics is that there ‘has been a tendency for the study of particular topics to be 
concentrated in brief time periods under hegemonic but ephemeral overarching 
approaches’ (Perry, 2017b: 1). Many China scholars are very keen on predicting 
China’s future but see little value in looking back farther than the very recent 
decades.  Much current research has moved on from the Land Reform, the GLP 
and the Cultural Revolution. There is no doubt that the CCP and the PRC now 
look very different from how they looked previously. However, are those periods 
really of little value now? Has China truly moved on from them? Does the 
discontinuity mean that the old stories cannot inform China today? Xi certainly 
217 
 
does not think so; neither should China scholars. When one examines Xi’s so-
called ‘innovative’ ideological thought, one finds that these ideas often echo the 
writings and research of and about Mao’s era. Therefore, examining the recent 
Party history can provide useful insights into the potential direction China may be 
heading. 
In 2017, Xi’s first five-year term came to an end, yet his personal power 
remained on the rise. The 19th Party Congress cemented the further rise of Xi by 
adding into the Party Constitution ‘Xi Jinping Thought for the New Era of 
Socialism with Chinese Characteristics’. It was an important symbolic gesture: the 
only other leader who had the ideology named after him was Mao (Martin, 2018). 
Meanwhile, the customary nomination of the next leader after Xi did not occur 
during the Party Congress, stirring up huge speculation inside and outside China 
about a potential third term for Xi. Regardless, the second five-year term of Xi is 
well underway; mediated confessions and other worrying signs continue. 
6.4.2 Xi’s 2nd five-year term  
In March 2018, China entered Xi’s second five-year term. 8th December 
2018 marked the 40th anniversary of the beginning of the ‘reform and opening-up’ 
policy, which ought to have been a proud proclamation to leave behind the poor 
and chaotic Maoist decades and to head towards prosperity. However, there are 
many other Maoist symbolic signs that have caught the eyes of the China 
observers. Both the content and the format of the communication invoke the 
memory of Mao and his Cultural Revolution. 
At the beginning of 2019, the loudspeaker blasting official media news has 
returned to some villages in China. The official tabloid Global Times dubbed it as 
‘nostalgic’: ‘In the 1970s and 1980s when loudspeakers spread important 
announcements or told villagers to gather for community meetings’, loudspeakers 
are back to play ‘an important role in conveying the voice of the Communist Party 
of China… and the spirit of the 19th National Congress’ to counter the negative 
influence of the internet (Chen, 2019: para6). An even more alarming example 
occurred in March 2019. Two students from Tsinghua University denounced their 
Marxist professor for teaching the ‘wrong’ ideology in a Cultural-Revolution 
manner (Park, 2019). Phrases such as ‘cow demons and snake spirits’ and 
‘poisonous weed’ blatantly appeared in their public WeChat social media 
message. These terms bear the unmistakable mark of the Cultural Revolution. The 
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incident attracted some disapproving responses on social media and prompted 
some people to regard it as a disturbing sign that the ideological control had not 
only escalated as a result of the pressure from above but also by the policing of 
the classroom from students. Meanwhile, the government is aggressively 
popularising the ‘Study the Great Nation’ App among people (Park, 2019). As 
part of the patriotic education, over 100 million users receive points by answering 
questions about Xi and his thought. In some cases, the result of the tests on the 
App is tied to the annual evaluation of professional performance31. The very 
phenomenon and the content of the app quickly invoke the memory of Mao’s 
personality cult and his Little Red Book. The above examples showcase the effort 
that the CCP is putting into mass persuasion. It updates the communication 
technique by continuing the use of effective old technology such as radio in rural 
areas and experimenting with new media in more developed areas.  As argued 
earlier, a fundamentally unchanged political system means that serving the Party 
has made a return after the liberalisation of the official media in China in the 
1980s (Jernow, 1994). Xi’s rule further reigns in the control over the media in 
whatever form it takes. Considering that Xi’s political agenda has regressed to 
tighter control over the society in general, the media has been made to facilitate 
and spread such control through certain discourses. 
Even if the three examples were considered as a few extreme cases with 
limited impact, there are more concrete things happening. Xi’s personal power 
continues to steadily grow. The way in which Xi was elected as president of the 
PRC at the NPC in 2018 was a telling story. Despite the fact that such voting is 
largely a symbolic gesture to respect the procedure, in 2013, among the nearly 
three thousand delegates, there was still one person who voted against Xi’s 
appointment alongside three voters abstaining (Zhao, 2016b). However, five years 
later, the NPC unanimously voted for Xi (Zhou, 2018).  Meanwhile, in March 
2018, the NPC ceremonially and overwhelmingly voted to lift the two-term limit 
for the presidency (Buckley and Wu, 2018). The two-term limit was implemented 
by Deng to prevent a permanent rule like Mao’s from occurring again and to 
ensure a transition of power as orderly as possible. In spite of being an unofficial 
rule, Xi’s past few predecessors respected the term limit. The abolition invokes, 
 
31 From my personal source. 
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once again, questions such as ‘Is Xi the new Chairman Mao?’ or ‘To what extent 
is the Cultural Revolution making a comeback?’ (Farrelly et al., 2019). 
As mentioned in Chapter 5, despite the CCP’s dynastic analogy, the Party 
is far from avoiding the cycle in reality. One prominent characteristic of the 
dynastic cycle governance is what Garnaut (2017) calls a pre-emptive ‘You-die; I-
win’ struggle. There is no safe way to exit the struggle. People who lost in the 
struggle, and even their families, could die or be erased from history. Thus, the 
winner of struggle invariably prefers someone either sharing a bloodline or having 
a symbiotic relationship to take over the control. The crucial issue of succession 
has been a destabilising element for the emperors and the Party alike most of the 
time. For Mao, the classic Chinese literature was a source of wisdom to govern 
the country, despite the mass campaigns against the ‘old culture’. According to 
some China watchers, the old governing philosophy such as the Dynastic 
Cosmology was the very core ideology to Mao. Xi has merely reinvigorated it to 
the highest level since the Cultural Revolution (Bishop, 2019).  
Against this background, mediated confessions, once again, become the 
platform for the demonstration of loyalty as well as intimidation. A wider 
implication is that mediated confessions are a reliable tool that the CCP tends to 
use at times of great political uncertainty. Since Xi came to power in 2013, there 
have been over 50 TV confession cases recorded up to 2018 (Safeguard 
Defenders, 2018). The confessants’ fates differed after the TV confessions; some 
of the confessants were released, some were imprisoned, some were under house 
arrest and some are still missing. As mentioned before, the whereabouts of the 
Swedish national, Gui, remains unknown since his repeated TV confessions. 
Some of the confessants go public with what has happened to them in the process 
of producing the mediated confessions. As widely speculated, the overwhelming 
majority of the confessions are orchestrated and forced. In this sense, TV 
confessions, like other forms of mediated confessions, are not at all genuine 
consent. The last criterion of Beetham’s model is whether there is an agreement 
with the status quo from the subordinate. The thesis has shown that there is a 
show of consent from the confessants, but it is not the genuine consent Beetham 
refers to. The confession is to show ordinary Chinese people that for those who 
have been left out of sharing most of the fruits of reform, the misery is caused by 
foreigners, by moral decline and by individuals, rather than the Party.  
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The resurgence of mediated confessions can be an indication of regression 
to the Maoist form of social control. This method of generating fear through 
actual disciplinary actions coupled with mediated confessions is similar to the 
practice in the Maoist era. Both Mao and Xi have relied on confessions to create 
mental pressure and to enforce their rule at a time of political uncertainty 
(Minzner, 2018). It seems that Xi has not resorted to the mass campaigns which 
characterised Mao’s own movements; he may never do. Some argue that there is 
already mass backlashes against the increasingly individualistic and capitalist 
society, such as the New Left and the more radical Neo-Maoist group (Blanchette, 
2019). Xi seems only to have borrowed Mao’s name and strategy partially to 
appear as a stronger, firmer, and more legitimate leader than he really is. 
However, watching TV is arguably a form of passive mass participation 
(Anderson, 1983; Meyrowitz, 1986). This thesis is unable to address the issue of 
the audience’s reception of TV confessions. More detailed inquiries into other 
cases of mediated confessions and an audience-oriented study are urgently needed 
to better understand the construction and effects of TV confessions, and more 
broadly, whether it could possibly be true that we are somehow back on a ship 
that needs a great helmsman in order to safely travel through the treacherous 
water. 
吾与足下 | Me and you 
同舟人也 | on the same boat 
舟若靠岸 | If the boat manages to dock 
吾亦可登 |  I will also manage to land   
林昭 | Lin Zhao32 
 
32 Lin Zhao (1932-1968): a poet, journalist, Christian and political dissident from Suzhou. She 
devoted herself to the Communist revolution fervently before the Hundred Flower Campaign, 
which made her realise Mao’s policy and movement was devasting and horrendous to China. She 
was imprisoned for what she had written in protest against the CCP and remained defiant 
throughout, writing articles which were critical of Mao and the CCP. To protest her treatment, 
she wrote by using her own blood when she was refused a pen. She was executed in 1968 and 
her family was notified of it when her mother was demanded to pay five cents for the bullets that 
were used to end Lin’s life. For more about her life story, please consult Lian Xi’s Blood Letters: 
The Untold Story of Lin Zhao, a Martyr in Mao’s China (2018). Today, it has become forbidden to 




How Mao’s legacy and mediated confessions are considered depends 
largely on one’s experience, knowledge, memory or imagination of it (Sorace et 
al., 2019). Moreover, as part of the critical tradition and as a researcher in general, 
I need to be self-critical and self-reflective. I am Chinese. I was born in the early 
1990s, grew up as an ‘obedient kid’ to my parents and ‘good student’ to my 
teachers, and was educated to university level in China. Most of my families and 
friends are in China. Having spent almost a decade living and studying in the UK, 
my worldview has changed. I would disagree with much of the thought about 
China and the world that I held when I was a teenager. Therefore, when 
researching and interpreting mediated confessions, I am not merely an observer 
(arguably nobody is), but also inevitably a participant. Who I am and who I was 
influenced the way I interpreted the mediated confessions. Here, I would like to 
highlight two aspects. Firstly, my experience has a major impact on my take on 
the Traditional Family Value Discourse and more broadly on the implication for 
Chinese scholars when researching China. Secondly, how the topic of the thesis 
gradually slipped into the more sensitive areas within China which unintentionally 
reflects the broad political regression since 2012.  
6.3.1 Blood is thicker than water 
The traditional family values and black and white attitude toward ‘us’ and 
‘the other’ stood out instantly while I went through the data. Both views 
instinctually resonate with how I once thought about the world. I am still very 
much at the mercy of the traditional filial values and am frustrated by it. While 
settling far away from my parents seems to be the life direction that I am taking, 
I’m riddled with helplessness and guilt in terms of how I can take care of my 
parents when they are old as I am the only child. This is tangled with the typical 
‘black-and-white’ attitude I used to have. My world was much simpler before: if 
you did not even take care of your own parents, you were a bad person, full stop. 
No excuses were allowed. I believed that I should only have looked inwards: what 
can I do to fix the problem?  
However, studying abroad gives me a chance to step back and look 
around, questioning if I am really the root cause of the problem and what can be 
changed from the outside. Then, a plethora of social consequences of the One-
child Policy become clear. I realised that while my experience may not be 
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universal, my dilemma and feelings are certainly not that uncommon. I am not the 
only one. It is quite common that many people of my generation are the only child 
in the individual family and live away from their parents to pursue careers. Even 
if they do live geographically close enough to be able to visit their parents 
frequently, it does not eliminate the ethical and financial issues of balancing the 
care responsibility between their parents, their own children and themselves.  
From a young age, I was taught filial piety. There is nothing wrong with 
teaching family virtue and to love and respect one’s parents. However, when it 
becomes the virtue that puts all the monetary, legal and moral (in particular) 
responsibility on children while the government is failing to deliver its duty of 
care for the old and its promise when forcefully rolling out the One-child Policy, 
the virtue becomes a sinister trap tossed out by the government and then hijacked 
and duplicated by social pressure to make the family members either fight each 
other or suffer together. The above is my experience at a personal level, but the 
implication of manipulating certain traditions at a social level can be very 
detrimental to Chinese society. It causes tension and conflict within the most basic 
social unit, the family. 
6.3.2 Political regression and the anaconda in the chandelier 
As someone who was born in the 1990s, my parents have warned me since 
I was a kid ‘not to talk about politics’. Meanwhile, as a Chinese student studying 
media and communication in the UK since 2010, I have been pursuing the study 
of the media’s role in the promotion of the Cultural Revolution since early 2014. 
With my parents’ warning in mind, I did not consider my topic as sensitive in 
2014. Nor did I expect that my topic would become too sensitive in such a short 
time. In 2014, I thought that the history of the Cultural Revolution may be an 
inconvenient topic, but at least the CCP had officially admitted mistakes were 
made. It is not a taboo that nobody dares to talk about. I learnt about the Cultural 
Revolution in school and that Mao was misled by the Gang of Four to have 
unleashed social and political chaos. People do mention the Cultural Revolution in 
daily life, often recalling it as a period of hardship. It was not a politically taboo 
topic, but it may have become one over the period of five years.  
In Link’s 2002 essay on China scholars’ self-censorship, he acknowledges 
the step forward from Mao’s era; it is now true that anything considered negative 
by the Party can generally be privately discussed without the fear of being 
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reported by neighbours. However, the threatening shadow of the consequence of 
being targeted by the CCP remains and looms overhead, like the lurking anaconda 
in the chandelier. Moreover, as mentioned throughout the thesis, the tide has 
clearly turned. History textbooks in schools have changed to the point that the 
Cultural Revolution it almost airbrushed out. ‘Cultural Revolution’, joining the 
rank of ‘Tiananmen’ and ‘Xinjiang’, has been on the list of censorship of 
academic journals that are allowed publication in China. For non-Chinese China 
scholars, visa access to China and the safety of their interlocutors are their main 
concerns when; for Chinese China scholars, taking the risk is not simply about 
personal courage. It is often the safety of family and friends that are the primal 
concerns. Approaching the end of writing up my thesis, I dared not show my 
father the draft despite his offering to proofread. I feared my parents would worry 
about me as well as themselves. Living in China, they are scared of the possibility 
that my writing may cause them trouble one day. This was the reason why I 
hesitated and still have not, as many of my PhD peers and scholars often do with 
their publications, promoted my first publication based on one chapter of this 
thesis on social media. In reality, my parents’ fear and my concern may 
(hopefully) be far-fetched, or silly to some people, as my parents are likely to 
have exaggerated the possible impact of my thesis. The truth is that I am no longer 
sure where the boundary lies. It is too vague, uncertain, and seemingly far yet 
close at the same time. My experience shows that the level of sensitivity changes, 
sometimes more rapidly than one can possibly foresee. There have been valuable 
discussions on the dilemma of non-Chinese China scholars (Link, 2002; Millward, 
2011; Greitens & Truex, 2018), yet the conversation about that of native Chinese 
China scholar is scarce by contrast. The consequence is that fewer Chinese China 
scholars will be able to afford to carry out the research that surrounds certain 
critical historical moments. Consequently, the relevant research area loses a 
crucial perspective of understanding those historical moments. 
It is the reality that I and many others who are in a similar situation have to 
face and live with. Nobody can give guarantees and the price of getting targeted 
can be detrimental both physically and psychologically. The manufactured 
uncertainty – the big ‘what if’ questions - breed insecurity and fear at the back of 
one’s mind in China.  It is a very familiar story that characterised the Cultural 
Revolution. In this sense, I agree with Link (2002) that there may not be a good 
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solution to it and we are all affected. I do not and should not count on personal 
courage to produce certain research. Nonetheless, I do hope that there can be a 
more honest discussion about and among Chinese China scholars’ research and 
dilemmas, just alike our non-Chinese China scholars have done. This may be a 
highly charged area of discussion, but only through discussions can we know that 
we are not actually alone; we can understand ourselves and let other people 
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The following are the examples from the People’s Daily and CCTV news 
programmes appearing in the chapters in both the original Chinese and in English. 
I translate the news to the best of my understanding. The excerpts are presented 
here in the same order as they appear in each chapter in the main thesis. 
News Examples in Chapter 4 
19671123 
When checking against the method of Chairman Mao’s historical materialist ideas 
and class analysis, I found that my view on the proletarian revolutionaries was the 
same as members of the gentry on peasants during the democratic revolutionary 
time. Those so-called people who did ‘not follow the instructional words’ – the 
majority of them – were the ones resisting slavery during the rule of the 
counterrevolutionary line, daring to offer advice, daring to hold on to the truth. 
They were full of revolutionary characters. In the Cultural Revolution, they hold 
high the red flag of the great thought of Chairman Mao, stand at the frontline of 
struggle, drag out the small bunch of capitalist roaders within the Party, unearth a 
large amount of evil evidence of their attempt to resurrect counterrevolution and 
drag them off the saddle. Their stance is firm and their flag bright. They fear 
nothing. But I’ve stood on the opposite side to them and become a stumbling 

















The root of my [Comrade Zhang’s] mistake is the failure to closely follow 
Chairman Mao’s words. You [the young worker] were born to a new society and 
grew up under the red flag, and you should think about why your father did not 
have enough food or warm clothes when he was forced to do physical labour for 
the landlord in the old society. Why was your father beaten almost to death when 
he was captured and sent to do hard labour by the Japanese devils? Chairman Mao 
led us to overturn the backwardness, and only until then did we start to have 
today’s life. If you do not study or work hard, how can you claim that you have 








They were ‘the most understanding and reasonable’ group of people who followed 
Mao’s guidance ‘the closest’, and ‘drew the clearest demarcation between who to 










Be honest with the masses;  
Together with the revolutionary masses, firmly expose and criticise the Chinese 
Khrushchev and his agents in Guizhou;  
Responsibility must not be pushed down in order to avoid the situation of the 





Eliminate Selfishness and Build up Devotion to the Public Interest; Following 




To become a true leading revolutionary cadre, one must first and foremost 





From now on, I will surely study laosanpian [three of Mao’s famous writings] 
hard, further fight against the character si, and establish Mao Zedong Thought as 
an absolute authority. I will devote my whole life to the revolution and achieve 












Although I have corrected the attitude toward the criticism from the masses and 









It is precisely due to this character si that led me to deviate from Chairman Mao’s 
revolutionary path and turn away from the revolutionary masses in the campaign. 
I have thoroughly realised that: character si is the soil where revisionism stems 
and grows and the deciding factor for my mistakes. If one can’t struggle against 
and overcome the character si, one can make mistakes anytime and anywhere 
when carrying out work. The ‘resentful feeling’ in one’s mind is a derivative of 
the character si, which is the ‘bacteria’ causing me to continue carrying out the 










If the revolutionary proletariats do not command the ‘absolute power’, do not 
have the invincible passion, or do not take ‘an act of violence’, it is impossible to 
carry out a big fight and killing against the Chinese Khrushchev and his agents in 
Guizhou, impossible to drag out and expose the vermin, and also impossible to 






Now he has realised that due to a lack of mental preparation for socialist 
revolution in the past, he deviated from Chairman Mao’s proletarian revolutionary 
path and was dragged by Liu Shaoqi’s counterrevolutionary revisionist path to an 
evil route of capitalist restoration. He passionately states that ‘the more the masses 
criticise me, the more I abhor the renegade, traitor, scab Liu Shaoqi and the more I 
love the great leader Chairman Mao! It was Liu Shaoqi who brought me harm and 
it was Chairman Mao who saved me! When the masses criticise me, they are 
pulling me towards the right path. I will stand on the same side as the masses, 
thoroughly criticising my own mistakes by using Mao Zedong Thought and 
criticising the counterrevolutionary crimes committed by the great renegade Liu 












I noticed that the self-criticism of a bunch of cadres in power who had taken the 
capitalist road within the province had covered up the truth regarding the issue in 
Qingdao. They deceived Chairman Mao and the Party central committee. I felt 
that I would have let Chairman Mao and the Party committee down if I hadn’t 
reported the situation to Chairman Mao and the Party Central Committee. Thus, I 







The great leader Chairman Mao teaches: ‘For those good people who made 
mistakes, (we) need to educate them. When their ideological consciousness 
awakes, (we) liberate them immediately’. Workers in the capital and the PLA 
Mao Zedong Thought Communication Team in Tsinghua University recalled and 











Long live the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution! Long live the dictatorship of 
the proletariat! Long live the invincible Mao Zedong Thought! Long, long live 
our great teacher, great leader, great commander and great helmsman Chairman 






‘We should support whatever the enemy opposes and oppose whatever the enemy 
supports’. 
凡是敌人反对的，我们就要拥护；凡是的人拥护的，我们就要反对。—— 
《和中央社、扫荡报、新民报三记者的谈话》1939 年 9 月 16 日       
"Interview with Three Correspondents from the Central News Agency, the Sao 
Tang Pao and the Hsin Min Pao" (September 16, 1939), Selected Works, Vol. II, 
pp. 272.  OR Quotations, pp15. 
 
19690906 
Old Comrade Zhang grabbed his [the slacking young man’s] hand and said: ‘You 
must follow Chairman’s orders. As long as you correct your mistakes, it will be 
fine. You need to get a copy of the document from the 9th Party’s Congress and 





Having said so and judging from his [the young worker’s] facial expression, I 
[Comrade Zhang] found that he was contemplating what I had said, thus I 
continued: ‘Think about it – why were we oppressed and forced to beg and run 
away from famine? It was precisely because we the poor had no barrel of gun or 
265 
 
control of rubber-stamps. Now Chairman Mao saved us from a sea of bitterness 
and let us take control of the rubber-stamp. However, you are making a scene - 
abandoning the barrel of a gun and being unwilling to make a revolution. This is a 








Judging from recent work, I reaffirm my understanding that one must read 
Chairman Mao’s books, that it is unacceptable for one not to read his works and 





The old society abused my whole family so much that we barely survived. It was 




Capital Worker-PLA Mao Zedong Thought Propaganda Team summarising and 
implementing the experience of the cadre policy; firmly implementing Chairman 
Mao’s proletarian policy; liberating the good people who had made mistakes but 
now realised the mistakes and were ready to change. 
首都工人、解放军驻清华大学宣传队总结落实干部政策的经验  坚决地落实




Yang, 2016: 735 
One needs to measure the application of the policy, otherwise, people jump off the 
building one after another, which is unsustainable. It doesn’t solve problems 
either. You [East China Normal University] target so many people at once, they 
are going to make complaints against you. Keep students in control. Don’t target 
too many at once. 
要掌握好党的政策，不然的话，一个个跳楼，这是不行的，不能解决问题，
你们（华东）师（范）大（学）一下子搞了这么多，人家要告你的状来了。
学生要处理好，不要打击面过广。” (杨继绳，2016, p735) 
Examples of the New Clips and the Documentary in Chapter 5 
 
I believe, what I did was (shi) something that broke the law, endangered the 
national interested. What I… I did was very wrong (de), I…I…I…I sincerely 





…in truth, Peter is an agent of the oversea anti-China force inside our country. He 
made use of livelihood-related issues such as land expropriation and demolition, 
in order to deceive the masses and lure them to act against the government to fight 
for their own interests. He intended to use civilian agents like me to gather the 
public opinion of our country and negative news about local government, and then 
pass it abroad. The material will be used by the anti-China force abroad to attack 
the human rights issue of our country and damage the good international 
reputation of our nation. This further facilitates the foreign anti-China force’s plot 










…After leaving the country, I had hoped that my mental pressure would have 
been alleviated. However, the pressure wasn’t reduced. In fact, it became worse, 
as my mounting feeling of guilt and shame grew day by day. On the one hand, I… 
ran away from my responsibility, which…further hurt the feelings of the victim’s 
family. On the other hand, I illegally left China. Not only did I escape my original 
punishment, but also break the Chinese law again… that was one more crime… 








…However, I was a criminal at large, so I couldn’t go back to China and visit 
my… my parents were in their eighties (swallowing hard twice). In 2015, my dad 
died of cancer (sobbing). I couldn’t attend the funeral (crying). After this, my 
mother fell gravely ill, so (swallowing)… I missed her day and night. I wanted to 
(crying)… see her once more while she was alive (crying)… Therefore, I must go 
back to the country and hand in myself. I will shoulder my own responsibility. 










I believe, what I did was (shi) something broke the law, endangered the national 
interested. What I… I did was very wrong (de), I…I…I…I sincerely learnt this 





A full list of the introduction of the confessing cadres featured in the 
documentary: 
 
Bai Enpei: Bai Enpei is the son of a poor peasant family. As young as 39, he 
became Yan’an Prefectural Party Committee secretary with the cultivation from 
the Party and excellent work.  
Li Chuncheng: Because I…actually… since my teenage years, I had hoped to join 
the Party and work under the leadership of the Party. 
Zhang Jianjin: Tianjin Medical Company Group is a big state-owned enterprise. 
Zhang Jianjin is very capable at work. During the decade in which he was in the 
position of main leadership, the corporation developed from being on the edge of 
bankruptcy to a giant in the industry with over 30 billion turnovers.  
Yang Weize: He became the youngest cadre at the age of 36. At 44, he became 
the youngest member of the provincial standing committee. He was in the 
important positions, such as vice-secretary of Suzhou City Party Committee and 
secretary of Wuxi City Party Committee secretary. 
Nie Chunyu: Before he took up the job in Luliang, Nie Chunyu had been doing 
research work in Shanxi Party Policy Research Office over two decades. He was 
pretty famous for his theoretical knowledge in Shanxi. 
Lü Xiwen: In Xicheng District, she used to live a modest life, diligent and well-




Tan Xiwei: Tan Xiwei’s hometown Shizhu County is in a poor mountainous area. 
He began his career as a commune clerk at the local level and became head of the 
county at 31. Local people spoke of him as hard-working, pragmatic and 
capable…. 
Deng Qilin: During the forty-year work in Wuhan Iron and Steel Corporation, 
Deng grew from a technician at the bottom to the leader of this big state-own 
company. Deng was a workaholic in the early days. His skills and professional 
dedication attracted much praise.  
 
Ep.1 
With the gradual promotion and the influence of the environment, I became 
increasingly more self-centred. Especially after 2005 when I hit sixty years old, I 
fell seriously ill. My thought work ‘dropped anchor’ so I started to pursue the 
monetary and the material. 
慢慢随着职务的提升，再加上环境的影响，考虑自己的就越来越多对了。尤




Comparing with the past, I indeed have relaxed, quite a bit, the self-discipline in 
recent years. Psychologically, I feel that I’ve been a cadre for a long time. The 
thought that the life of a cadre (should be) better than that of the ordinary people 
led me to crimes. I also feel really ashamed that having been a Party member for 









I am corrupt, but I very much hope that the central Party can increase the anti-
corruption force. Since the 18th Party Congress, the central has adopted a series of 
actions, such as seeing Party self-governance exercised with rigour, to tackle 
corruption. This is the Party’s hope. Only by doing this can our Party shoulder the 






China has always been a society of etiquette and favour. For example, if everyone 
gets together, the ties and relationship cannot be expressed without eating and 
drinking together. Why did the Central stipulate the ‘Eight-point Regulation’? 
What benefit can it bring to the working style of the whole Party? What 
importance does it carry? (I) didn’t make an effort to understand it thoroughly and 







I not only destroyed myself but also entrapped my wife and harmed son, leading 
the whole family into the abyss of financial crimes. Had they not been the wife or 
the son of a Party secretary, or had I not been provincial Party Secretary, they 








In the eyes of other people, Tan seems to be a filial son. Before being investigated 
by the Party, he sensed that the situation would be bad and that he might not be 
able to see his mother again. He went back to his hometown, kneeled down in 
front of his mother and admitted his big mistakes and letting his parents down. 






Just to deal with merely these things, we spent altogether around a dozen days. 
Like emerald bracelets…we use this - a string - to tie them (the bracelets) 







The pair of us had quite a bad influence. The two of us had dinner parties every 
day, of course, the location is secretive right? Actually, (we) had realised it, but 





The will of the people (what people’s hearts are for and against) is very important. 
Once it is lost, it is very hard to win it back; there may not even be chances to do 
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so. The CCP won the right to rule China and it must be the choice of history and 
the people. It makes good sense. However, this choice doesn’t solve all the 
problems once and for all. Today, realising the China Dream and making people’s 
lives better are our more important tasks and responsibilities. Not only getting 
economically more affluent, but the incorruptibility of our Party and government 
is, I believe, what is very important to laobaixin (ordinary people). Only by 
ensuring the Party’s fine conducts can corruption be prevented and reduced or 










The first step of my life was at our Liangjiahe. I stayed for as long as seven years, 
from 1969 to 1975. However, when I left the village, my body left but my heart 
remained here (applause). At the time I said, if opportunity allowed in the future, I 
would go into politics and do a job that brought benefits to the people (applause). 
人生啊，我的第一步迈出来，就是到咱们梁家河。来这里一下子就呆了七





Corruption is something we very much detest. It is very good that the nation is 
making a big effort to fight against corruption now. We are very happy to see the 







Regarding this thing, my opinion is that it is not right. The current policy is to 
eliminate these things, and it works very well. We are very happy after the 





For many people, the scariest thing is being named (laughing). This is because 
many of our cadres, especially our Party cadres, care a great deal about their 
‘face’ (laughing). If you are named and shamed in public, some of you feel like as 
if your face is ripped off in public and you have nowhere to hide. By using this 
method of naming, the purpose is, on the one hand, to teach the person a good 
lesson; on the other hand, and more importantly, to teach the masses and the 
cadres around them a good lesson. It is to educate more Party cadres in order to 
ensure them to be cautious.   
实很多人来说呀，他最怕的是被曝光（乐呵呵）。因为我们很多干部，特别
党员领导干部还是很要面子的（笑笑笑），你被点名道姓地公开曝光了，那
有人感觉是自己脸皮被当众扒下来了，会感到无地自容。通过这种曝光的形
式，一个方面是深刻教育本人，更多的是深刻教育周边更多的群众和更多的
干部，是教育更多的党员干部，使他们呢通过这个来引以为戒。 
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